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Abstract 
The thesis herein presented entitled "Domestic 
Violence and Human Rights: A socio-legal study (with 
special reference to Indian and USA). It deals with the 
protection of women right under various international and 
national laws. The topic assumes importance in the wake of 
globalization. A new dimension of domestic violence after 
Convention on the Elimination on Discrimination against 
women. Violence Against Women's Act 2005 USA "Domestic 
Violence Act 2005" has been added importance for the 
present research. The thesis discusses the impact of 
various oft-quoted laws specially CEDAW "Beijing 
Declaration, Domestic Violence Act 2005, VAWA 2005 USA" 
on women. For India the study is relevant in the 
background of latest development such as protection of 
women rights under criminal law, Family law, International 
law. Constitutional law. Dowry Prohibition act 1961, 
Domestic Violence Act 2005 CEDAW, Beijing declaration, 
Platform for action etc. specially domestic violence act. 
The status of women through historical period has 
been discussed. In historical period especially in Vedic 
period is characterized by the absence of the purdah 
system, equal rights in selecting life partners, polygamy 
being rare, mainly confined to the ruling class. The dov^Ty 
system was prevalent only in rich and royal families and 
only in the form of gifts. 
Muslim Woman Chand Bibi who lived during the 
latter half of the sixtieth century was decidedly the greatest 
women. She was also a great scholar of Arabic and Persian 
languages who patronized many scholars of repute. Sahibji, 
wife of Amir Khan, was a woman of remarkable military 
power. These noble and great Muslim women will continue 
to inspire humanity. That Muslim women have contributed 
to the cultural heritage of India is not exaggeration. Faith in 
the Divine should inspire us all to work in a co-operative 
spirit for the cause of peace. Emperor Shah Jahan, 
composed a work called Samudra-Sangama (the 
Confluence of Oceans). This book is intended to illustrate 
the agreements in fundamentals between Hinduism and 
Islam, throughout the history of India; respect for other 
faiths has been a persistent tendency. 
The evil of dowry had become deep rooted, especially 
in Rajasthan. Polygamy and the system of Devadasi had 
already spread. The medieval period saw women being 
oppressed in the feudal social order and patriarchal 
families. 
Thus, in short, during the British rule, awareness 
was created while education and organizing political 
participation increased women's mobility. The laws also 
were on their side as several legal enactments rectifying 
women's unequal position were passed. 
The first world conference on women was held in Mexico 
City in 1975, which highlighted the themes of "equality, 
development". The second world conference on women 
convened in Copenhagen in 1980, added three sub themes: 
"education, employment and health". In Nairobi, the third 
world conference was held to review and appraise the 
achievements of the United-Nations decade for women; 
equality, development and peace (1976-1985). The goal was 
set here for the adoption of "Forward looking strategies for 
the advancement of women to the year 2000". In its thirty 
third sessions, which was held at Vienna, the commission 
stressed that a drastic effort must be made to revive a 
flagging campaign for women's advancement because there 
was sufficient evidence to indicate that advances towards 
women's economic and political rights were slow or had 
actually stopped. 
In its thirty seventh sessions, the commission urged 
the fourth world conference on women to consider women's 
rights and concerns. This conference was held in the 
capital city of China, Beijing in September 1995. The 
Beijing Conference, in a series of UN- sponsored global 
conferences on women laid the foundation in the field of 
Human Rights of women, who constitute nearly half of the 
world population. 
The platform for action, a 362 paragraph document 
was the blueprint for women's advancement in countries 
around the world. It was the main document of the 
conference. A draft document was approved at the Thirty 
ninth session of the UN Commission on the status of 
women for presentation in Beijing. 
The Beijing conference further expanded the agenda 
for women's empowerment. Issues once considered taboo 
ideas earlier viewed as too sensitive and actions ruled out 
as unacceptable were confronted head-on. The exercise led 
to the adoption of a platform for action, unanimously, by 
about 40 countries. The platform for action provides 
normative guidance for governments who bear the primar\' 
responsibility for implementing its strategic objectives. 
The next important document on gender is the Vienna 
Declaration adopted by the World Conference on Hun or 
Rights in June 1993. The Vienna Declaration enjoins full 
and equal by women of all human rights. It prescribes this 
be a format for governments and for the United Nations. In 
participate Conference on Human Rights has stressed the 
importance of working towards elimination of violation 
against woman in public and private life. 
The platform for action', a 362 paragraph document 
was the blueprint for women's advancement in countries 
around the world. It was the main document of the 
conference. A draft document was approved at the thirn-
ninth session of the UN Commission on the status of 
women for presentation in Beijing. 
The Beijing conference further expanded the agenda 
for women's empowerment. Issues once considered taboo, 
ideas earlier viewed as too sensitive and actions ruled out 
as unacceptable were confronted head-on. The exercise led 
to the adoption of a platform for action, unanimously, by 
about 40 countries. The platform for action provides 
normative guidance for governments who bear the priman>' 
responsibility for implementing its strategic objectives. 
Violence against women is a global problem. 
Historically men have dominated women and discriminated 
against them. Women's lack of access o legal information, 
aid or protection, the lack of knowledge of law and 
inadequate efforts by public authorities to enforce existing 
laws in some cases increases violence against them. 
Although international human rights order has 
transformed itself conceptually in response to repeated 
challenges from women's rights movement, the conclusive 
test of its effectiveness lies in its enforceability in the 
municipal arena. The jurisprudence on municipal 
enforcement of international human rights law has evolved. 
Rather than making enforcement conditional strictly upon 
legislative enactment, there is a growing tendency to read 
international human rights law into the constitutional law. 
The constitution of independent India comes to be 
adopted by the Constituent Assembly on November 26, 
1949. Being a contemporaneous document, the basic 
objectives underlying the Declaration of Human Rights 
found eloquent expression in it.,The fundamental rights in 
Part III and the directive principles of state polic}' in Part IV 
taken together, by and large, incorporates the Human 
Rights declared by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations. The right to equality covered by articles 1, 2, 4, 6 
and 7 of the Declaration corresponds to articles 14, 15, 15, 
17, 18 and 23 of the Indian constitution. The right to life 
and liberty mentioned in articles 3, 5, 9 and 10 of the 
Declaration are covered by articles 21 and 22 of the 
constitution. The right to privacy mentioned in article 12 of 
the Declaration and article 17 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and implicit in the right 
to life conferred by article 21 of the constitution as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court of India. 
The preamble to the constitution of India resolved to 
secure to all its citizens justice- social, economic and 
political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and 
worship, equality of status and opportunity; and to promote 
among them fraternity assuring the dignity of an individual 
and the unity of the nation. To attain these objectives, the 
constitution guarantees certain fundamental rights and 
freedom, such as freedom of speech and expression, 
protection of life and personal liberty. Indian women are 
beneficiaries of these rights in the same manner as men. 
Articles 14,15 and 16 ensure equality and prohibit 
discrimination on the basis, inter alia, of sex. In 15(3), 21 , 
42 gives protection to women rights. 
Article 15, which permits special provision for women 
and children, has been widely resorted to and the courts 
have upheld the validity of special measures in legislation 
or executive orders favoring women. In particular, 
provisions in the criminal law, in favor of women, or in the 
procedureJ law discriminating in favor of women have been 
upheld. 
Article 21 spells that "no person shall be deprived of 
his life or personal liberty except according to procedure 
established by law". This Article if read literally is a 
colorless, it is established by the State that there is a law 
which provides o procedure which has been followed by the 
impugned action. But the expression "procedure 
established by law" in Article has been judicially construed 
as procedure which is reasonable, fair and just. 
The right to life and right to the personal liberty, in 
India, have been guaranteed by a constitutional provision, 
which has received the widest possible interpretation. 
Article 21 of the constitution, so various rights have found 
shelter, growth and nourishment. Citizen would like to be 
aware of the have evolved from precedents of courts. 
Article 21, which lays down that "no person shall be 
deprived of life or personal liberty, expect according to 
procedure established by law". This right is a fundamental 
right, enforceable against the state, and judicial decisions 
have imposed, on the State, several positive obligations. 
The question arises while going through the 
constitutional provisions that why a constitutional 
provision arises on various subjects. Is the ordinary law not 
enough? To the answer it is true that Indian Penal Code 
contains adequate provisions to punish a person who takes 
away or attempts to take the life of another. But the impact 
of constitutional provision lies in this respect; that inspired 
by political motives. Hence it can be said that the 
enumerative rights can derive from Article 21 . 
In our criminal law, there are few provisions available, 
which can be used to address the issue of domestic 
violence. The introduction of section 498-A in the IPC in 
1983 was significant in bringing domestic violence out of 
the closet, but this section with its specificit}' to dowry 
ignores the other factors of violence. Other offences of 
assault, hurt, grievous-hurt, dowry death, murder, rape, 
etc. are also often used against the perpetrators of violence. 
These criminal offences, however are not enough to deal 
with the complexities of domestic violence because the 
violence inflicted is not by a stranger but by an intimate 
partner of family member of the victim, more importantly, a 
criminal remedy will only serve to punish the abuser and is 
not sufficient to address to the needs of the victim of 
violence who has to stay within that family. 
As such under the civil law there is no remedy for 
domestic violence. A closer look at the available remedies 
reveals that the various personal laws provide remedies 
only on divorce or separation. The only other civil remedy 
concerns providing maintenance to the woman seeking 
divorce. All these are representative of an irretrievable 
breakdown of family ties. In cases of domestic violence the 
women might not opt for divorce and may wish to continue 
with their marital relationship, in such circumstances the 
civil law is silent. 
Domestic violence act provides that any conduct of a 
relative of the victim which subjects her to habitual assault 
(f • • 5 . , 
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or makes her life miserable, or injures or harms her or 
forces her to lead an "immoral life" would constitute 
domestic violence. Thus domestic violence includes 
physical, mental, economic and sexual violence. 
Sexual/economic in the sense that the bill covers both 
these aspects and provides protection to a woman whose 
husband or his relatives may be forcing her into 
prostitution. 
Both remedies then must be available to the woman 
who may choose to lodge a criminal complaint or file and 
application for a protection order under the bill or she may 
decide to do both depending on her needs and the gravity of 
the situation. Such protection for victims of domestic 
violence, which is easy to obtain is of great importance. 
Thus the main features of the bill are. 
1. It defines domestic violence. 
2. Shared household- this term is used instead of the 
traditional concept of "the matrimonial home" 
because the bill covers a group of persons beyond 
marital relationships. This also addresses the 
problem of violence even in cases where a marriage 
has not been registered where there is absence of 
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proof of valid marriage or where the woman is under 
the belief that valid marriage exists. 
3. Various orders can be passed like the protection 
order, residence order, order pertaining to monetarv' 
relief and temporary custody of children. Violation of 
a protection order is an offence, which is cognizable 
and non-bailable. 
4. Immediate relief-protection orders may be granted 
within 72 hours by protection officers and may 
operate for a period of two years upon confirmation. 
5. Rights awareness-mandatory obligation under law to 
make information of legal rights available to women. 
6. Mandatory counseling-for the accused and 
complainant, either singly or jointly according to the 
magistrate's decision. 
7. Appointment of protection officers. 
Then role of police have been discussed on the basis 
of field study. The researcher mentioned the cases; data of 
N.C.R.B have been discussed. How for these cases are 
tackled by the executive and judiciary has been discussed 
through case law. 
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During the recent past, Indian Courts have been 
overwhelmingly burdened with innumerable cases relating 
to conjugal violence including the extreme cases of dowr}^ 
deaths or bride burnings. Therefore, keeping in view the 
alarming increase in the hands of her husband or the in-
laws, in her matrimonial home, the Indian Courts have 
played positive roles in tackling the incidences of violence 
in the marital homes. The courts have adopted very 
stringent posture towards such cases, by pronouncing 
tough and firm Judgments against the perpetrators of such 
heinous crimes. 
VAWA 2005 USA has been discussed then 
comparison with Domestic Violence Act 2005 of India with 
Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 has been discussed. 
In June 2005, Congress introduced the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA) of 2005, bipartisan legislation 
to reauthorize the VAWA legislation originally passed in 
1994. Since VAWA first became law in 1994, more than 
660 state laws protecting victims of domestic violence and 
sexual assault have been passed, and VAWA 2005 has an 
even more comprehensive approach to the problem of 
violence. The legislation is called a re-authorization because 
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it provides new authority for an existing law. The House 
passed VAWA with an overwhelming vote for approval on 
September 8, followed by unanimous Senate approval on 
October 4. President Bush signed the bill into law on 
January 5, 2006, continuing it for five more years. VAWA 
could provide nearly $3.9 billion of funding over the next 
five years to combat and prevent violence against women. 
However, it is up to the Congress to pass the needed 
funding every year. 
So if we compare these two acts our submission are 
as follows: 
Our submission is that though the Domestic Act 2005 
made lots of provisions to define and execute the law for the 
protection against domestic violence but VAWA 2005 has 
certain provisions, which help women to fight against 
victims. 
Firstly, VAWA could provide nearly $3.9 billion dollars 
of funding over the next five years to combat and prevent 
violence against women. 
Secondly, focusing legal and financial aid on housing 
issues for victims of violence. Additionally, the law expands 
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grants for transitional, housing, and protects victims from 
being unfairly evicted or denied housing because they were 
or are victims of domestic violence or sexual assault. 
Thirdly, providing grants to help encourage state and 
local cooperation of advocates, public health departments, 
and health care providers to create a more efficient 
healthcare response to domestic violence and sexual 
assault. 
So we should make such provisions in future and that 
is possible only by creating legal awareness and cooperation 
among the three organs of the state. NGO's should also 
come forward to help women who are victims and are not 
aware of provision of the act. Government must provide 
financial aid for the rehabilitation of the victims because of 
the aim of the act is to provide assistance to those women 
who are victims and are not financially capable to fight for 
their rights. 
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Objective of problem 
The present work is undertaken to go into the depth 
of a problem of domestic violence. The present work 
concentrates on the status of women from historical period 
and problem of domestic violence, causes and remedies of 
domestic problem. 
Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of the present field study is 
1. Whether present laws are satisfactory or need 
to be revised? 
2. Whether judicial decision or direction can be 
the substitute of problem? 
3. Whether legislative reform be effective if the 
will to implement the law is lacking? 
4. Whether women are legally aware to protect 
the rights? 
The judicial decisions or directions of can not be the 
substitute of the problem. But, there should be strict 
enforcement of law and legal awareness must be created 
among people. 
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The data collected has been analyzed with the help of 
computer. In the end the aforesaid hypothesis has been 
tested and findings are recorded. 
Research Methodology 
The present study is confined to explore the scope of 
the judiciary processes in the prevention of crime. The role 
of police is critically evaluated. 
The present work is based on both doctrinal and non-
doctrinal method, which is descriptive, analytical and case 
study. Along with a doctrinaire method non -doctrinaire 
method has also been used for the field survey to 
corroborate the findings of the present research work. 
Empirical research deeds with case laws, field study 
close ended questionnaires have been distributed to the 
various sections of the people and their opinion relating to 
domestic violence have been evaluated. The city of Meerut, 
Bulandshahr, Baghpat, Noida, which are closely situated 
near Aligarh has been selected for the field's study of the 
problem. Date of crime against women has been also 
mentioned. Data of National Crime Record Bureau has 
been given, which is important for the purpose of 
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comparative study. Various books on Domestic Violence, 
Journals on Domestic Violence statutes, website to have 
the latest materials and data on domestic violence were 
consulted. 
Review of Literature 
Various articles in The Hindustan Times, The Times 
of India, The Pioneer, India Today, Journals of ILI, New 
Delhi, National Association of Women Lawyer, USA, 
Journal of OHCHR, ISIL and books of eminent authors 
including book of Justice Anand on "Human Rights", 
Mamta Rao, "Women and Children" Domestic Violence 
rules and regulation by P.K. Das, "Women and Protective 
Laws" by Shobha Saxena and various Text Books of leading 
authors of India and abroad on the subject to relating 
Women's Rights. Various statutes, conventions, reports 
relating to women's rights like Domestic Violence Act 2005, 
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, CEDAW, Beijing Convention, 
Plat Form for Action, Special Rapporteure in Domestic 
Violence against women 2004, various websites and many 
other books mentioned in the bibliography have been 
consulted. The primary and secondary sources, has been 
duly acknowledge in the respective chapters. Bibliography 
shows the range of the subject and works of scholar as well 
as the judgment of the court reveal the various dimensions 
of the problem. 
Chapter-I It is customary which deals with the general 
introduction, justification of undertaking of the present 
research and also covered the plan of study chapterisation, 
hypothesis, object of study and research methodolog}- to be 
adopted. 
Chapter-II It contains the historical background. It starts 
with the status of women, their position during Vedic 
period. Post-Vedic period, the position of women in Hindu, 
Muslim and Christian communities. How they had enjoyed 
their various rights and how they were treated by men and 
what were their status in their respective Laws and has 
pointed out the difference between the religious norms and 
social values in contemporary societ}'. 
Chapter-Ill in this chapter the right of women under 
various laws have been discussed starting from UN 
Charters, various Convention Vienna Accord 1994 Beijing 
Declarations and the platform for Act, on 1995. The United 
committee on convention on elimination of All Forms of 
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Discrimination against in its general recommendat ion h a s 
been discussed in details. 
In consti tutional law, preamble of the constitution, 
the relevant provisions of the constitution of India h a s been 
discussed especially Preamble Art. 14, 15, 16, 21 and 39 
are envisaged to the life of the poor thoroughly discussed 
through case law. Various provisions of Criminal law like 
498-A, 304-B h a s been discussed. Then relating to the 
women in personal law have been discussed then DowTy 
Prohibition and related cases were discussed and then 
provisions of the Domestic Violence Act h a s been 
discussed. 
Chapter-IV deals with the role of police, how far they are 
able to tackle the problem; what are the obstacles, which 
prevent t hem to perform their duties and wha t are the 
negative points, which they ought to improve to prevent 
such a he inous crime of domestic violence. 
Chapter-V deals with the role of judiciary in violating rights 
of women with the help of latest cases. Laws relating to the 
protection of women rights. 
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Chapter-VI deals with the domestic violence Act 2005, 
American Domestic Violence Act 2005 (VAWA 2005) and 
Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 in details and comparative 
study with the US law. 
Chapter-VII deals with conclusions and suggestions i.e. 
various recommendations to combat the social evil of 
domestic violence. 
Conclusion 
The 19th and 20th century shows efforts and 
attempts of the social reformer for the betterment of 
woman. In this present social system woman are facing 
various miseries, exploitation and oppression. Women are 
exploited in their family and in married life by their 
husbands and relatives. 
The existence of this social malaise has been 
acknowledged in the Vienna Accord of 1994 and the Beijing 
Platform, 1995. The intervention of the state of protect 
women against violence of any kind, especially that which 
occurs within the family, has been strongly recommended 
by the UN Committee on Convention on Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)." In the 
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word of Justice Anand "We are still unable to boast of a 
society where there is total gender equality or gender 
equity. Until recently, the question of gender equality or 
gender equity was merely a topic of theoretical discussion. 
Things are changing but rather slowly. Movement from the 
First U.N. World Conference on Women held in Mexico in 
1975 to the Fourth World conference on Women held at 
Beijing in 1985, has been a journey in search of equality-, 
development and grant so encouraging but the tide must 
continue. 
But the question is whether the women have been 
able to reap the benefits provided for them under the 
Constitution of India? The answer unfortunately is not 
encouraging. There is still a long way to go to achieve the 
goals enshrined in the Constitution". 
Apart from the amendments, the NCW has proposed 
the initiation of new bills/laws for the better protection of 
the rights of women. In the field of criminal law, a new Bill, 
the Criminal Laws (Amendment) Bill, has been 
recommended, seeking significant strengthening for 
penalties under the Indian Penal Code in cases of outraging 
modesty of minors and in cases of child rape and incest 
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provisions of safeguards to be built into the Cr PC and the 
Indian Evidence Act in the context of rape cases was also 
proposed. It also recommended provisions for examination 
of rape victims by women officers, investigation by women 
police officers, trials by women magistrates, provisions for 
presumptions regarding the commission of the final sexual 
act." 
In 1961 Dowry Prohibition Act was passed. Despite 
the Act and its subsequent amendments in 1983 and 1986 
brides are still harassed, tortured and even burned to 
extract more dowry. According to the records of Crimes 
(Women) Cell, from 1983 to 1991, 43 cases of bride 
burning, instituted by the Cell, were tried by the courts; 
there were just 3 convictions, rest of the cases ended up in 
acquittals in the Sessions Court itself. 
Thus the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 seeks to 
address emergency situations and stop violence. It is 
designed to help the woman during the most intense phase 
of abuse. It will not only provide a support mechanism but 
will also be a tool for women to negotiate for their rights 
from a position of equaility. 
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On the objectives of the legislation, Human 
Resource Development Minister Murli Manohar Joshi said 
that. "Domestic violence is undoubtedly a human rights 
issue and serious deterrent to development. The 
phenomenon is w i^dely prevalent but has remained largely 
invisible in public domain. While cruel behavior against a 
woman by her husband or his relatives is recognized as an 
offence under Section 498-A of the India Penal Code, 1860, 
the civil laws does not address this phenomenon in its 
entirely. 
Efforts should be made to decentralize justice and 
take it to the doorsteps of the litigants. 
The concept of mobile courts should be 
reintroduced to achieve this aim. Mobile courts will help in 
getting justice faster. It will also help in tackling the issue 
at the grassroot level before they become complicated and 
loaded with falsehood. 
After going through the act of US and India it is 
cleared that the social economic condition both of the 
countries are different so violence against women varies 
from circumstances of each countries. In USA female Eire 
much more effective then in India. Indian women are much 
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more dependent on their husbamd, they are not financially 
independent if some of them are literate they are not bold 
enough to come out within the four walls and fight for their 
rights and approach to the court for the protection for their 
right there are also legal complications and they shall not 
get justice within time and after taking legal action they can 
not lead a normal life due all these reasons Indian women 
suffer violence silently within home, Whereas American 
Women are financially independent they have various 
facilities and they are quite aware of their rights. 
25 
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INTRODUCTION 
S t a t e m e n t of problem 
The present study is undertaken to go into the 
depth of a problem of domestic violence. As we are 
well aware that domestic violence becomes a global 
problem. In my thesis the s tatus of women through 
historical period has been discussed. In historical 
period especially in Vedic period, which is 
characterized by the absence of the purdah system, 
equal rights in selecting life par tners , polygamy 
being rare, mainly confined to the ruling class. The 
dowry system was prevalent only in rich and royal 
families and only in the form of gifts. There was no 
discrimination between a boy and a girl. Girls were 
allowed to undergo Upanayana or thread ceremony. 
Despite the overall social and cultural 
subordination of women, it is surprising to find 
that law givers recognized the right to property, 
particularly that which was known as Streedhan, 
women's property. Manu defined Streedhan as 'that 
which was given to her before the nuptial fire, in 
bridal procession, in token of love and which she 
has received from brother, mother, father or 
husband". 
India has produced great heroic Muslim 
woman. Chand Bibi who lived during the latter half 
of the sixtieth century was decidedly the greatest . 
She was also a great scholar of Arabic and Persian 
languages who patronized many scholars of repute. 
Sahibji, wife of Amir Khan, was a woman of 
remarkable military power. These noble and great 
Muslim women will continue to inspire humanity. 
That Muslim women have contributed to the 
cultural heritage of India is not exaggeration. Faith 
in the Divine should inspire us all to work in a co-
operative spirit for the cause of peace. Emperor 
Shah J ahan , composed a work called Samudra-
Sangama the Confluence of Oceans). This book is 
intended to illustrate the agreements in 
fundamentals between Hinduism and Islam 
throughout the history of India. Respect for other 
faiths has been a persistent tendency. 
The evil of dowry had become deep rooted, 
especially in Rajasthan, Polygamy and the system 
of Devadasi had already spread. The medieval 
period saw women being oppressed in the feudal 
social order and patriarchal families. 
Thus, in short, during the British rule, 
awareness was created while education and 
organizing political participation increased women's 
mobility. The laws also were on their side as 
several legal enactments rectifying women's 
unequal position were passed. 
Violence against women is a global problem. 
Historically men have dominated women and 
discriminated against them. Women's lack of access 
o legal information, aid or protection, the lack of 
knowledge of law and inadequate efforts by public 
authorit ies to enforce existing laws in some cases 
increases violence against them. 
The first world conference on women was held 
in Mexico City in 1975, which highlighted the 
themes of "equality, development". The second 
world conference on women convened in 
Copenhagen in 1980, added three sub themes: 
"education, employment and health". In Nairobi, 
the third world conference was held to review and 
appraise the achievements of the United-Nations 
decade for women; equality, development and peace 
(1976-1985). The goal was set here for the adoption 
of "Forward looking strategies for the advancement 
of women to the year 2000". In its thirty third 
sessions which was held at Vienna, the commission 
stressed that a drastic effort must be made to 
revive a flagging campaign for women's 
advancement because there was sufficient evidence 
to indicate that advances towards women's 
economic and political rights were slow or had 
actually stopped. 
In its thirty seventh sessions, the commission 
urged the fourth world conference on women to 
consider women's rights and concerns. This 
conference was held in the capital city of China, 
Beijing in September 1995. The Beijing conference, 
in a series of UN- sponsored global conferences on 
women laid the foundation in the field of human 
rights of women, who constitute nearly half of the 
world population. 
The platform for action, a 362 paragraph 
document was the blueprint for women's 
advancement in countries around the world. It was 
the main document of the conference. A draft 
document was approved at the thirty ninth session 
of the UN Commission on the s ta tus of women for 
presentat ion in Beijing. 
The Beijing conference further expanded the 
agenda for women's empowerment. Issues once 
considered taboo ideas earlier viewed as too 
sensitive and actions ruled out as unacceptable 
were confronted head-on. The exercise led to the 
adoption of a platform for action, unanimously, by 
about 40 countries. The platform for action 
provides normative guidance for governments who 
bear the primary responsibility for implementing its 
strategic objectives. 
The next important document on gender is the 
Vienna Declaration adopted by the World 
Conrcrcncc on human rights in June 1993. The 
Vienna Declaration enjoins full and equal by 
women of all human rights. It prescribes this be a 
format for governments and for the United Nations. 
In participate Conference on Human Rights has 
stressed the importance of working towards 
elimination of violation against origin in public and 
private life, elimination of all forms of sexual 
harassment , exploitation and trafficking in women, 
elimination of gender bias in the administration of 
just ice. The Beijing Declaration once against 
focused world attention on the prevailing 
discrimination against women in the world polity 
and formulated steps for its removal. Action to be 
taken by government, employers, NGOs and others 
are: 
(a) Condemn violence against women and not use 
any custom, tradition or religious 
consideration to avoid their obligations to its 
elimination; 
(b) Adopt m e a s u r e s to modify the social and 
cu l tu ra l p a t t e r n s of men and women; 
(c) Provide well funded she l t e r s and relief suppo r t 
for vict ims of violence; 
(d) Assist female victims of violence due to 
p ros t i t u t ion and trafficking, cons ider 
rat i f icat ion and enforcement on trafficking 
and slavery; 
(e) Develop p r o g r a m m e s and p r o c e d u r e s to 
e l imina te sexual h a r a s s m e n t and o the r forms 
of violence in all educa t iona l i n s t i t u t i ons , 
workplaces and e lsewhere ; 
(f) Promote r e s e a r c h on violence aga in s t women, 
encourage the media to examine the gender 
s t e reo types and take m e a s u r e s to e l imina te 
t h e m . 
The cons t i tu t ion of i n d e p e n d e n t India comes 
to be adop ted by the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly on 
November 26 , 1949. Being a c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s 
documen t , the bas ic objectives unde r ly ing the 
Declaration of Human Rights found eloquent 
expression in it. The fundamental rights in part III 
and the directive principles of state policy in part 
IV taken together, by and large, incorporate the 
human rights declared by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations. The right to equality covered by 
articles 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 of the Declaration 
corresponds to articles 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 23 of 
the Indian constitution. The right to life and liberty 
mentioned in articles 3, 5, 9 and 10 of the 
Declaration are covered by articles 21 and 22 of the 
constitution. The right to privacy mentioned in 
article 12 of the Declaration and article 17 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966 and implicit in the right to life conferred by 
article 21 of the constitution as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court of India. 
The preamble to the constitution of India 
resolved to secure to all its citizens just ice- social, 
economic and political; liberty of thought, 
expression, belief, faith and worship, equality of 
s ta tus and opportunity; and to promote among 
them fraternity assuring the dignity of an 
individual and the unity of the nation. To attain 
these objectives, the constitution guarantees 
certain fundamental rights and freedom, such as 
freedom of speech and expression, protection of life 
and personal liberty. Indian women are 
beneficiaries of these rights in the same manner as 
men. Articles 14,15 and 15 ensure equality and 
prohibit discrimination on the basis, inter alia, of 
sex. In 15(3), 21 , 39, 42 gives protection to women 
rights. 
In our criminal law, there are few provisions 
available, which can be used to address the issue 
of domestic violence. The introduction of section 
498-A in the IPC in 1983 was significant in 
bringing domestic violence out of the closet, but 
this section with its specificity to dowry ignores the 
other factors of violence. Other offences of assault , 
hurt , grievous hurt ; dowry death, murder, rape, 
etc. are also often used against the perpetrators of 
violence. These criminal offences, however are not 
enough to deal with the complexities of domestic 
violence because the violence inflicted is not by a 
stranger but by an intimate par tner of family 
member of the victim, more importantly, a criminal 
remedy will only serve to punish the abuser and is 
not sufficient to address to the needs of the victim 
of violence who has to stay within that family. 
The object of adding the chapter XXA in Indian 
Penal Code is to protect the wife where she is 
subject to cruelty but not to disrupt the family life 
where the husband and wife in spite of some 
previous misunderstanding intent to stay together, 
it should be the duty of Court to encourage such 
rapprochement and allow them to live as husband 
and wife rather than to disrupt the family 
prosperity by forcing the wife to pursue a criminal 
proceeding2. 
In Shoba Rani^ the Supreme Court held that 
dowry demand amounted to cruelty, Delhi High 
Court in inter Raj Malik^ held that person could be 
convicted both under section 4 of the Dowry 
Prohibition Act, 1961 and provisions under section 
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498-A of Indian Penal Code, only because it does 
not create any situation for double jeopardy. 
The provision of section 498-A was enacted to 
meet the social challenge to save married women 
from being ill-treated by husband or his relatives. 
In Kundula Bala, Subrahmanayam v. State of 
Andhra Pradesh,^ the Supreme Court showed its 
very concern about the women harassment and 
torture. It held that, there had been an alarming 
increase in cases relating to harassment , torture, 
abetted suicides and dowry deaths of young 
innocent brides. This growing cult of violence and 
exploitation of the young brides, though keep on 
sending shock waves to the civilized societies 
whenever it happens, continues unabated . There is 
a constant erosion of the basic human values of the 
tolerance and the spirit of "lives and let live". Lack 
of education and economic dependence of women 
have encouraged greedy perpetrators of the crime. 
It is more disturbing and sad that, in most of such 
reported cases it is the woman who plays a pivotal 
role in this crime against the younger woman, as in 
11 
this case, with the husband either acting as a mute 
spectator or even at active participant in the crime, 
in ut ter disregard of his matrimonial obligations. 
The problem of violation of human rights 
cannot be solved if the ground situation is such 
that some of the laws and procedures remain only 
on paper. There is not much justification for 
passing laws that are impossible to enforce. The 
police and the criminal just ice system as a whole 
loose their credibility, if they cannot protect life 
and property. 
It is an integral part of the criminal justice 
system and, therefore, its performance and 
effectiveness will very much depend on the 
performance of other components of the system. 
Reforms do not necessarily mean that the police be 
given more powers, but it does mean that we take a 
fresh look at the functioning of the criminal just ice 
system and amend some of the laws and procedures 
to enable the police to perform its legitimate role 
more effectively. The trend of growing adversarial 
relationship between the police and other 
12 
components of the criminal justice system must be 
reversed at the earliest if the rule of law is to be 
established in the country. 
As such under the civil law there is no remedy 
for domestic violence. A closer look at the available 
remedies reveals that the various personal laws 
provide remedies only divorce or separation. The 
only other civil remedy concerns providing 
maintenance to the woman seeking divorce. All 
these are representative of an irretrievable 
breakdown of family ties. In cases of domestic 
violence the women might not opt for divorce and 
may wish to continue with their marital 
relationship, in such circumstances the civil law is 
silent. 
Domestic Violence Act 2005, provides that any 
conduct of a relative of the victim which subjects 
her to habitual assaul t or makes her life miserable, 
or injures or harms her or forces her to lead an 
"immoral life" would constitute domestic violence. 
Thus domestic violence includes physical, mental, 
economic and sexual violence. Sexual/economic in 
13 
the sense that the bill covers both these aspects 
and provides protection to a woman whose husband 
or his relatives may be forcing her into 
prostitution. 
Both remedies available under the Domestic 
Violence Act must be available to the woman who 
may choose to lodge a criminal complaint or file 
and application for a protection order under the bill 
or she may decide to do both depending on her 
needs and the gravity of the situation. Such 
protection for victims of domestic violence, which is 
easy to obtain is of great importance. Thus the 
main features of the Act are: 
1. It defines domestic violence. 
2. Shared household this term is used instead of 
the traditional concept of "the matrimonial 
home" because the bill covers a group of 
persons beyond marital relat ionships. This 
also addresses the problem of violence even in 
cases where a marriage has not been 
registered where there is absence of proof of 
14 
valid marriage or where the woman is under 
the belief that valid marriage exists. 
3. Various orders can be passed like the 
protection order, residence order, order 
pertaining to monetary relief and temporary 
custody of children, violation of a protection 
order is an offence which is cognizable and 
non-bailable. 
4. Immediate relief-protection orders may be 
granted within 72 hours by protection officers 
and may operate for a period of two years 
upon confirmation. 
5. Rights awareness-mandatory obligation under 
law to make information of legal rights 
available to women. 
6. Mandatory counseling for the accused and 
complainant, either singly or jointly according 
to the magistrate 's decision. 
7. Appointment of protection officers. 
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The researcher has done field study and 
thrown light on the Role of police. I have mentioned 
the cases data of N.C.R.B how far these cases are 
tackled by the executive and judiciary been 
discussed. 
During the recent past, Indian Courts have 
been overwhelmingly burdened with innumerable 
cases relating to conjugal violence including the 
extreme cases of dowry deaths or bride burnings. 
Therefore, keeping in view the alarming increase in 
the hands of her husband or the in-laws, in her 
matrimonial home, the Indian Courts have played 
positive roles in tackling the incidences of violence 
in the marital homes. The courts have adopted very 
stringent posture towards such cases, by 
pronouncing tough and firm Judgments against the 
perpetrators of such heinous crimes. 
Further discussed the VAWA 2005 USA & then 
compare it with Domestic Violence Act 2005 of 
India, Dowry Prohibition Act. 1961. 
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Objective of the study 
The purpose of the study is to focus on 
International law, social legislations relating to 
women rights e.g. Dowry prohibition act 1961, 
Domestic violence act 2005, IPC, family law. 
Constitutional law etc. and CEDAW, Beijing 
Declaration, VAWA 2005 USA etc and makes an 
effort to find out the solution of following problem : 
1. Are women facing domestic violence? 
2. How far their rights are protected under 
different laws? 
3. What is the role of police in tackling these 
crimes? 
4. What is the role of judiciary in this 
direction? 
The present work is under taken to go into the 
depth of a problem of domestic violence. The 
present work concentrates on the s ta tus of women 
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from historical period and problem of domestic 
violence, causes and remedies of domestic problem. 
The social causes of crimes against women 
include causes like inferior s ta tus of women due to 
social conditioning, patriarchal s t ructure of 
society, a family atmosphere, lack of proper 
training, broken homes, overcrowding in one room, 
too much interference by the parents , too slack a 
discipline, lack of love of parents , imprisonment, 
drunkenness , immorality, cruelty, addiction to 
drugs, sickness and modern permissive atmosphere 
etc. at time excessive punishment may also 
embitter a child and lead him to antisocial activity. 
Indian society is male dominated. Man 
occupies a superior s ta tus and the woman is 
merely his appendage. A woman is never an entity 
in her own right, she is "first the daughter , next 
the wife, and last the mother of a man". Men are 
consciously taught to be aggressive and tough 
while women are conditioned to be submissive and 
docile. The constitution and the protective laws 
assert just ice and docile. The constitution and the 
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protective laws assert justice and equality to be the 
goals but the given concepts and shared 
unders tanding assign different kinds of resources, 
opportunities and expectations to the two genders, 
each of which is sought to be governed by its own 
distinct code of fairness and just ice. This concept 
of equality and justice resul ts in gross injustice to 
the women and is the cause of their exploitation 
and their low social s ta tus . 
Any law against domestic violence must be 
taken into the account of reality that the moment 
woman complains of domestic violence she is 
thrown out of the house or she is forced to leave be 
because of danger to her life. There is no provision 
in law to restrain the husband from such action. 
This is a major deterrent to her res is tance. In 
principle, the woman should have equal right to the 
matrimonial home, regardless of whether she is a 
victim of domestic violence or not. And in cases of 
complainants this is all the more necessary. 
Many new laws have been passed, old have 
been amended but Govt, or NGO cannot do 
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anything. If the society doesn't support them 
gender issues are emerging but these need to be 
given proper direction d& understood in the right 
prospective, then only women can achieve better 
position at home at work & in society. Blind faith is 
not enough. But, there should be strict 
enforcement of law and legal awareness must be 
created among people. 
To bring about a social change, a change of 
att i tude is very important. Indian society will be 
receptive to ideas. They accommodate both 
modernity & tradition. Women may know what their 
rights are & fight back where they are 
discriminated or denied opportunities. To become 
independent, they must be economically 
independent, not few but all. Until the s ta tus in 
family is changed, until women strived to redefine 
their role & unless they revolt against the 
traditions, no amount of legislation changes their 
s ta tus . 
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Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of the present field study is 
whether judicial decisions or directions of Court 
cannot be the subst i tute of the problem? So far, 
lots of efforts have been made to protect women 
right but it is painfully evident to (observe that 
more so many years had passed. Since the 
universal declaration of Human right, women rights 
have been adopted. It is still tangled in complex 
issue of culture lack of enforcement 85 
accountability. So the question arises can any 
legislative reforms be effective ? If the will to 
implement it is lacking Liberalization of women is 
not an enactment & constitutional sanct ions. It is 
not possible to bring about a change in the s ta tus 
of women through legislative enactment . There is a 
large gap between the law & social at t i tude & which 
act as a barrier in the enforcement of laws. 
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The hypothesis of the present field study is 
1. Whether present laws are satisfactory or 
need to be revised? 
2. Whether judicial decision or direction can 
be the subst i tute of problem? 
3. Whether legislative reform be effective if the 
will to implement the law is lacking? 
4. Whether women are legally aware to protect 
the rights? 
The judicial decisions or directions can not be 
the subst i tute of the problem. But, there should 
strict of enforcement of law and legal awareness 
must be created among people. 
The data collected has been analyzed with the 
help of computer. In the end the aforesaid 
hypothesis has been tested and findings are 
recorded. 
Although international human rights order has 
transformed itself conceptually in response to 
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repeated challenges from women's rights movement, 
the conclusive test of its effectiveness lies in its 
enforceability in the municipal arena. The 
jur isprudence on municipal enforcement of 
international human rights law has evolved. Rather 
than making enforcement conditional strictly upon 
legislative enactment, there is a growing tendency 
to read international human rights law into the 
constitutional law. 
Convention on Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women specifically Article 1 s ta tes that "for 
the purpose of present Convention, the term 
'discrimination against women' shall mean any 
distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the 
basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of 
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment 
or exercise by women, irrespective their martial 
s ta tus , on a basis of equality of men and women, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural , civic or any 
other field. 
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Whereas Article 2 of this Convention directly 
drfinc'S the violence against women. The Article 
states that "violence against women" shall be 
understood to encompass: 
(i) physical, sexual and psychological violence 
occurring in the family, including battering, 
sexual abuse of female children with 
household, dowry related violence, martial 
rape, female genital; mutilation and other 
traditional practices harmful to women, non-
spousal violence and violence related to 
exploitation; 
(ii) physical, sexual and psychological violence 
occurring within the general community 
including rape, sexual ha rassment and 
intimidation at work, in educational 
inst i tut ions and elsewhere, trafficking in 
women and forced prostitution; 
(iii) physical, sexual and psychological violence 
perpetuated or condoned by the State, 
wherever it occurs. 
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The 3 parts definition by the Convention 
focuses on all the aspects of domestic violence, 
including psychological aspects of violence. 
Perhaps before concluding the definition UN has 
gone through many debates to make the issue and 
concern all around complete. 
The complete system of social inst i tut ions 
norms of behaviour and religion proscription of 
which have hardened like statutory laws obstruct 
proper implementation. Let us take few 
illustrations we all know that the divorce law but it 
is theoretical possible due to economic dependence 
on men & social stigma suffered by divorce. The 
scope of marriage though enlarged in law s tands 
narrow in practice. It is difficult to across the 
social barr iers . The succession law is unsuccessful; 
widow marriage is yet to be universally accepted. 
Dowry has been outlawed but in many cases it is a 
fundamental part of negotiation. 
Recently, Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has 
passed to reform the position of women. But 
question remain how far it unit be enforced. 
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Under the Act the domestic violence includes 
actual abuse or threat to abuse that is physical, 
sexual, verbal, emotional or economic. Harassment 
by way of unlawful dowry demands to the woman or 
her relatives are also covered under the Act. The 
act provides for the rights of women to secure 
housing. It also provides for the right of women to 
reside in her matrimonial home or shared 
household, whether or not she has any title or 
rights in such home or household. This right is 
secured by a residence order, which is to be passed 
by the Magistrate. 
Thus the Act seeks to address emergency 
situations and stop violence. It is designed to help 
the woman during the most intense phase of abuse. 
It will not only provide a support mechanism but 
will also be a tool for women to negotiate for their 
rights from a position of equality. 
Indian women do not suffer from legal 
disparities but they suffer from practical 
disparities. 
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Research Methodology 
The present study is confined to explore the 
scope of the judicial processes in the prevention of 
crime against women and the role of police is 
critically evaluated. 
The present work is based on both doctrinal 
and non-doctrinal method which is descriptive, 
analytical and case study. Along with a non-
doctrinaire method has also been used for the field 
survey to corroborate the findings of the present 
research work. 
Empirical research deals with case laws, field 
study close ended questionnaires have been 
distributed to the various sections of the people 
and their opinion relating to domestic violence have 
been evaluated. The city of Meerut, Bulandshahr , 
Baghpat, Noida, which are closely si tuated near 
Aligarh has been selected for the field's study of 
the problem. National Data of Crime against women 
has been also taken. Data of National Crime Record 
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Bureau has been given, which enables me to do 
comparative study. 
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Review of Literature 
In present work various articles in Hindustan 
Times, The Times of India, The Pioneer, India 
Today, Journa ls of ILI, New Delhi, National 
Association of Women Lawyer, USA, Journa l of 
OHCHR, ISIL and books of eminent authors 
including book of Just ice Anand on "Human 
Rights", Mamta Rao, "Women and Children" 
Domestic Violence rules and regulation by P.K. 
Das, Women and Protective Laws by Shobha Saxena 
and various Text Books of leading authors of India 
and abroad on the subject relating to "Women's 
Rights". Various s ta tutes , conventions, reports 
relating to women's rights like Domestic Violence 
Act 2005, Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, CEDAW, 
Beijing Convention, Platform for Action, Special 
Report on Violence against women's of threa ts to 
grains on women's human Rights, 2000^, consulted 
various websites and many other books mentioned 
in the bibliography. The primary and secondary 
sources have been duly acknowledged in the 
respective chapters . Bibliography shows the range 
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of the subject and works of scholar as well as the 
judgment of the court reveals the various 
dimensions of the problem. 
Chapter-I it is customary, which deals with the 
general introduction, justification of undertaking of 
the present research and also covered the plan of 
study chapterisation, hypothesis, object of study 
and research methodology to be adopted. 
Chapter-II contains the historical background. It 
s tar ts with the s ta tus of women, their position 
during Vedic period, Post-Vedic period, the position 
of women in Hindu, Muslim and Christian 
communities. How they had enjoyed their various 
rights and how they were treated by men and what 
were their s ta tus in their respective Laws and has 
pointed out the difference between the religious 
norms and social values in contemporary society. 
Chapter-Ill In this chapter, the rights of women 
under various laws have been discussed starting 
from the UN Charters, various Conventions, Vienna 
Accord 1994 beyond declarations and the platform 
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for Act on 1995. The United Committee on 
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of 
Disciimination against in its general 
recommendation has been discussed in details. 
In constitutional law, the right to social and 
economic justice envisaged in the preamble art 14, 
15, 16, 2 1 , and 39 are envisaged to the life of the 
poor thoroughly discussed through case law. 
Relevant provisions of the constitution of India has 
been discussed. Various provisions of Criminal law 
like 498-A, 304-B has been discussed. Then 
provision relating to the women in personal law 
have been discussed, then Dowry Prohibition Act 
1961 and related cases were discussed and then 
provisions of the Domestic Violence Act 2005 has 
been discussed. 
Chapter-IV deals with the role of police, how far 
they can able to tackle the problem what are the 
obstacles, which prevent them to perform their 
duties and the negative points, which they ought to 
improve to prevent such a heinous crime of 
domestic violence. 
Chapter-V deals with the role of judiciary in 
protecting the rights of women and with the help of 
cases, latest laws relating to the protection of 
women rights. 
Chapter-VI deals with the domestic violence Act 
2005, American domestic violence Act 2005 (VAWA 
2005) and Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 in details 
and comparative study with US laws. 
Chapter-VII deals with conclusions and 
suggestions i.e. various recommendations to 
combat the social evil of domestic violence. 
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The present chapter a t tempts to provide a 
historical context to the study of the position of 
woman through the ages. 
1. Position of Woman in Vedic Period: 
In a Vedic period woman participated in all 
fields like man and took active part in human life. 
During that period woman enjoyed a fair amount of 
freedom and equality with man. Woman studied in 
Gurukul. For a long time girl in higher societies 
were allowed to undergo Upanayana rite. The great 
woman like Ghosa, Apala, Lopamudra, Gargi, 
Indrani, Yami and others had distinct qualities of 
art, music, dance and even fighting in the battle. 
Purdah was not prevalent in Vedic period. In the 
matter of selecting the life par tner in marriage 
woman had equal right. The example of polygamy 
was rare and mainly confined to ruling class. Dowry 
system was prevalent in rich and royal families only 
in the form of movable gift. A widow could marry 
again in Vedic times there was no discrimination 
between boy and girl. There were two classes of 
girls: (i) the Brahmvadini s tudents , who donned the 
sacred thread, tend to fire and study one Veda, but 
in distinction from the boy s tudents , do the begging 
for alms within their own parental home and (ii) the 
Sadyo Vadhey who are given only symbolically and 
formally, immediately before marriage. Woman 
must have enjoyed a quality of life comparable to 
that of the man.2 
2. Position of Woman in Post Vedic Period: 
The basic rules for woman's behaviour as 
expressed in the laws of Manu insist that a woman 
must constantly worship her husband as a god even 
though he is desti tute of virtue or a womanizer. 
Woman should be kept in dependency by her 
husband because by nature they are passionate 
and disloyal. The ideal women are those who do not 
strive to break these bonds of control. The salvation 
and happiness of woman revolve around their virtue 
and chastity as daughter, wives and widows.3 The 
role of woman got restricted to the four walls of 
their home. During 500 BC to 500 AD. which can be 
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approximated to the period of early smrities, the 
epics of Ramayana and Mahabharata and the early 
Puranas, the Upanaya rights for girls were 
completely abandoned. During the Puranic and Epic 
period, there was restriction of the age of marriage 
of girls, deprivation of woman in various areas . 
Beside, relegating woman to a lower position, 
there are ritual and practices for a woman, which 
re-enforce her role as a devout wife and doting 
mother. Women perform a large number of the 
yearly calenderical rites^. These rites seek the 
protection and well-being of crucial kinsman 
(especially husband, brother, son). Man's rites are 
not concerned with having good wives or one who 
will have a long life. 
One important point unders tanding the value 
s t ructure in Indian society is the dual concept of 
the female in Hindu philosophy. On the one hand 
woman is fertile, benevolent best lover of 
prosperity; on the other hand she is considered 
aggressive, malevolent and destructive. This dual 
character manifest self in the goddesses also as 
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there are dangerous, aggressive, malevolent 
goddess like Kali and Durga there are equally 
important goddesses like Laxmi, Saraswati, 
Mariamman who are benevolent.^ Veena Das, while 
analysing the anthropological meaning of 
prevalence of the worship of goddess usually s tands 
alone and is not encompassed with a higher male 
principle. She adds. "The principle of power find 
expression in the goddesses who represent shakti , 
who come to the aid of man and the god in period of 
cosmic darkness , by killing the demon who threaten 
the entire cosmic order. The principle of 
renunciation on the other hand find expression in 
the ideals of Sati".6 
The customs of widow burning came into 
existence around 400 A.D. Though there are 
instance of widow surviving their husbands and 
offering them funeral obligations, on the whole 
position of widows was not so honorable before this 
period. 
The widow marriage was prohibited. The 
practice of 'Sati ' was recommended by many of the 
later authorit ies and was well-established by the 
end of 6th Century A.D. The practice prevailed early 
as Alexander's invasion about 325BC. Travelers like 
Strabo, Megasthenes and Diodarus who 
accompanied Alexander, allude to this practice. The 
lawgivers forced the widows to lead a life of 
austeri t ies, fasting and abstinence of pleasure. 
Unjust, archaic social customs like child 
marriage, 'Sati ' and polygamy reduced the s ta tus of 
woman to the level of mere goods or a chattel . They 
were regarded as 'nari-sudras ' . 
3. Position of Women in Islamic Period: 
In the Muslim period, i.e. in the 11^^ century 
onwards the position of woman further 
deteriorated. Woman faced a number of hardship 
and cruelty due to evil practice like child marriage. 
The purdah system, sati, widowhood, prostitution 
and devdasi system. As Hate mentions, the advent 
of the Muslims arrested the progress of Hindu 
Civilization and era of blind faith and perpetuation 
of old customs followed.^ 
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During this period the role of woman 
confirmed to the dictum laid down by Manu, the 
great law giver in the second century that , 'a widow 
does not deserve freedom and that her life 
throughout be one of dependence on man. Another 
dictum was that a woman should be subservient in 
all stages of her life in childhood to the father, in 
youth to the husband and his elderly kinds and to 
the sons when widowed,^ 
The position of the daughter in Hindu Society 
reached at nadir. As child marriage was a common 
practice of the social life of Mughal period. In some 
cases the marriages were performed at the age of 
nine or ten year even before they had learnt to 
talk.10 
Along with the insecurity and uncertainty, 
which prevailed in the Mughal period, the practice 
of Purdah became rigid. Both Hindu and Muslims 
woman lost there 's liberal activities and became the 
property of their male masters . As result the social 
life of woman's narrowed down.n 
The practice of torturing of widows was 
prevalent in upper caste until recently. It is 
believed to have come into vague in about 8*^^ 
century A.D. This practice of torturing of widow is 
believed to have adopted by the Brahmins under the 
influence of Budhismi^. 
From time to time, Protestant movement like 
Buddhism, Jainism, Vaishnavism, Veerashaivism 
and Sikhism made sincere efforts to improve the 
s ta tus of woman. Buddhism considered male moves 
a superior to the runs . In Jainism though woman 
were given a respectable position in congregational 
life, they were condemned severely. In the 12^^ 
century Veerashaivism permitted their woman the 
right to divorce and remarriage. The Bhakti 
movement also played vital role in raising the 
s ta tus of woman by allowing them to seek spiritual 
solace independently. 
By the thir teenth or fourteenth century, the 
dowry system became a positive evil of great 
magnitude, particularly among the higher classedi^. 
40 
During the Mughal period, Aine-Akbari has traced 
the evil of dowry.''^ 
The IS i^^  century was a period of all round 
declines in India. It was the darkest period so far 
as women were concerned. Political decay following 
the disruption of the Mughal Empire and disorders 
were visible due to the advent of various European 
powers. Under the new conditions woman lost their 
independent identity. They were totally and 
forcefully subjugated to male superiority.i^ 
Cousin, referring to the s ta tus of woman at the 
end of the 19'^ century was at the lowest point of 
literacy, of individuality, of health, of social s ta tus , 
of initiative of economic s ta tus of power, or of her 
security. 16 
According to Dube, the deterioration in the 
s ta tus of woman brought about a number of 
consequences. He says "it was inevitable that their 
character and personality should also be effected. 
The uneducated were considered on the level of 
shudras , married before their character were fully 
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developed, transfer from loving atmosphere of the 
parent 's house to the house of parents-in-law. i^  
The reasons that are responsible for the 
deterioration of the s ta tus of woman in India were 
(i) joint family system, (ii) polygamy and sati 
practice, (iii) enforcement widowhood, denial of the 
right to divorce and right to remarry after 
widowhood, (iv) child marriage and purdah system. 
Because of child marriages too much older man 
there was an increase in number of widows. Their 
entry to social, political, and religious functions 
were prohibited. During this period one finds 
exceptional woman like Chand Bibi, Laxmi Bai, Nur 
Jahan , Kittu Rani Channamma who made their 
remarkable impact in the field of administrat ion. ^ ^ 
For the upliftment of woman in India several 
factors are responsible. The first one was the direct 
influence of the British noted for their courtesy 
towards woman, the general awakening of Asian in 
the 20th century and the political struggle for 
Indian's independence also gave considerable force 
to the feminist movement in India.i^ 
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The position of girls, woman and widows were 
improved during the British period. They introduce 
female education in India. In 1929 they passed the 
Child Marriage Restraint Act. By which restricted 
the evils of early marriage and increase the number 
of widows. This Act not only prohibits the child 
marriage and raised the minimum age for marriage 
of girls to 14 years. 
The social s ta tus of wife also improved during 
the British period because of rise in female 
education and the rise in the age of marriage. The 
Hindus Woman's Right of separate residence and 
Maintenance Act of 1946 enables Hindu wives to 
claim maintenance without having judicial 
separation under some circumstances. 
No man in India has done more than Gandhi 
for their elevation and occupation by women of 
their rightful place in domestic and public life 
passionate lover or humanity, an implacable force 
of injustice in whatever form or sphere, it is small 
all wonder that Gandhi so greatly espoused the 
women cause. He preached forcefully against the 
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wrongs done to women in the name of law, tradition 
and religion. He fearlessly speaks against enforced 
widowhood, purdah, dedication of girls to temples, 
prostitution, early marriage, dowry system, the 
economic bondage and material of women. 
Gandhi championed the cause of women. He 
considered women as the incarnation of ahimsa 
means infinite love, which again means infinite 
capacity for suffering. Who but woman, the mother 
of man, shows this capacity in the largest measure 
let her forget she ever was or can be the object of 
man's lust and she will occupy her proud position 
by the side of man as his mother, maker and silent 
leader. It is given to her to teach the art of peace to 
the warring world thirsting for that nectar . Gandhi, 
considered women as 'the personification of self 
sacrifices. He was against the purdah system. He 
wrote: 'Chastity is not a hot-house growth it cannot 
be superimposed. It cannot be protected by the 
surrounding wall of purdah. It must grow from 
within, and to be worth anything. 
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Gandhi considered that marriage is natural 
thing in life and to consider it derogatory in any 
sense is wholly wrong. The idea is to look upon 
marriage as a sacrament and therefore to lead a life 
of self-restraint in the married state. Gandhi was as 
much a friend of children as of older people. The 
instinctively saw the light of love in his eyes and 
were at tracted to him. About Kanyadan in the case 
of little children? Has a father any right of property 
over his children? he is the protector, not owner. 
The father forfeits the privilege of protecting when 
he abuses it by seeking to barter away the liberty of 
the ward. 
In spite the cruel practice of 'sati ' its incidence 
was on increase throughout the 17th and 18^^ 
centuries because at that time religion had become 
corrupt and the priests governed people. Hindus at 
that time were under lighted and had become strict 
follower of customs. People firmly believed that 
man's sins were completely washed out if his widow 
was burnt alive with his dead body. 
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The pitiful and pitiable plight of the widows 
who were forced to commit 'sati ' a t tracted the 
attention of a good number of enlightened Indians 
and the Britishers under the leadership of Raja 
Ram Mohan Roy and Lord William Bentinck. In 
spite of the strong opposition, a historic revolution 
of great importance was passed on Dec. 14, 1829 by 
which 'sati ' was made a crime of culpable homicide 
punishable with fine, imprisonment or both later 
the British realised that they could stop 'sati ' by 
police force but that they could not arrange the 
remarriage of widows. 
The familial, social and legal position of Hindu 
Woman was greatly improved during British period, 
as compare with the Muslims period but violence 
against her were not decrease. During India's 
struggle for independence, thousands of woman 
took part under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, 
Sarojini Naidu, Vijay Laxmi Pandit. Gill has rightly 
observed about the achievement with regard to the 
s ta tus of woman during British period. 
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4. Contemporary Modern Period: 
Due to the principle of democracy based on 
liberty, a woman's role began to change towards 
greater emancipation from man's domination. The 
role of wife-mother affected by this new freedom. In 
India, due to efforts of social reformers and social 
legislations, woman were brought out of the 
confines of their home.20 The process of 
industrialization and urbanization had their share 
in the changes which followed.21 It was the 20^^ 
century that brought about dynamic change and 
new concept which affected the s ta tus of woman 
given them fresh dignity and importance. 
Woman faces innumerable problem and 
discrimination only because they are woman. 
Discrimination on the basis of gender or can be 
witnessed, in present social system, in every walk 
of life. In India the sex ratio is in favour of male. 
She is considered to be an object of sex in our 
society. 
The Indian constitution has incorporated in its 
objective the principle of equality. It has also 
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proclaimed the equality of man and woman in all 
domains of life.^^ 
In Article 15 and 16 of the constitution it is 
mentioned. Under Art 325 and 326 women have not 
only given voting rights but also the right to stand 
for election. They can take part in political life of 
country. Art 39 provides equal pay for equal work 
irrespective of 'sex'. The modern Indian legislation 
have stabilized the position of woman by offering 
her same rights, opportunities, and opening which 
men have. 
The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has 
statutorily recognized the right to property of the 
Hindu daughter. Dowry system, are abominable 
social evil, which makes young woman's life 
miserable, has been curbed by the enactment of the 
Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961. Education is also 
made free and compulsory for all the children of 5-
14 age group. Accessibility to education and 
availability of increasing opportunities for acquiring 
education has bought about t remendous changes in 
the role of woman.23 
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At present wife enjoys a respectable position. 
She can even live separately U/S . 18 of the Hindu 
Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and can claim 
maintenance. The wife under section 8 can adopt a 
son. Under the Hindus Marriage Act, 1955 both 
husband and wife can claim divorce. 
Widow Remarriage is legalized; Sec. 14 of the 
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has made her the 
absolute owner of the property. Under Sec.6 of the 
Act she inherits the coparcenary interest of her 
husband along with the son and daughter . Sec. 6 of 
the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, 
recognises her as the natural and legal guardian of 
her minor children after their father. These 
legislations have promoted emancipation of woman 
to a very large extent. Besides these legislations, 
under the provision of the Directive Principles of 
State Policy, each state has under taken woman's 
welfare programmes. There is hardly any field today 
wherein woman have not entered.2^ 
The United Nations by declaring 1975 as 
woman's year and the next decade as Woman's 
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Decade called upon its member s ta tes to develop 
new measures for emancipation of woman and to 
ensure equal opportunities and equal respect and 
recognition in all fields. 
In a nutshell it can be said that education and 
woman's participation in all fields of economy, 
science and culture will help them in achieving the 
real equality. But the crime record against woman 
increase day by day in the modern era. We read 
daily in newspaper the dowry death of woman and 
the news of rape. We read many news of rape of girl 
by their father or other relatives in their four tour 
walls of house. 
Muslim Law 
Three different sets of views were expressed by 
Muslim women interviewed by us : (a) the educated 
middle classes in U.P. were opposed to any change 
whatsoever; (b) the poorer women of the same state 
expressed a desire for monogamous marriages and 
denounced the inequities of polygamy; and (c) there 
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was a uniform and emphatic demand, from women 
in Kashmir, for the banning of polygamy. 
Muslim Law regards marriage as a contract. 
Some jur is ts have advocated the adoption of a 
s tandard contract providing, inter alia, that the 
wife shall have the power to divorce her husband if 
he takes a second wife. Although this remedy is 
advocated for the prevention of polygamy, it will not 
obviously provide any substantive relief to the first 
wife children, nor seriously affect the position of 
the husband because the second marriage would 
remain valid and the act of bigamy would not be 
legally wrong. It would also be ineffective to prevent 
fake conversions to Islam to evade the prohibition 
of bigamy under other laws. 
While the desirability of reform in Muslim Law 
is generally acknowledged and polygamy has been 
prohibited in most other Muslim, countries, the 
Government of India has taken no steps in this 
direction, on the ground that public opinion in the 
Muslim community does not favour this change. 
Ignoring the interests of Muslim women is denial of 
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equality and social justice; and therefore, there can 
be no compromise on the basic policy of monogamy 
being the rule for all communities in India. 
The Muslim marriage is a contract between two 
parties of different sexes who agree to cohabit on 
certain terms. 
The ceremony of "nikaah" binds the two 
together, unless a divorce takes place, for life. In 
Sunni law, the ceremony must occur in the 
presence of two witnesses, if it is to be valid. The 
presence of witnesses is not a prerequisite in Shia 
law. Both parties must agree to be married though, 
in the case of the bride, silence is interpreted as 
consent. Divorce is an integral part of Muslim law, 
as is the provision for more than one wife. Though 
advised against, it is accepted in religion and in 
Indian law that a man may have up to four wives. If 
he marries a fifth time, while still being married to 
four other women, the marriage is not void, but 
irregular. It may be rectified by divorcing any one of 
the other wives at a time later than the 
performance of the fifth ceremony. 
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MEHR 
Mehr is the dower or form of bride price paid 
by the man to the woman he marries. It is meant to 
protect her in case of abandonment in favour of 
other women, divorce, or neglect by maintaining 
her. 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF A WIFE UNDER MUSLIM 
LAW 
Apart from cohabiting with her husband under 
all normal and acceptable conditions, and his right 
to demand obedience from her, a Muslim woman is 
bound to observe purdah in accordance with the 
social position of the parties and local custom. 
She is entitled to maintenance from the 
husband in a manner suitable to his economic 
s ta tus , regardless of her own wealth. She is also 
entitled to an equal share of his company and equal 
t reatment in all respects to his other wives. She is 
also entitled to dower and residence at his house. 
.•^ j 
She does not lose her identity, but is at liberty to 
deal with her property independently. 
Upon death or divorce, she is bound to observe 
iddat, for the duration of three courses i.e. she may 
not marry or engage in sexual activity for three 
menses. In case she is pregnant, this period 
extends to the duration of her pregnancy or for four 
months and ten days, whichever is longer. 
A woman married in the Muta form is not 
entitled to maintenance under the Shia Law. But it 
has been held that she is entitled to maintenance 
as a wife under the provision of Sec. 125 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code. 
Divorce 
Muslim Law: 
Under Muslim law, a husband has an absolute 
and unlimited right to repudiate the marriage at, 
his will, but a Muslim wife has no such right. 
Traditional law permitted her to seek dissolution 
under three forms: (a) divorce where the husband 
delegates the right of divorce to the wife in the 
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marr iage con t rac t s t ipu la t ing t h a t she may divorce 
him on his tak ing ano the r wife; (b) divorce by 
ag reemen t on the wife's giving some cons ide ra t ion 
to the h u s b a n d ; and (c) divorce by m u t u a l consen t . 
Taking advan tage of the law e n u n c i a t e d by the 
m u t u a l consen t . Taking advan tage of the law 
e n u n c i a t e d by the Maliki and Shafi ' schools the 
d isso lu t ion of Muslim Act, 1939, recognizes the 
wife's r ight to divorce on the following g r o u n d s : 
a) H u s b a n d ' s d i s a p p e a r a n c e for four yea r s ; 
b) Neglect and failure to provide m a i n t e n a n c e for 
two yea r s ; 
c) H u s b a n d ' s impr i sonmen t for seven y e a r s or 
more ; 
d) Fai lure to perform mar i t a l obligationsiiC!5*ftir€e 
yea r s ; 
e) Impotency; 
'^: ^ 
M^i''^:] 
> -^  / ' 
f) Insan i ty , leprosy, genera l d i sease ; 
g) Option of puber ty ; and 
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h) Cruelty or any other ground recognized as 
valid for divorce under Muslim Law. 
This Act has benefited many Muslim women. The 
most frequently used grounds are the option of 
puberty and failure to provide maintenance. In the 
latter case, courts have occasionally denied the 
right to a wife where her conduct was such as to 
absolve her husband from his duty to provide 
maintenance. In such cases, however, a more 
reasonable view is that taken by Jus t ice Krishna 
Ayyar who observed that there is nor merit in trying 
to preserve a marriage which has in fact broken 
down. It is therefore serve a marriage, which has in 
fact broken down. It is therefore recommended that 
the right to divorce on the failure of the husband to 
provide maintenance should be irrespective of the 
wife's conduct. 
In spite of the right provided by the Act of 1939 
and the customary forms, a Muslim wife continues 
in a position of legal inferiority and insecurity as 
long as the husband ' s unilateral right to divorce 
56 
'^SJB^JM 
continues to be recognized other Muslim countries 
have already restricted this right. It is 
recommended that immediate legislation should be 
undertaken to eliminate this unilateral right of 
divorce by the husband and to introduce parity of 
rights for both par tners regarding grounds for 
seeking divorce. 
Maintenance 
Muslim Law: 
While maintenance of the wife is the highest 
obligation of husband in Muslim law, the wife must 
be accessible to the husband and obey his 
reasonable commands. A divorced Muslim wife has 
no right to maintenance beyond three months. 
There is no justification for such a discrimination 
and we recommend that the right to maintenance 
should be extended to divorced Muslim wives. 
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Adoption and Guardianship of Children 
Muslim Law: 
A Muslim father's position is dominant and his 
right with regard to guardianship is very wide 
indeed. The mother is not recognized as a natural 
guardian even after the father's will (Shias do no 
recognize this when the mother is a non-Muslim). 
Muslim law, however, recognizes her prime right of 
custody of minor children, which cannot be 
deprived even by the father except for misconduct. 
There is a difference between the Shia and the 
Hanafi schools regarding the age when the mother 's 
right of custody terminates. In case of a minor son, 
the Shia school holds that the mother 's right is 
only during the weaning period, i.e., till the child 
reaches the age of two years. The Hanafi School 
extends this period to seven years of age. In case of 
minor girls, the age of seven, and the Hanafi law till 
the stations puberty. Both schools agree that only 
the mothers should have custody of a minor 
married girl till she at tains puberty. 
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Inheritance 
Muslim Law: 
Muslim law, while recognizing the rights of 
women to inherit, discriminates between male and 
female heirs of the same degree, the share of the 
latter being half that of the former. We recommend 
legislation to give an equal share to the widow and 
the daughter along with sons as has been done in 
Turkey. 
HINDU MARRIAGE ACT 
While bigamy has been made an offence for the 
Hindu and the second marriage is void in law, such 
marriages are still prevalent, as evidenced by a 
census study in 1961 and case brought to the 
notice of the committee during its tour in the States 
of Manipur, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, 
West Bengal, and Madhya Pradesh, Uneducated and 
economically dependent women find it difficult to 
go to court and are not always supported by their 
families in lodging prosecutions. Technical 
interpretation of the word solemnization of the 
59 
marriage also poses difficulties. It is therefore 
necessary to make the following changes in the law 
to make its enforcement more effective. 
With the permission of the court, the right to 
initiate prosecution of bigamy should be extended 
to persons other than the girl's family to prevent 
the current widespread violation of the law. 
In sec t ionl? of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1995, 
the words solemnized should be replaced by the 
words goes through a form of marriage. Further, an 
explanation should also be added to the section to 
the effect that an omission to perform some of the 
essential ceremonies by parties shall not be 
construed to mean that the offence of bigamy was 
not committed, if such a ceremony of marriage gives 
rise to a de facto relationship of husband and wife. 
A provision should be introduced in Section 6 
of the Hindu Marriages Act, 1955, to the effect that 
nothing contained in the Act shall prevent a court 
from groaning an injunction against a proposed 
bigamous marriage. 
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Divorce 
Monogamous marriage without the right of 
divorce causes great hardship to both part ies . The 
concept of union for life of the sacramental nature 
of marriage which renders it in dissoluble has been 
introduced in all legal systems in India. The laws 
are however characterized by variations and 
unequal t reatment of sexes. According to the 
Census of 1971, there are 870,000 divorced or 
separated women of whom 743, 200 are in the rural 
areas and 127,500 in urban areas , the ratio being 
1,630 women per 1,000 men. The figures for 1961-
71 indicate a distinct drop in the percentage of 
divorced and separated persons over the decade, 
although the proportion of women was higher than 
that of men in both rural and urban areas . A 
census survey in 1961 indicated wide acceptance of 
divorce by the village community. Its incidence was 
the highest among Muslims followed by Hindus, 
Buddhists , Ja ins , Sikhs, and Christ ians. Adultery, 
barrenness , and extreme poverty were the most 
common grounds for divorce. 
Contrary to the general notion regarding the 
indissolubility of Hindu marriages, customary 
forms of divorce, recognized both socially and 
judicially, have been widely practiced among the 
lower castes . The most usual forms are: divorce by 
mutual consent, by the husband, and by deeds. 
Under customary law there is no waiting period 
after divorce for remarriage. The other advantage of 
these forms are against public or morality, a 
divorce under customary law may be rejected by a 
court. It has been suggested that an exhaustive 
record of these customs should be prepared which 
forms should be made invalid. Copies of this will be 
prepared which forms should be made invalid. 
Copies of this record should be made available to 
the people and to the panchayats . 
The Hindu Marriage Act, 1995, permits divorce 
to both parties for (a) living in adultery; (b) 
conversion; (c) insanity; (d) communicable leprosy; 
(e) venereal disease; (f) renunciation; (g) 
disappearance for seven years or more; (h) failure 
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to resume cohabitation for two years after a decree 
of judicial separation; and (i) failure to comply with 
a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. A wife 
has two additional grounds; (a) if the husband has 
another living life; and (b) if he has been guilty of 
rape, sodomy, or bestiality. It was recommended 
that cruelty and desertion should be included as 
grounds for divorce in this Act, to prevent the 
circuitous route of obtaining a judicial separation 
first and then seeking divorce after two years . 
The interpretation of reasonable cause for 
desertion or restitution of conjugal rights as made 
by the judiciary is not satisfactory; and in certain 
cases, the judiciary's att i tude to the wife only in 
cases of genuine economic necessity, it is 
recommended that difference in the place of work 
should not be regarded as a ground for desertion or 
restitution of conjugal rights. 
Sections 13 and 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act 
deals with the divorce. Section 13 of the Act states 
that adultery and cruelty are each sufficient 
grounds for obtaining a divorce. Cruelty need not 
be physica l , and app rehens ion of damage to body or 
mind or hea l th is also te rmed cruel ty u n d e r th i s 
sect ion. Mental cruel ty m u s t be s u c h t h a t it h a s 
adverse effects on the pe t i t ioner ' s h e a l t h , or can be 
proved to have such effects in fu ture . 
ADOPTION AND GUARDIANSHIP OF CHILDREN UNDER 
HINDU LAW: 
The Hindu Minority and G u a r d i a n s h i p Act, 
1956, u p h o l d s the super ior r ight of the fa ther and 
m a k e s him the first (the mo the r being the second) 
n a t u r a l gua rd i an for boys and u n m a r r i e d gir ls . The 
father h a s however lost h is p rev ious r ight to 
deprive the mothe r by appoin t ing a t e s t a m e n t a r y 
gua rd i an . The prior r ight of the mo the r is ordinar i ly 
recognized only to cus tody of ch i ld ren below five 
yea r s of age. She h a s also a be t t e r claim t h a n the 
father in the case of i l legit imate ch i ld ren . The Act 
also d i rec t s , t h a t in deciding g u a r d i a n s h i p , cou r t s 
m u s t t ake the welfare of the child as a p a r a m o u n t 
cons idera t ion , A recen t decis ion of the Supreme 
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Court observed that, in special circumstance, the 
mother could be the natural guardian even when 
the father was alive. It is hoped that this decision 
will guide lower courts and prevent them from 
invariably upholding the father's right even against 
the child's interest . 
MAINTENANCE UNDER HINDU LAW: 
Unlike criminal law where the wife's claim for 
maintenance depends on the husband ' s having 
sufficient means, under Hindu law, this right is 
absolute but is lost if the wife becomes unchas te . 
In assessing the amount of maintenance the court 
takes into account the position and the s ta tus of 
the part ies, the reasonable wants of the claimant 
and the obligation of the husband. It also judges 
the justification for the wife's living separately. 
This act does not also limit the obligations of 
maintenance to the man only. 
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Inheritance 
Hindu Law: Pre-independence India had several 
systems of succession among Hindus, in most of 
which the position of women was one of dependence 
with barely any proprietary rights. Even where they 
enjoyed some rights, they had only a life interest 
and not full ownership. The Hindu Succession Act, 
1956 made some radical changes, the most 
important being is the equal rights of succession 
between male and female heirs in the same category 
(brother and sister, son and daughter) . It also 
simplified the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga schools 
and extended the reformed law to persons in South 
India previously governed by the 
Marummakkattayam. Its greatest progressive 
gesture is the recognition of the right of women to 
inherit and the abolition of the life estate of female 
heirs. The Class I heirs of a man who takes the 
property in equal shares as absolute owners are the 
widow, the mother, son, daughter, widow of a 
predeceased son, and sons and daughters of 
predeceased sons of daughters . 
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Unfortunately, traditional resistance led to 
some compromises in the original intentions. For 
instance, the one major factor responsible for 
continuing of the inequality between son and 
daughters is the retention of the Mitakshara 
coparcenary, whose membership is confined only to 
males. A numbers of decisions and laws like the 
Hindu Women's Right to Property Act and Hindu 
Succession Act have made encodes in the concept 
of the coparecenary. The Hindu Code Bill, 1948 as 
amended by the Select Committee, had in fact 
suggested abolition of the coparcenary get a share 
of his property which ensures that the female heirs 
of a male member of the coparcenary get a share of 
his property which is demarcated by a notional 
partition. In consequence, the sons get a share of 
the father's property in addition to their own 
interest as coparceners. Under the Dayabhaga 
system, the daughters get equal shares with the 
brothers, as there is no right by birth for sons. The 
right of a coparecener to renounce his share in the 
coparcenary and to transform his self-acquired 
property into joint family property is frequently 
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used to negate or to reduce the share of a female 
heir. We, therefore, recommend the abolition of the 
male right by birth and the conversion of the 
Mitakshara coparcenary into a Dayabhaga one. 
Section 4(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 
1956, excludes the evolution of tenancy rights on 
agricultural holdings under s tates laws from the 
scope of the Act. This has led to the elimination 
land legislation in many s ta tes . Some s ta tes do not 
have, however, successfully excluded widows and 
daughters without giving any part icular economic 
justification of such law. A typical example is the 
Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land 
Reforms Act, 1950, which is likely to apply to all 
agricultural land in that State in course of time. 
Similar discriminatory features are seen in some of 
the recent land ceiling laws adopted in different 
s tates, e.g., Karnataka, Punjab or Madhya Pradesh. 
In order to achieve the social equality of women as 
also in the interests of uniformity, we recommend 
the abolition of Section 4(2) of the Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956. 
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Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, 
relating to the right of inheritance to a dwelling 
house has also resulted in some discrimination 
between unmarried, widowed, and married 
daughters . While supporting the main object of the 
section which asser ts the primacy of the rights of 
the family against that of an individual and 
restricts partition, we are not happy about the 
invidious distraction between married and other 
daughters since the right of residence is restricted 
only to those daughter who are unmarr ied or 
widowed and are deserted by or separated from 
their husbands . We, therefore, recommend the 
removal of this discrimination so that all daughters 
enjoy the same right. 
The unrestr icted right of gestation often 
resul ts in depriving female heirs of their rights of 
inheri tance. We, therefore, recommend the 
restriction of this right under the Hindu Succession 
Act, 1956. 
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CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE ACT 
The laws relating to position of Christian 
women in India are as follows: 
The Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 
provides that every marriage between persons one 
or both of whom are Christians must be solemnised 
according to Christian rites. Marriage between two 
Christians or one Christian and one non-Christ ian 
which are not so solemnised are not recognised in 
law, except under the Special Marriage Act. The 
Christian Marriage Act, 1872 permits marriage 
between Roman Catholic and Protestants . 
A marriage may be solemnised between two 
persons either or 4 both of whom are Christ ians if 
neither party has a living spouse at the time of 
marriage, neither party is either idiot or lunatic at 
the time of marriage, and the part ies are not within 
prohibited degrees of relationship. The legal age of 
majority as in all marriages is 18 for women and 21 
for men. 
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Christian marriages are registered in a record 
kept at the Church. This record of marriage is 
recognised as a proof of marriage, by the State. The 
record bears the name, date of birth, parentage and 
signature of each of the contracting part ies . They 
also verified by the signatures of two witnesses. A 
civil registration of marriage is, however, valid in 
'aw. There is some ambiguity as to whether 
marriage between a Roman Catholic and a non 
Christian is valid. However, dispensations have 
been granted by the church for such marriages. 
DIVORCE UNDER CHRISTIAN LAW: 
The Indian Divorce Act, 1869, which governs 
all Christ ians, discriminates between the husband ' s 
wife has committed adultery. The husband can do 
so if the wife has committed adultery. The wife has 
to prove a second offence along with adultery 
(incest, bigamy, cruelty, desertion) in order to 
obtain a divorce. The Law Commission prepared (in 
1960) to draft bill to this law on the lines of 
provisions for divorce under the Special Marriage 
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Act, 1954. The failure of government to give effect 
lo this suggestion is much to be regretted and it is 
recommended that immediate steps should be taken 
to reform the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 on the lines 
suggested by the Law Commission. 
MAINTENANCE UNDER CHRISTIAN LAW: 
They concede the right only to women. In 
fixing the quantum of maintenance, the courts bear 
in mind the husband 's ability, the wife's own assets 
and the conduct of the parties. The Indian Divorce 
Act, 1869, which governs Christians give discretion 
to the benefit of the husband or the children if 
divorce has been obtained by the husband because 
of the wife an adultery. If the court has decreed 
damages to the husband against the adulterer, it 
may order the settlement of the whole or part of 
this amount for the benefit of the children or 
maintenance of the wife. 
In order to minimize the hardship caused by 
non-payment of maintenance and to ensure 
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certainty of payment, it recommends that all 
maintenance amounts should be deducted at the 
source by the employer as in the case of income 
tax. Where this is not possible, a r rears of 
maintenance should be recovered as ar rears of land 
revenue or by distress as in the case of fines under 
the Criminal Procedure Code. The best solution lies 
in entrust ing the entire question of maintenance to 
specialized courts like family courts which could 
take into consideration the incomes and degrees of 
financial dependence of both spouses in settling 
such mat ters . 
INHERITANCE UNDER CHRISTIAN LAW: 
Christians in Kerela are governed by the 
Travancore Christian Succession Act, 1916, and the 
Cochin Christian Succession Act, 1921. Apart from 
multiplicity, these laws give only a life interest 
terminable on death or remarriage to a widow or 
mother inheriting immovable property. A daughter 's 
right is limited to Stridhanam. Even in cases where 
she is entitled, she takes a much smaller share. We 
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recommend immediate legislation to bring the 
Christian women of Kerela under the Indian 
Succession Act, 1925. 
In Goa, the widow is relegated to the fourth 
position and is entitled to only fruits and 
agricultural commodities. In Pondicherry, the laws 
relegate a woman to an inferior position and do not 
regard her as full owner even in the few cases 
where she can inherit property. We recommend the 
extension of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, to 
these territories. 
SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1 9 5 4 : 
Divorce under this secular form of marriage 
can be obtained by either party for adultery, 
desertion for three years, cruelty unsound mind, 
leprosy, venereal disease, continuous absence for 
seven years, non-resumption of co-habitation for 
one year following a decree of judicial separation of 
resti tution of conjugal rights. In addition, the wife 
can obtain divorce on the grounds of rape, sodomy, 
or bestiality. A special feature of the Act is the right 
to divorce by mutual consent. It is recommended 
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Ihat mutual consent should be recognized as a 
ground for divorce in all the personal laws so that 
two adults whose marriage has , in fact, broken 
down can dissolve it honourably. 
Two general principles should be adopted for 
reforms of all divorce law: (1) there should be parity 
of rights regarding grounds for divorce for both 
partners; and (2) conversion to another religion 
should not be recognized as a ground for divorce as 
it offers and easy way of avoiding matrimonial 
obligations. 
In the light of above discussion it can be 
concluded that s ta tus of woman had gone through 
ups and down in the Indians history. At some time 
in Vedic period or Post Vedic period, woman 
enjoyed almost all equalities with the man in all 
sphere of life like social, political, economic, 
cultural and even religious. Medieval period and 
Islamic period shows deterioration in the position 
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of woman and the time when British came to India. 
And many barbaric practices developed and woman 
was confined to a subordinate s ta tus . She used to 
be behind pardah and living in the seclusion. A wife 
was treated as a property of her husband. The 
subordinate position of woman was deep rooted in 
the Indian society of that period. 
The 19th and 20^^ century shows efforts and 
at tempts of the social reformer for the bet terment 
of woman. In this present social system woman are 
facing various miseries, exploitation and 
oppression. Their husbands and relatives in their 
family and married life have exploited women. 
Woman's are violated by the men sexually or 
otherwise and the always remains silent because of 
limitations of society on her. 
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1. International Law 
The first at the international level, prohibition 
against sex discrimination was first highlighted in 
the United Nation Charter of 1945 and later in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. 
The International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights approved in 1966 guarantees equal 
protection of the law to both sexes. 
World conference on women was held in 
Mexico City in 1975, which highlighted the themes 
of "equality, development". The second world 
conference on women convened in Copenhagen in 
1980, added three sub themes: "education, 
employment and health". In Nairobi, the third world 
conference was held to review and appraise the 
achievements of the United Nations decade for 
women; equality, development and peace (1976-
1985). The goal was set here for the adoption of 
"Forward looking strategies for the advancement of 
women to the year 2000". In its thirty third session 
which was held at Vienna, the commission stressed 
that a drastic effort must be made to revive a 
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flagging campaign for women's advancement 
because there was sufficient evidence to indicate 
thai advances towards women's economic and 
political rights were slow or had actually stopped. 
In its thirty seventh session, the commission 
urged the fourth world conference on women to 
consider women's rights and concerns. This 
conference was held in the capital city of China, 
Beijing in September 1995. The Beijing conference, 
in a series of UN- sponsored global conferences on 
women laid the foundation in the field of human 
rights of women, who constitute nearly half of the 
world population. 
'The Platform For Action' was the blueprint for 
women's advancement in countries around the 
world. It was the main document of the conference. 
A draft document was approved at the Thirty ninth 
session of the UN Commission on the s ta tus of 
women for presentation in Beijing. 
The Beijing conference further expanded the 
agenda for women's empowerment. Issues once 
considered taboo, ideas earlier viewed as too 
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sensi t ive and ac t ions ru led out a s u n a c c e p t a b l e 
were confronted head-on . The exercise led to the 
adopt ion of a platform for ac t ion , u n a n i m o u s l y , by 
abou t 40 coun t r i e s . The platform for act ion 
provides normat ive gu idance for gove rnmen t s who 
bear the pr imary responsibi l i ty for imp lemen t ing i ts 
s t ra teg ic object ives. 
Violence aga ins t women is a global problem. 
Historically men have domina ted women and 
d i sc r imina ted aga ins t t hem. Women 's lack of access 
of legal information, aid or p ro tec t ion , the lack of 
knowledge of law and i n a d e q u a t e efforts by publ ic 
au tho r i t i e s to enforce exist ing laws in some cases 
i nc r ea se s violence aga ins t t hem. 
Action to be t aken by government , employers , 
NGOs and o the r s a re : 
(a) condemn violence aga ins t women and not 
u s e any cus tom, t rad i t ion or re l igious 
cons idera t ion to avoid the i r obl igat ions to 
i ts e l iminat ion; 
(b) Adopt m e a s u r e s to modify the social and 
cu l tu ra l p a t t e r n s of men and women; 
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(c) Provide well funded s h e l t e r s and relief 
s u p p o r t for victims of violence; 
(d) a s s i s t female vict ims of violence due to 
p ros t i tu t ion and trafficking, cons ider 
rat i f icat ion and enforcement on 
trafficking and slavery; 
(e) Develop p rog rammes and p r o c e d u r e s to 
e l iminate sexual h a r a s s m e n t and other 
forms of violence in all educa t iona l 
i n s t i t u t i ons , workplaces and e l sewhere ; 
(f) Promote r e sea r ch on violence aga ins t 
women, encourage the med ia to examine 
the gender s t e reo types and t ake m e a s u r e s 
to e l iminate them. 
The fourth world conference on women, held at 
Beijing j u s t a few years back , h a s b r o u g h t u s 
fur ther forward by reaffirming gender equal i ty as a 
fundamen ta l p re - requ i s i t e for social j u s t i c e , the 
platform for act ion at the Beijing conference 
a d d r e s s e d eleven subs t an t i ve a r e a s of concern , 
poverty, educa t ion , hea l th , violence, a rmed conflict, 
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economic s t ructures and policies, decision-making 
, mechanisms for achievement of women, women's 
human rights, mass media and the environment. 
The conference also attempted to strike a balance 
between local customs, traditions and cul tures and 
indeed, Beijing went even so far as to demand that 
religious and cultural values should contribute to 
the realization of women enjoying full equality. 
Convention on the elimination of all forms 
of discrimination against women (CEDAW), effective 
since 1981, provides that women be given rights 
equal to those of men on equal terms. The preamble 
maintains that "the full and complete development 
of a country, the welfare of the world and the cause 
of peace require the maximum participation of 
women on equal terms with men in all fields^." 
Nothing that great divisions among 
humankind were increasingly being articulated 
along cultural lines, she warned that the 
management of conflict based on cultural and 
religious specificities often resulted in the 
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justification of violence against women both within 
and between conflicting groups. 
Mukta Tomar (India) said the progress of 
any society was dependent on its ability to protect 
and promote the rights of its women. The 
guaranteeing of equal rights and privileges for 
women by the constitution had marked the first 
step towards the transformation of the s ta tus of 
women in India. As a result of concerted efforts and 
a comprehensive policy framework over the last five 
decades, there had been significant advances in the 
socio-economic indicators for women. 
Empowerment for women was critical for the 
socio-economic progress of any country. The 
Government of India was convinced that education 
was the key for the advancement of women. The 
spread of liberal education and values had 
unleashed forces for social reform and created 
awareness about the need for increased 
participation of women in the educational, social, 
economic and political life of India. In addition to 
the role of the State and the Constitutional 
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provisions that existed, the judiciary had also 
played a key role in the advancement of gender 
justice in India. The Supreme Court of India had 
delivered landmark pronouncement on mat ters 
such as the need for equal property rights for 
women, and grass roots groups organizing women 
had become agents of social change, enabling 
access to financial and material resources^. 
Violence against women is an obstacle to 
the achievement of the objective of equality, 
development and peace. Violence against women 
both violets and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment 
by women by their human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The long- standing failure to protect and 
promote those rights and freedoms in the case of 
violence against women is a matter of concern to all 
states and should be addressed. Knowledge about 
its causes and consequence, as well as its 
incidence and measures to combat it, have been 
greatly expanded since the Nairobi Conference. In 
all societies, to a greater or lesser degree, women 
and girls are subjected to physical, sexual and 
psychological abuse that cuts across lines of 
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income, class and culture. The low social and 
econonnic s ta tus of women can be both cause and a 
consequence of violence against women. 
The term "violence against women" means 
any act of gender based violence that resul ts in, or 
is likely in, physical, sexual or psychological harm 
or suffering to women, including threa ts of such 
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, 
whether occurring in public or private life. 
Accordingly, violence against women encompasses 
but is not limited to the following: 
Physical, sexual and psychological violence 
occurring in the family, including battering, sexual 
abuse of female children in the household, dowry 
related violence, martial rape, female genital 
mutilation and other traditional practices harmful 
to women, non-spousal violence related to 
exploitation; 
Physical, sexual and psychological violence 
perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever its 
occurs. 
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Acts or threats of violence, whether 
occurring within the home or in the community, or 
perpetrated or condoned by the state, instill fear 
and insecurity in women's lives and are obstacles 
to the achievement of equality and for development 
and peace. The fear of violence, including 
harassment , is a permanent constraint on the 
mobility of women and limits their access to 
resources and basic activities. High social, health 
and economic costs to the individual and society 
are associated with violence against women. 
Violence against women is one of the crucial social 
mechanisms by which women are forced into a 
subordinate position compared with men. In many 
cases, violence against women and girls occurs in 
the family or within the home, where violence is 
often tolerated. The neglect, physical and sexual 
abuse, and rape of girl children and women by 
family members of the household, as well as 
incidences of spousal and non-spousal abuse, often 
go unreported and are thus difficult to detect. Even 
when such violence is reported, there is often a 
failure to protect victims or punish perpetrators . 
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Violence against women is a manifestation 
of the historically unequal power relations between 
men and women, which have led to domination over 
and discrimination against women by men and to 
the prevention of women's full advancement. 
The world conference on Human Rights 
reaffirmed the solemn commitment of all s ta tes to 
fulfill their obligation to promote universal respect 
for, and observance and protection of, all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all, in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
other ins t ruments relating to human rights, and 
international law. 
Bearing in mind the Programme of Action of 
the international Conference on population and 
Development and the Vienna Declaration and 
programme of Action adopted by the World 
conference on Human Rights, the Fourth World 
Conference on women reaffirms that reproductive 
rights rest on the recognition of the basic right of 
all couples and individuals to decide freely and 
responsibly the number, spacing and timing of 
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their children and to have the information and 
means to do so, and the right to attain the highest 
s tandard of sexual and reproductive health. It also 
includes their right to make decisions concerning 
reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and 
violence, as expressed in human rights documents . 
Violence against women both violates and 
impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of 
human rights and fundamental freedom. Taking 
into account the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence against Women and the work of special 
Reporters, gender-based violence, such as battering 
and other domestic violence, sexual abuse, sexual 
slavery and exploitation. 
In addressing the enjoyment of human 
rights. Governments and other actors should 
promote an active and visible policy of 
mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policies 
and programmes so that, before decisions are 
taken, an analysis is made of the effects on women 
and men, respectively^. 
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Since the Vienna Conference on Human Rights 
in 1993, the slogan 'women's rights are human 
right's has come to be formally acknowledged and 
adopted at the inter governmental level. The 
increasing ratification of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (referred to as CEDAW) following Vienna 
and Beijing has created the illusion tha t the state 
parties have indeed recognized that gender based 
violations constitute human rights violations and 
need serious intervention on their par t to address 
it4. 
The barriers faced in claiming human rights 
for women, both in terms of the general and special 
human rights framework, and in conclusion outline 
some contentious issues that continue to confront 
women's human rights. Although India is a 
ratifying party to both general and special human 
rights s tandards set out in the ICCPR, and CEDAW, 
Women's rights continue to be marginalized from 
the normative framework of the human rights 
regime by the state. While the position set out here 
is by no means specific to India, and indeed 
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reflects the problem areas within international 
human rights order, the examples drawn upon here 
are from the Indian context. 
Gender based human rights abuse would refer 
to denial or violation of rights on the ground of 
being female. Sex has been the basis for 
differentially attributing to men and women certain 
roles, relations and identities. The socialised roles 
thus at tr ibuted are based on assumptions about 
men and women, which are variously drawn from 
culture, tradition and religion. These underlying 
assumptions have been the justification for 
delineating different rights, responsibilities and 
resources to men and women in the family, the 
society; the market and the state. Although these 
roles are not static but vary over time and cul tures, 
they have historically disadvantaged women in 
terms of fixing greater degree of responsibilities on 
them while allowing them lesser choices, lesser 
rights and subordinate s ta tus . 
The gendered reality for women determines the 
nature and circumstances of the human rights 
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violations specific to women, as well as the 
availability and accessibility of remedies for them. 
It is therefore important to draw into the human 
rights framework, the impact of gendered social 
reality on the women's rights. For example, in a 
cultural context such as India, where women are 
perceived as custodians of culture, the violations of 
their right to life and bodily integrity is different 
from men in a situation of communal or caste 
violence. Although the sexual abuse of women of 
the victim group nearly always accompanies such 
violence, most documentation of such incidents, 
reflect, the numbers of those killed and injured, 
comprising largely of made victims. The capacity of 
human rights documentation frameworks to take 
into account such gender specific violations is 
severely limited. 
An even more contentious area of 
discrimination has been the private sphere, given 
the power vested in the inst i tut ions of family and 
the community to arbiter women's rights and 
freedoms. Significant numbers of women "are 
routinely subject to torture, starvation, terrorism, 
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humiliation, mutilation; and even murder" within 
the family simply because they are female. "Crimes 
such as these against any group other than women 
would be recognised as a civil and political 
emergency as well as a gross violation of the 
victim's humanity." However the human rights 
discourse for most part of its existence, failed to 
recognise such violations as falling within its 
purview, despite its claims of universality. 
There exist serious limitations in 'extending' 
human rights guarantees to women despite being 
framed as available without discrimination on the 
basis of sex. The general human rights framework 
adopted a normative male model of rights violations 
and as a result excluded in its application 
differently situated persons. Its primary focus has 
been the state sanctioned or condoned oppression 
in the public sphere, far removed from the private 
spaces where women's lives are circumscribed. The 
application of these norms to persons in unequal 
situations has inflicted ra ther that alleviated 
discrimination against women, because its neutral 
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framework fails to take into account the historical 
discrimination against women. 
The historical context of the cold war 
separated the civil political rights from the socio 
economic and cultural, fragmenting for times to 
come, the indivisible bundle of rights. The debate 
on human rights thereafter has been ridden with 
dilemmas on prioritization of one set of rights over 
the other the civil political over the socio economic 
and cultural . That most persons exercising civil 
political rights in the public sphere are male, given 
their unhindered access to the public/political 
sphere in contract to the socio cultural barriers 
that hinder women's participation in the public 
sphere was not considered. This prioritization of 
the civil and political has impaired the recognition 
of women's rights given that often the a t ta inment of 
right to life for women is conditional upon and 
mediated through the realm of socio cultural and 
economic rights. For example, the lack of full 
reproductive rights has been known to be life 
threatening to women in many par ts of the world, 
as reflected in the high maternal mortality and 
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deaths from unsafe abortion services. Although 
reproductive rights may be of significance to men, 
they by no means have a direct impact on their life 
and survival. 
Further, the violator in terms of the general 
human rights framework has always been the state 
acting through its agents. It has failed to and 
resisted taking note of private actors contributing 
to systemic forms of discrimination against women 
in the private sphere. Domestic violence is a case 
in point. This constitutes one of the most universal 
and systemic forms of gender based discrimination. 
While there may be instances of violence against 
individual men this does not consti tute a pat tern of 
violence experienced by men in any given society. 
In response to critiques of the general human 
rights framework, it has often been argued that the 
increasing numbers of women are entering the 
political and public sphere are equally vulnerable 
to state abuse as reflected in cases of custodial 
rape and torture of women. Hence, it is asserted 
that the traditional model of human rights is valid 
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and inclusive of gender specific abuse. This 
position continues to invisibles conditioning that 
once married a woman belongs to her marital home 
and must exist it only the immutable power and 
control exercised by the family and the community 
over women, which is parallel only to that of the 
state in case of men. When socio cultural norms 
deny women both spaces and capacity of existing 
independently of marriage or family, their situation 
in domestic violence is similar to that of a victim of 
custodial violence. The reality that legal redress , 
however flawed, does exist is obscured by the social 
conditioning that once married a woman belongs to 
her marital home and must exists it only upon 
death. It is therefore not surprising that a high 
number of cases of domestic violence come to fatal 
conclusions. The state through the law has clearly 
enabled the social norms and the family to regulate 
women's rights. Despite such evidence, the general 
human rights the community through public 
education and health care programmes along with 
programmes and laws that s trengthen the s ta tus of 
the girl child and women generally. The effect of 
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Ihc present law with its emphasis on policing 
individualizes the problem without implicating the 
larger s t ructures , traditions and the discriminatory 
state laws that together contribute to the 
subordination of women. 
India, like many other state part ies , has 
ratified CEDAW with a declaration that limits its 
obligations relating to changing the discriminatory 
cultural practices within the community and the 
family. Hence in relation to Articles 5(a) 16(1), the 
Indian state declares that "it shall abide by and 
ensure these provision in conformity with its policy 
of non-interference in the personal affairs of any 
community without its initiative and consent". 
Thus in Indian discriminatory provision for women 
within marriage and family continue to be asserted 
and defended as a cultural and religious right. In a 
similar vein, many other state part ies to CEDAW 
have either in general terms or in relation to 
specific provisions limited their obligation on the 
ground of inconformity with the Sha'ria laws which 
govern rights in relation to the family and /or the 
criminal jus t ices system. 
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Women's human rights remains a contentious 
area, given the high number of reservations, apathy 
in translating treaty obligations into express 
legislative enactment at home, the inadequate 
accountability and enforcement and the alienation 
of individual from accessing the treaty body for 
enforcement of these rights. At the level of setting 
normative s tandards , wide ratification of CEDAW is 
an achievement for women's human rights agenda. 
However until the issues of accountability, 
enforceability and individual redress remain 
unresolved human rights will remain far-fetched for 
women. This section takes an overview of the 
contentious issues in the context of women's 
human rights and the challenges emerging in 
relation to them. 
International law is premised on the principal 
of state sovereignty that allows ratifying s ta tes to 
limit or modify their obligations under a treaty. 
Admittedly, state ratification, and the resulting 
obligation to eliminate discrimination against 
women, is an achievement both in terms of 
transforming human rights generally and in 
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validating a conceptual framework for women's 
human rights. To that extent, reservations can be 
viewed instrumentally as an enabling device that 
facilitates state endorsement of normative 
s tandards on women's issues of implementation 
and accountability are bound to arise and 
consensus building. 
India's declaration which limits its obligations 
under CEDAW, and other reservations of similar 
intent give rise to both technical and conceptual 
issues relation to tenability of such reservations. 
The Vienna law of treaties governing reservations 
permits only those reservations that are consistent 
with the object and purpose of the treaty in 
question. Further, the reservation is required to be 
specific and not vague, and be made in good faith 
by the state party. Reservations to CEDAW, such as 
that of India, amount to an unqualified exemption 
for the state from intervening in discriminatory 
cultural practices in the private sphere even 
though by ratification the state implicitly 
acknowledges the need for such intervention. Since 
India's reservation fails to specify a time frame of 
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limit the nature of interventions envisaged by 
CEDAW, it is inconceivable for a state to completely 
disclaim it obligation to pro-actively transform 
discriminatory customary practices through at 
least one of the many forms of interventions at the 
programmatic, policy and legislative levels. 
Underlying the issue of reservations is the 
sovereign right of a state to limit its obligations in 
relation to other states. Generally, international 
treaties constitute an exchange of obligations 
between states and allow for reservations to enable 
states to limit of modify their obligations in certain 
areas. However, human rights treaties are 
differently placed, in that they relate to the rights 
guaranteed to persons, which upon ratification the 
state under takes to protect. Many of these rights 
are non-derivable, and accountability of the state 
flows regardless of ratification of the treaty 
containing the same. This therefore puts human 
rights treaties on a different footing from other 
treaties under international law, justifying a more 
stringent scrutiny of its reservation. Hence, it can 
be argued that the treaty consti tuted for monitoring 
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h u m a n r igh ts t r ea t i e s need to have the power to 
scru t in ize r e se rva t ions to examine thei r 
compatibi l i ty with the object and p u r p o s e of the 
t rea ty , and i ts effect on the integr i ty of the 
concerned t rea ty . In the event a r e se rva t ion is 
found u n a c c e p t a b l e , the t rea ty body ough t to sever 
the s ame , while con t inu ing the opera t ion of the 
t rea ty aga ins t the s t a te par ty wi thou t the benefi t of 
the r e se rva t ion . 
The i s sue of validity i of c u l t u r a l re la t iv is t 
a r g u m e n t s to justify s t a t e deroga t ion from its 
h u m a n r igh t s obl igat ions in re la t ion to women ' s 
r ights is cri t ical given the large n u m b e r of 
r e se rva t ions m a d e on th i s b a s i s . The r e t r e a t from 
such respons ib i l i ty condones and re-aff i rms the 
p a t r i a r c h a l control of c o m m u n i t i e s over the i r 
women. Ind ia ' s rese rva t ion to CEDAW, c a s t s as ide 
d i sc r imina t ion aga ins t women as an i s s u e for the 
communi ty to resolve au tonomous ly . This posi t ion 
con t i nues to s u s t a i n and r e - c o n s t r u c t the false 
d ichotomies of p u b l i c / p r i v a t e , civil po l i t i ca l / soc io 
economic and indiv idual /co l lec t ive t h a t women ' s 
r ights movement and more recent ly , the 
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i n t e rna t iona l h u m a n r ights law h a s tr ied ha rd to 
erode. 
In no tab le con t ras t , women ' s m o v e m e n t s have 
explored i s s u e s of cu l tu ra l specifici t ies to a s s e r t 
the mult ipl ici ty of ident i t ies and diversi ty of the 
s t ruggles t h a t cons t i tu t e it. Cu l tu ra l con tex t s ; have 
not been u s e d by women to waive the i r r igh t s to 
equal i ty and dignity, a s is reflected in the h is tory 
of the mak ing of CEDAW. In the d e b a t e s leading to 
the adopt ion of the Convent ion, Afghanis tan had 
said t h a t overcoming d i sc r imina t ion would requ i re 
"combat ing of t r ad i t ions c u s t o m s and u s a g e s which 
thwar t the a d v a n c e m e n t of women. . . (and) i n t ense 
educa t iona l efforts . . .designed to en l igh ten publ ic 
opinion". The drafting commit tee for the 
Convent ion itself cons t i tu t ed r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from 
Iran, Egypt, Phi l ippines , G h a n a and o the r coun t r i e s 
known for the i r s t rong t r ad i t iona l and cu l tu ra l 
moor ings . When the draft Convent ion was finally 
pu t to vote a t the Commiss ion on the S t a t u s of 
Women, the r ep re sen t a t i ve s from different cu l t u r a l 
context col labora ted ac ros s geo-poli t ical 
b o u n d a r i e s to r e t a in the Convent ion ' s m a n d a t e on 
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state obligation to eliminate discriminatory cultural 
and traditional practices. In contrast , the 
reservations by the state parties have used cultural 
relativism to uphold discriminatory cultural 
practices even when these violate women's human 
rights. This view tends to project culture as being 
fixed and homogenous, with no democratic space 
for plurality of interpretations or practice, which in 
fact is incorrect since diversity in norms and 
practice has always existed. Given that women as a 
social group have suffered the maximum human 
rights violation in the name of culture, it is 
important to begin investigating and exposing the 
primary beneficiaries of such claims and their 
politics. In such instances it is important for 
women's and human rights groups to begin 
questioning the s ta tus of the speaker, and the 
participation of the affected social group in 
formulating a reservation that curtails their human 
rights. 
Most other human rights t reat ies can be 
invoked for individual redress and for insti tuting 
inquiry against systemic violations through their 
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respective optional protocols. CEDAW however, is 
yet without one. Although women's rights groups 
have been able to lobby for considerable support 
for an optional protocol, but it has yet to be 
adopted by the General Assembly and transformed 
into a treaty. It remains to be seen whether state 
parties consider women's rights issue serious 
enough to strengthen international mechanisms for 
their enforcement, at least to a stage equivalent to 
the other human rights t reat ies. The optional 
protocol if passed, would allow the CEDAW 
however, is yet without one. Although women's 
rights groups have been able to lobby for 
considerable support for an optional protocol, but 
it has yet to be adopted by the General Assembly 
and transformed into a treaty. It remains to be seen 
whether state parties consider women's rights 
issues serious enough to strengthen international 
mechanisms for their enforcement at least to a 
stage equivalent to the other human rights treaties. 
The optional protocol if passed, would allow the 
CEDAW Committee to entertain individual petitions 
and enquire into issues of systematic and mass 
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discrimination, only upon a separate ratification of 
the protocol by the state in addition to its 
ratification of CEDAW. 
Although international human rights order has 
transformed itself conceptually in response to 
repeated challenges from women's rights movement, 
the conclusive test of its effectiveness lies in its 
enforceability in the municipal arena. The 
jur isprudence on municipal enforcement of 
international human rights law has evolved. Rather 
than making enforcement conditional strictly upon 
legislative enactment, there is a growing tendency 
to read international human rights law into the 
constitutional law in areas where the domestic laws 
are vague or even silent. 
Since human rights treaties once ratified by a 
state, secures to individuals a universal s tandard 
of human dignity (rather than mere inter state 
obligations), the ratification creates a legitimate 
expectation in individuals for securing the rights 
guaranteed under the treaty. 
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In Vishakha & ors. V. State of Rajasthan 86 
ors, the supreme court upheld the rights of working 
women against sexual harassment in working 
places relying on the provisions of the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) and the fundamental 
rights conferred by articles 14,15,19(1) (g) and 21 
of the Constitution of India. The court declared: 
"In the absence of domestic law occupying 
the field, to formulate effective measures 
to check the evil of sexual harassment of 
working women at all workplaces, the 
contents of international covenants and 
norms are significant for the purpose of 
interpretation of the guarantee of gender 
equality, right to work with human 
dignity in Articles 14,15,19(l)(g) and 21 
of the constitution and safe guards 
against sexual harassment implicit 
thereon. Any international convention not 
inconsistent with the fundamental rights 
and in harmony with its spirit must be 
read into these provision to enlarge the 
meaning and content thereof, to promote 
the object of the constitutional 
guarantee' '^. 
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The rights of women are Central to our vision 
of a democratic society. But the fine works of these 
documents and of the Vienna Declaration in 1993 
and the declaration of Beijing in 1995 stand in 
sharp contrast to the dully reality of life for 
millions of women. Of the 1.3 billion people living 
in poverty, 70 per cent are women; the majority of 
the world's refugees are women: female illiteracy is 
invariably higher than male illiteracy. Women and 
girl-children are treated as commodities is cross-
border prostitution rackets and the pornography 
industry. Millions of girls are still subject to genital 
mutilation, while women in every country are 
regular victims of domestic violence. In many 
countries, women lack across to reproductive 
health care and every day women are targeted in 
armed conflicts. Women's economic, social and 
cultural rights continue to be neglected. 
There can be no peace, security or sustainable 
economic development in societies, which deny 
human rights, including the human rights of 
women. This is gradually being understood by 
governments and their willingness to discuss with 
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the United Nations the application of international 
invStrumcnts, including the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. 
Fighting for women's human rights is a 
positive struggle which recognizes the quality of a 
woman's contribution in every aspect of the 
community: 
Over the last decade, the concept of gender 
has increasingly informed policy programming and 
treaty interpretation both within and outside the 
United Nations system. Much of the impetus came 
from the consensus on the need to regress gender 
inequality that was reached at the United Nations' 
global conferences of the 1990s. But the global 
conferences were only one step in a long process of 
considering the concept of gender within the UN 
system. 
The principle of the equal rights of women and 
men was recognized in the Center of the United 
Nations, and is contained in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and all subsequent 
major international human Rights and all 
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subsequent major international human rights 
ins t ruments . Confirmation of the principle of 
equality in these ins t ruments was an important 
step in the recognition of the rights of women. Yet 
traditional exclusion of women from the public 
domain has persisted in many countries-relegating 
women to the private domain. 
The need for women's participation in all 
spheres of society-in both the public and the 
private domains and the recognition of inequality 
and discrimination in the private domain, led to the 
creation, of specific s tandards for the protection of 
women's rights, ' In 1979, the United Nations 
General Assemble adopted the Convention on the 
Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW). CEDAW establishes women's right 
to non-discrimination on the basis of sex, and 
affirms equality in international law .It provides 
that women and men are entitled to the equal 
enjoyment and exercise of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in civil, cultural , economic, 
political and social fields. 
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The 1993 Vienna Conference on Human 
Rights, the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population 
and Development and the 1995 Beijing Women' 
World Conference, recognized the need to build on 
these principles to assert women's rights. These 
global conferences promoted the review of policies 
and programmes from the perspective of their 
impact on women and men in other words, a re-
evaluation of policies and programmes from a 
gender perspective. 
The incorporation of a gender perspective in 
the work of the United Nations is fundamental to 
the process of mainstreaming gender. 
Mainstreaming gender is an acknowledgement of 
the different ways in which gender roles and gender 
relations shape women's and men's access to 
rights, resources and opportunities, within and 
between cultures, and at different stages in their 
life cycles. 
Its aim is to achieve the advancement of 
women through correcting disparities in different 
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policy sectors and ensuring their enjoyment of civil, 
cultural, economic, political and social rights. 
As the lead United Nations organization for the 
follow-up and implementation of the Vienna 
Programme of Action, OHCHR is fully committed to 
maintaining a policy dialogue on human rights and 
gender mainstreaming with its UN Partners 
(particularly UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNFPA and 
the Division for the Advancement of Women), as 
well as with government, development banks, 
bilateral aid agencies, NGOs and civil society. The 
objective is to build common unders tanding of the 
fundamental link between gender issues and the 
human rights of women and girl-children. 
The persistence of unequal outcomes suggests 
that women's as well as men's experiences require 
explicit attention in terms of the protection and 
promotion of human rights. While great progress 
has been made in recent years in the collection of 
data disaggregated by sex. Such data are not yet 
consistently used as a basis for legal and policy 
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measures in promoting the enjoyment of human 
rights. 
Access to, and control of, productive 
resources, particularly land, are key factors in 
addressing women's poverty. Although women's 
right to own land is often legally established, 
gender asymmetry in access to and control over 
land is one of the main obstacles to the full 
participating of women in rural development. 
Because of continuing exclusion of women from, 
and discrimination against women in, acquiring 
land, security of tenure and inheritance rights to 
land and property, women also face particular 
constraints in securing their right to housing. The 
continued discrimination women face in all matters 
relating to land and property has been identified as 
the single most critical factor in the perpetuation of 
gender inequality and poverty. 
Education is also a prerequisite for effective 
economic participation. Education and training for 
women and girls yields high social and economic 
re turns , and is a precondition for the empowerment 
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of women. While enrolment ratios for boys and girls 
at the primary level are approaching equality 
everywhere, differences persist at the regional level 
and for different age groups and levels of schooling, 
especially at higher levels. Two thirds of the world's 
illiterate adults are women, with illiteracy highest 
among older women who never had the opportunity 
to go to school. 
Although women's participation in various 
aspects of economic and community life has 
increased, it remains lower than that of men .The 
female economic activity rate is now nearly 70 per 
cent of the male rate in developing countries, 
ranging from 86 per cent in East Asia to 50 per 
cent in Latin America and the Caribbean. A large 
part of women's work is in low-paid or unpaid 
occupations. In agriculture, family enterprises and 
the informal sector, women have little possibility 
for savings, credit or investment, and limited 
security. Women's work is poorly measured in 
official statistics in spite of its t remendous 
importance for the well-being of families. 
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Women work in different jobs and occupations 
than men, almost always with lower s ta tus and pay 
.In the industrialized countries, unemployment is 
higher among women than men, and women 
account for 75 per cent of unpaid family workers. 
In many parts of the world, women who are poor 
remain unable to exercise their right to loans and 
credit, even though this right is established under 
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women and is considered to 
be a powerful toll in overcoming poverty and 
economic dependence. 
Analysis of the content and na ture of human 
rights, as well as of measures to ensure their 
enjoyment, should be informed by gender-based 
considerations. There are many processes at the 
domestic and international levels through which the 
content of human rights is clarified and their 
implementation occurs. The systematic integration 
of gender factors into these processes, into 
measures for implementation and into domestic and 
international monitoring, remains to be achieved. 
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In the enjoyment of rights, women face 
constraints and vuhicrabilities, which differ from 
those that affect men and which are of significance 
relevance to the enjoyment of these rights. At the 
same time, these variables mean that women may 
be affected by violations of rights in ways that are 
different from men. Women are disproportionately 
affected by poverty and social marginalization 
.Women suffer systemic and systematic 
discrimination, which result in deep pat terns of 
inequality and disadvantage. The overall level of 
development and of resources available to 
countries, women's literacy levels and women's 
access to information and to legal remedies also 
have an impact on women's enjoyment of their 
rights. 
Many women experience multiple barriers in 
gaining access to rights such as employment, 
housing, land, food and social security. Women's 
social position, marital s ta tus , class, or 
membership in particularly vulnerable groups, such 
as refugee or migrant women, rural or urban poor 
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women, are often linked to de facto, and sometimes 
also to de jure, discrimination. 
International human rights ins t ruments , the 
Beijing Platform for Action and the Vienna 
Declaration and programme of Action provide a 
solid basis for promoting women's enjoyment of 
their human rights. Including those related to 
economic development and resources, and the 
alleviation of women's poverty. The Platform for 
Action recognizes the impact of gender on the 
enjoyment of human rights, including access to 
rights, opportunities and resources, and with 
regard to t reatment in many areas . Together with 
international human rights ins t ruments , the 
platform for Action emphasizes that such gender-
based inequalities and disadvantage need to be 
addressed explicitly in all actions of governments 
and of other actors entrusted with their 
implementation. 
In our country we have implemented the 
provisions of CEDAW and other international 
conventions including Beijing convention into our 
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municipal law. Supreme Court has played a 
significant role in this direction one the leading 
case decided by the Supreme Court is Vishakha Vs 
state of Rajasthan. 
The judgment of the court was delivered by 
J .S . Verma, C.J. on behalf of Sujata v. Manohar 
and B.N. Kirpal, J . J . on a writ petition filed by 
Vishaka, a non-governmental organization working 
of "gender equality" by way of PIL seeking 
enforcement of fundamental rights of working 
women under Art. 14, 19 and 21 of the 
constitution. In holding so the court relied on 
international conventions and norms, which are 
significant in interpretation of guarantee of gender 
equality, right to work with human dignity in 
Articles 14,15,19 (1) (a) and 21 of the constitution 
and the safeguards against sexual harassment 
implicit therein. The immediate cause of filling the 
petition was alleged brutal gang rape of social 
worker of Rajasthan. The Supreme Court, in 
absence of enacted law to provide for effective 
enforcement of basic human rights of gender 
equali ty and g u a r a n t e e aga ins t h a r a s s m e n t , laid 
down the following guidel ine. 
1. All employers pe r sons in charge of work place 
whe the r in the publ ic or pr iva te sec tor , should 
t ake appropr i a t e s t eps to p reven t sexual 
h a r a s s m e n t wi thout prejudice to the general i ty 
of h is obligation, he should t ake t he fowling 
s t eps : 
(a) Express prohibi t ion of sexual 
h a r a s s m e n t which inc lude physical 
con tac t and advance ; sexual ly colored 
r e m a r k s showing po rnograph ic or any 
o ther unwelcome phys ica l , verbal or 
non-verba l conduc t of sexua l n a t u r e 
should be not iced, p u b l i s h e d and 
c i rcu la ted in app rop r i a t e ways . 
(b) The ru le of regula t ion of Government 
and publ ic sector bodies re la t ing to 
conduc t and discipl ine inc lude ru les 
prohib i t ing sexua l h a r a s s m e n t and 
provide for app rop r i a t e p e n a l t i e s in 
such ru les aga ins t the offender. 
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(c) As r ega rds to pr ivate employers , s t eps 
should be taken to inc lude the aforesaid 
prohibi t ion in the s t a n d i n g o rde r s u n d e r 
the indus t r i a l employment (Standing 
order) Act, 1946. 
(d) Appropr ia te work condi t ions shou ld be 
provided in r e spec t of work le i sure 
hea l th and hygiene to fu r the r e n s u r e 
t h a t the re is no hos t i le env i ronmen t 
towards women at work place and no 
woman should have r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d s 
to believe t h a t she is d i s advan t aged in 
connect ion with her employment . 
2. Where such conduc t a m o u n t s to specific 
offences u n d e r the Indian Penal Code or u n d e r 
any o ther law, the employer shal l in i t ia te 
app rop r i a t e act ion in acco rdance with law by 
mak ing a compla in t with the app rop r i a t e 
au tho r i t y 
3. The vict ims of sexual h a r a s s m e n t would have 
the option to seek t rans fe r of the p e r p e t r a t o r 
or the i r own t ransfer . 
120 
When, however instances of sexual harassment 
resuming in violation o fundamental rights of 
women workeis under Arts, 14,19 and 21 are 
brought before the Court of redressed under Art 32 
of the constitution ineffective redressed requires 
that some guidelines should be laid down for the 
protection of these rights to fill the legislative 
vacuum, Mr. Just ice Verma said 
A STUDY OF THE CASE OF APPAREL EXPORT 
PROMOTION COUNCIL v . A.K. CHOPRA^ 
Harassment at the work place by the males is 
the reality of the working woman's life. In a historic 
blow for gender justice, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, 
upheld the removal of an employee from services of 
the Apparel Export Promotion Council on charges of 
sexual harassment , quashing an earlier verdict of 
the Delhi High Court., the Apex Court. The Apex 
court observed that lenient action in such cases 
was bound to have a de-moralizing effect on 
working women. 
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Apparel Export Promotion, Council v. A.K. 
Chopra, is the first case in which the Supreme 
Court applied the law laid down in the case of 
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan and upheld the 
dismissal from service of superior officer of the 
Delhi based Apparel. Export Promotion Council who 
was found guilty of sexual harassment of a 
subordinate female employee at the place of work 
on the ground that it violated her fundamental 
right guaranteed by Art 21 of the Constitution. 
The Hon'ble Supreme Court said that the 
observations made by the High Court that since Mr. 
Chopra did not 'actually molest' the woman, 
rebelled against realism and had no credibility. Mr. 
Chopra's conduct was unbecoming of good conduct 
and behavior 'expected from a superior officer and 
amounted to sexual harassment . The Hon'ble 
Supreme Court observed that there is no gain 
saying that each incident of sexual harassment at 
the place of work, resul ts in violation of 
fundamental right to gender equality and the right 
to life and liberty the two most precious 
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fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution 
of India. 
The above provisions, rather than providing a 
remedy for female harassed at the place of work, 
actually prove counter productive. This is because 
"outrage to the modesty of a woman" is an essential 
ingredient of the offence, the entire trial is devoted 
to determine whether the woman had any modesty 
to speak of. In this way, the victim is put on trial 
not the offender. It has been observed that the 
accused cannot be convicted of this offence where 
the victim had no modesty to mention or it was not 
such as to be outraged by the act at tr ibuted to the 
offender. 
One may contend that the term "condition of 
work" would take within its fold harassment at 
work place and the complaint procedures provided 
under the Act would be sufficient to deal with 
sexual and gender based harassment claims. This 
however cannot be accepted because it requires 
special attention. It cannot be dealt with as one 
among many issues. 
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Thus, existing laws do not serve the purpose. 
Actually, the Employers must have a duty to 
provide a suitable working environment . It can be 
observed that: 
1. A certain and detailed company policy 
regarding sexual and gender based 
harassment should be adopted and such 
policy must be well publicized. 
2. An institutionalized but informal 
complaint procedure should be set up 
with high ranking female officials to hear 
complaints. 
3. Secrecy must be ensured to the victim. 
4. Special investigative agency must exist 
comprising both male and female officials 
to investigate the compliant 
5. appropriate disciplinary action must be 
taken against the offender. 
6. immediate action must be taken on every 
compliant in this regard. 
124 
Employers mus t be liable for sexual of gender 
based h a r a s s m e n t caused to female Employees by 
supe rv i so r s with or wi thout ac tua l de legated 
au thor i ty , with or wi thout knowledge of the 
employer . However, the employer may be 
d i scharged from such liability if she or he , a s the 
case may be , had (i) c rea ted a rea l and respons ive 
avenue of compla in t ; (ii) an e x p r e s s policy aga ins t 
h a r a s s m e n t at work place; and (iii) met icu lous ly 
imp lemen ted it. Against the growing social m e n a c e 
of sexua l h a r a s s m e n t of women At the work p lace , 
Hon'ble S u p r e m e cour t h a s i s sued cer ta in 
guide l ines in Vishaka v. S ta te of R a j a s t h a n . 
It is a m a t t e r of na t iona l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
concern t h a t not w i th s t and ing the Universal 
Declara t ion of H u m a n Rights and the In t e rna t i ona l 
covenan t s and o ther Dec la ra t ions of Rights and the 
pe rmea t ion of h u m a n r igh t s ph i losophy into 
munic ipa l law, violat ions of women r igh t s a re on 
the i nc rease in many coun t r i e s inc lud ing India . 
H u m a n r igh t s ac t iv is ts all over the world have a 
chal lenging t a s k before them. Sp read ing a w a r e n e s s 
of h u m a n r igh t s is impor tan t , bu t more i m p o r t a n t 
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ivS promotion of universal respect for human rights 
among the instrumentali t ies of s tates and citizens 
alike and prevention of violations of these precious 
rights. 
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Part -A (ii) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The Preamble of the Constitution emphasizes 
on the ultimate authority of the people from whom 
the Constitution emerges. There is no sex 
discrimination. The words "WE THE PEOPLE OF 
INDIA" include both males and females. 
The Preamble outlines four objectives of the 
Indian Republic, viz. justice, liberty, equality and 
fraternity. 'Justice ' implies reconcilement of 
individual conduct with the general welfare of the 
society. The essence of just ice lies in the 
at tainment of the common good. It embraces as the 
preamble proclaims the entire social, economic and 
political spheres of human activity. 
The word 'liberty' in the Preamble, signifies 
not only the absence of any arbitrary restraint on 
the freedom of individual's action but also for the 
creation of conditions which would provide for the 
necessary ingredient required for the proper 
development of the personality of the individual. 
Since society consists of individuals social progress 
depends on the progress of individuals. Hence, it is 
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in the interest of the society to ensure the 
maximum liberty of thought and action of the 
individual consistent with the circumstances and 
social conditions. 
The two words 'liberty' and 'equality' are 
complimentary. Equality does not mean that all 
human beings are mentally and physically equal. It 
signifies equality of s ta tus and equal opportunity. 
Emphasis has been laid on the objective of 
'fraternity' in order to ensure two things, viz. the 
dignity of the individual and unity and integrity of 
the country. It is the spirit of brotherhood that is 
emphasized by the expression 'fraternity'. In a 
country like ours with diverse religion, language, 
culture and social system, unity can be achieved 
through the spirit of fraternity. 
Right to Equality: 
"Art 141, Equality Before Law: The State shall 
not deny to any person equality before law or equal 
protection of laws within the territory of India." 
The Constitution of India guarantees equality 
before law or equal protection of laws to every 
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person irrespective of the fact that he is, or he is 
not the citizen of India. Both the phrases aim to 
establish what is called the equality of s ta tus and 
of opportunities as envisaged in the Preamble. 
Article 14 of the Constitution prevents any 
arbitrary discrimination. 
Interpreting the scope of this Article 
A technical pedantic or doctrinaire approach 
should not be made and the doctrine should not be 
involved even if different scales of pay, service 
conditions, leave etc. are introduced in different or 
dissimilar posts . 
Article 14 forbids hostile discrimination but not 
reasonable classification. Art, 14 certainly applies 
where equals are treated-differently without any 
reasonable basis . Where equals and unequal are 
treated differently, Art, 14 would have no 
application. 
In its struggle for social and political freedom, 
mankind has always tried to move forward to the 
idea of equality for all. The urge for equality and 
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liberty has been the moving force of many 
resolutions. 
However, fulfillment of complete equality 
between men and women in all spheres of life is a 
distant dream. The laws of a country can at best 
assure to its citizens only a limited measure of 
equality. The Constitution makers mind only 
political and legal equality and the s ta tus of a 
fundamental right. Aspects like economic and social 
equality were included within the scope of Directive 
Principles of the State Policy. Article 15(1) of the 
Constitution ensures prohibition of discrimination 
on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of 
birth. Stated in words, it s tands as follows^: 
The State shall not discriminate against any citizen 
on grounds only of religion, race, caste sex, place of 
birth or any of them. 
No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, 
caste, sex, place of birth or any of them be subject 
to any disability, liability, restriction or conditions 
with regard to: 
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Access to shops, public res tauran ts , hotels and 
places of public entertainment; or the use of wells, 
tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public 
resort maintained wholly or partly out of state 
funds or dedicated to the use of general public. 
Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from 
making any special provision for women. 
Art. 15, however, has provided a couple of 
exceptions in its application Art. 15 (3) allows the 
state to make any special provision for women and 
children. Art, 15(4) permits the state to make any 
special provision for the advancement of socially 
and educationally backward classes or for the 
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribes. The 
t reatment meted out to women and children is in 
the larger and longer-range interest of the 
community. 
Art, 15(4) was included in the Constitution as 
a result of the First Constitutional Amendment in 
1951. 
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Article 16' 
This Article guarantees equality of opportunity 
in matters of public employment. It is stated in the 
following words: 
16(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of 
religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, 
residence or any of them be ineligible for, or 
discriminated against in respect of any employment 
or office under the state. 
15(3) Nothing in the Article shall prevent 
Parliament from making any law prescribing, in 
regard to a class or classes of employment to an 
office (under the Government of, or any local or 
other authority within a state or Union Territory, 
any requirement as to residence within that State 
or Union Territory) prior to such employment or 
appointment. 
Art, 16(2) prohibits discrimination to any 
citizen in respect of appointment on grounds of 
religion, caste, race, sex, descent, place of birth or 
residence, should that appointment he under the 
State. 
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What Art. 15 (1) and 16(2) prohibit is that 
discrimination should not be made only on the 
ground of sex. However, these Articles do not 
prohibit the state from making discrimination on 
the ground of sex coupled with other 
considerations, to be a permissible classification. 
While dealing with this aspect of the matter , the 
Supreme Court remarked as under: 
"Art. 14 is general and must be read with the 
other provisions which set out the ambit of 
fundamental rights. Sex is a sound classification 
and although there can be no discrimination in 
general on that ground, the Constitution it self 
makes special provisions in respect of women and 
children. The two Articles when read together 
validate the impugned chance in Sec.497 I.P.C.". 
Just ice Krishna Iyer in M/S C.S. Muthatma 
Vs. Union of India^A expressed somewhat similar 
views in the following words: 
"We do not mean to universalize or dogmatize 
that men and women are equal in all occupations 
and all s i tuations and do not exclude the need 
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where the r equ i r emen t of pa r t i cu l a r employment , 
the set of sex or the pecul ia r i t i es of social sec tors 
or the h a n d i c a p s of e i ther sex may compel 
sensi t ivi ty. But save, where the different iat ion is 
d e m o n s t r a b l e , the ru le of equal i ty m u s t govern." 
In case the Supreme Cour t observed t h a t 
having t aken the air h o s t e s s in service and after 
having ut i l ized her services for four y e a r s , to 
t e rmina t e he r services by the m a n a g e m e n t in the 
event of he r becoming p r e g n a n t a m o u n t s to 
compell ing the poor air h o s t e s s no t to have any 
ch i ldren and t h u s interfere with and divert the 
ord inary course of h u m a n n a t u r e . The t e rmina t ion 
of the services of an air h o s t e s s u n d e r such 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s is not only a ca l lous and cruel act 
bu t an open insu l t to Indian womanhood , the mos t 
s a c r o s a n c t and che r i shed i n s t i t u t i on . Such a 
course of act ion is ext remely d e t e s t a b l e and 
a b h o r r e n t to the not ion of a civilized society. Apart 
from being grossly une th i ca l , it s m a c k s of a deep-
rooted sense of an u t t e r se l f i shness a t the cost of 
all h u m a n va lues . Such a provision, therefore is not 
only manifes t ly u n r e a s o n a b l e and a rb i t r a ry bu t 
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contains the quality of unfairness and is, 
therefore, clearly violative of Art. 14. 
The Supreme Court while dealing with a rule 
barring married women from working in a 
particular firm criticized the validity of the rule in 
the following words: 
"We are not impressed by these reasons for 
retaining a rule of this type. Nor do we think that 
because the work has to be done as a team, it 
cannot be done by married women. We also feel that 
there is nothing to show that married women would 
be more likely to be absent than unmarr ied women 
or widows. If it is the presence of children, which 
would account for greater ostentation of married 
women, tha t would be so with the widows having 
children. The fact that the work has to be carried 
out by the workers as a team and presence of all 
,^ese workmen is in our opinion no 
disqualification. So far as married women or 
widows are entitled to such leave as the rule of the 
Respondent 's Firm provide and they would be 
availing themselves of these facilities". 
U^ 
Right Against Exploitation: 
The following expression consti tute the 
relevant portion in Art. 23** of the Constitution. 
Prohibition of Traffic in human beings and 
forced labour: 
Traffic in human beings and 'beggar' and other 
similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and 
any contravention of this provision shall be an 
offence punishable in accordance with law. 
Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from 
imposing compulsory service for public purposes 
and in imposing such service, the State shall not 
make any discrimination on grounds only of 
religion, race, caste or class or any of them". 
Art. 21 , which mentions about personal liberty. 
Supreme Court has included International 
conventions for the protection of rights of women. 
Besides, many cases Vishakha^ case is the first 
case where provisions of Human Rights emphasized 
in International Covenants was enforced. 
Art.23 may be compared to the 13th 
Amendment of the Constitution of America^ which 
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abolished slavery. In our country, at the time of 
adoption of the Constitution, there was no such 
practice like slavery in our country but there 
existed large scale exploitation of forced bonded 
labour practiced by upper caste people upon the 
underprivileged section of the society. 
Evils like the practice of devdasi and other 
similar practices in the Southern and Western part 
of the country and some of the temples in Orissa 
particularly bordering Andhra Pradesh were 
rampant and still existed. 
The ideal of human dignity, which though 
pervades the entire Constitution has been 
expressed in explicit terms in the form of this 
Article. The expression 'Traffic in Human Beings' 
means disposal by way of sale or hire or otherwise 
of human beings more or less in the same manner 
as man does with the disposable articles. 
The trafficking in women and girls in the male 
dominated society has been the evil practice since 
old times. Medieval feudalism brought down the 
position of women to a very mark. Prostitution 
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became rampant and flesh trade established itself 
with agents and pimps and the dignity of women 
had gone down to the lowest ebb. To counter this, 
the Parliament enacted. The Suppression of 
Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, 
"This Act was renamed as "Immoral Traffic 
(Prevention) Act, 1956" and enforced with effect 
from January 26,1987. The Act was enacted by the 
Parliament in pursuance of the ratification by India 
of the International Convention of the Suppression 
of Traffic in persons and of the prosti tution by 
others, signed in New York on May 9. 
Thus sex is a prohibited ground of 
discrimination under Art. 15 and Art. 16, but not 
under Art.29, Courts however, have come to settle 
down with an interpretation which means that sex 
as a basis of classification may be a suspect but 
cannot altogether be prohibited. Special laws for 
women can be made in different kinds of cases 
notwithstanding the fact whether they are 
favourable or unfavourable to women. It has only to 
he seen in such a situation that such orders may 
not only be redresser but also seem to be 
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reasonable. The following cases are cited by way of 
example. 
In Anjali Roy Vs. The Statef''^, the fact involved 
was that after opening of a college exclusively for 
women, girl s tudents were denied admission into 
another college, which was a co-educational 
institution. Accordingly one Anjali Roy was denied 
admission in the co-educational college under the 
orders of the Director of Public Instruction of the 
Government of West Bengal. The petitioner 
challenged the orders of the D.P.I, as arbitrary and 
unreasonable . The Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta 
dismissed the Writ Petition holding that the order 
prohibiting the admission of the girl s tudents to the 
former co-educational institution was with the 
intention to make the girl s tudents to take 
admission in women's college so tha t the same 
could be popular and well established and thus , 
become self sufficient. This was thus , a special 
provision as contemplated by Art. 15(3) for the 
benefit of women and in consequence the provision 
of Art. 15(1) was not available for this . It was 
further held that Art. 15(1) was of wider 
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implications as compared to Art.29(2) and 
prohibited discrimination on the ground of sex on 
all matters and so it included discrimination in 
matters of admission into educational inst i tut ions 
with the result that Art. 15(1) should control 
Art.29(2). 
In "University of Madras Vs. Santhabai^B and 
another The High Court of Madras took a different 
view to deny admission to Santhabai in a newly 
opened college. The Court held the view that the 
University of Madras is not a 'State as defined in 
Article 12 of the Constitution and thus its 
regulation will not be subject to prohibition of 
Art. 15(1) of the Constitution of India. Another point 
is that admissions are regulated within the ambit of 
Art.29(2) and the regulation of the University 
required that colleges should have the necessary 
infrastructure to provide essential facilities for 
women before they could be admitted. This fact is 
not discriminatory on ground of sex. 
So far as the scope of Art. 15(3) is concerned, 
the High Court expressed that notwithstanding 
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Art. 15(1) it was lawful for the state to establish 
educational insti tutions solely for women and the 
exclusion of men s tudents from such insti tut ions 
does not contravene. Art. 15(1). The cumulative 
effect of Art, 15(3) and 29(2) is that while male 
s tudents have no right to get admission in women's 
college, the women's right to admission to other 
colleges is a matter within the regulation of 
authorit ies. 
The Supreme Court of India, the protector and 
guardian of the fundamental rights has always been 
the champion in maintaining and elaborating the 
concept of "equality of s ta tus" - particularly, when 
the discriminatory laws were made by the State 
against women. In the very first year of its working, 
a woman, Champakam Dorairajan^ for claiming 
equality of s ta tus came before the Supreme Court 
and got the Government Order(G,0.) of the Madras 
Government declared unconsti tut ional and violative 
of Article 14 (Right to equality) and Article 15 
(Discriminatory legislation). Article 14 of the 
Constitution firstly, confers on women the equality 
of Status and secondly, protects against any 
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violation of this principle. Article 14 of the 
Constitution recognizes "women" as a class. The 
Court has declared that women as a class were 
different from men as a class; and for this, the 
legislature had merely removed the disability 
attaching to women by passing the Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956. This Act has declared in 
unequivocal term that the limited rights in property 
of a female will now be held by her as an absolute 
owner, which clearly shows depar ture from the 
Shastric Law. Furthermore Section 8 of the Hindu 
Succession Act has put female heirs at par with 
male heirs. In case of division of property after the 
death of father, sons, wife and daughters are 
entitled to inherit his estate including alienated 
property even though the wife and daughter were 
under the customary laws incompetent to challenge 
the alienation, the Court has made it clear that the 
Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act does not 
discriminate between citizens on the ground of 
place of birth, it equally applies to the "Mitakshra" 
and "Dayabhaga" Schools of Hindu law. The Hindu 
Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1955, under Section 
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22, provided that illegitimate daughters along with 
sons can claim maintenance from-those who take 
the estate if she has not obtained any share in the 
estate. This preferential t reatment is not violative 
of Article 14 as it puts daughters equal to sons. 
The Landmark case in the history of women's 
right on this point is Air India v. Nargish Meerza 
and others.^ In this case some of the provisions of 
Air India Employees Service Regulations and of 
Indian-Airlines (Flying Crew) Service Regulations 
were declared against the letter and spirit of Article 
14 of the Constitution of India. Regulation 46(l)(c) 
of the Air India Employees Service Regulations, 
provided that "An Air Hostess was to resign from 
her service: (a) upon attaining the age of 35 years, 
or (b) on marriage, if it takes place within four 
years of service, or (c) on first pregnancy, 
whichever occurs earliest. Jus t ice Fazal Ali, while 
declaring clause "C" of the above provision, i.e. 
termination of services on first pregnancy as 
violative of Article 14, observed that , "it seems to 
us that the termination of services of an Air 
Hostess under such circumstances is not only a 
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callous and cruel act but an open insult to Indian 
womanhood—the most sacrosanct and cherished 
institution." Therefore, such a provision is not only 
manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary but contains 
the quality of unfairness and exhibits naked 
despotism and is, therefore, clearly violative of 
Article 14 of the Constitution. 
The writ by Miss Muthamma,^ a senior member 
of Indian Foreign Service, speaks a story which 
makes one wonder whether Articles 14 and 16 
belong to myth or reality. It was a unique example 
of sex discrimination ultra-vires Articles 14 and 16 
of the Constitution of India. Rule 3 (2) of the Indian 
Foreign Services Rules, 1961 provided that "a 
woman member of the service shall obtain the 
permission of the Government in writing before her 
marriage is solemnized. At any time after marriage, 
a woman member of the service may be required to 
resign from service, if the Government is satisfied 
that her family and domestic commitments are 
likely to come in way of the due and efficient 
discharging of duties " Jus t ice Krishna Iyer 
while delivering the judgment has observed that the 
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"Discrimination against woman, in t raumatic 
transparency, is found in this rule In these 
days of nuclear families inter-continental marriages 
and unconventional behaviour one fails to 
unders tand the naked bias against the gender of 
species.°^o 
In University of Madras v. Shanti Bai^^ the 
regulation of the University requiring that the 
College should provide certain facilities for women 
before they could be admitted, the Hon'ble Court 
held, are not discriminatory on the ground of sex 
but they are only reasonable restrictions permitted 
within the frame work of the Indian Constitution. 
On the same analogy it was held that the denial of 
admission in a college to a woman s tudent under 
above regulation is not unconsti tut ional . 
Article 14 of the Constitution of India 
prohibits class legislation but permits reasonable 
classification. The Classification must be based on 
sum "intelligible differentia" and should have a 
"rational nexus" with the object sought to be 
achieved by the act or legislation in question. 
Having in view classification and object of 
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legislation "women" can be treated as a class and 
special laws can be made in their favour. Various 
provisions have been declared valid and within the 
frame work of the Constitution of India, where 
women have been given a special t reatment . Such 
provisions of law have been declared by the Courts 
as "permissive classification" not violating the 
principle of equality under Article 14 of the 
Constitution provided the classification is not 
arbitrary. 
Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code which 
makes assaul t or use of criminal force with intent 
to outrage the modesty of any woman (and does not 
inclulk "man" within the provocation of the 
section), is not invalid as being a violation of the 
equal protection clause. 12 The Classification made 
in favour of wives and that too those deserted by 
their husbands is also not arbitrary. Because the 
classification made under Section 488 of Criminal 
Procedure Code 1893 (now section 125 of Criminal 
Procedure Code 1973) aims at preventing starvation 
of wives deserted by their husbands and provides 
for right to maintenance. This can not be 
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questioned on the ground that the Section provides 
for maintenance of wife and contains no similar 
provision in favour of men as against wivesJ^ it is 
not inconsistent with the principle of equality. 
Though, contrary view has been expressed by 
Hon'ble Madras High Court. The High Court 
observed that a jobless husband is entitled for 
maintenance from her well to do wife. The wife filed 
special leave petition before the Hon'ble Supreme 
Court. During pendency of the case in the Apex 
Court, one of the litigating parties died, t hus the 
matter has become infructuous. 
The Allahabad High Court made it clear that 
special provision for women as a class can be made, 
but not to benefit an individual woman.i^ Exclusive 
reservation of posts in reservation offices of 
Railways for women alone is violative of Articles 14 
and 16 of the Constitution of India, i^ ^ 
Article 15 of the Constitution is more specific 
instance to right of equality which prohibits the 
State from making discrimination "against any 
citizen on rounds only of religion, race, sex, place 
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of birth or any of them." To effectuate equality 
between men and women the Constitution of India 
prohibits the State to make any kind of 
discrimination on the basis of sex specifically. Not 
only this but the Constitution has gone, further 
and empowered the State to a positive act where it 
is needed, by giving 'preferential t reatment" in 
favour of women. 15 
In University of Madras v. Santa Bai,^^ the 
respondent was refused admission to the college on 
the ground of "sex" only. The Syndicate of 
University had directed to the college under its 
jurisdiction not to admit women s tudents without 
obtaining permission of the Syndicate. Had the 
respondent not been a woman, she would have been 
admitted in the college on the basis of her marks . 
The Madras High Court held that the Madras 
University was not a "State" and therefore, the 
respondent could not complain of discrimination 
under Article 15(1) as Article 15(1) of the 
Constitution prohibits discrimination made by the 
"State" only. The Court further held that University 
was right in refusing admission to the respondent 
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in the colleges open for men only, because in these 
colleges there were no facilities for women like 
separate common room, toilet, and the like. In 
Anjali Roy v. State of West Bengal,^"^ the appellant 
was denied admission in the third year class with 
honours in Economics for which she applied. Her 
case was that the refusal of her application was 
solely on the ground of her sex and this was in 
contravention of Article 15(1} of the Constitution of 
India. The college authorit ies offered her the 
facilities for attending the honours classes in that 
institution, provided she got herself admitted in the 
women's college which was recently established in 
the locality and which, at present impart 
instruct ions only in the pass courses. 
Jus t ice Bose held that the provision 
contemplated in Article 15(1) of the Constitution 
does not require that absolutely identical facilities 
as those enjoyed by men in similar mat ter must be 
afforded to women also. 
In Dattatraya Motiram v. State of Bombay,^^ 
Chief Jus t ice Chagla held that as a result of joint 
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operation of Article 15(1) and Article 15(3) the 
State could discriminate in favour of women against 
men, but it could not discriminate in favour of men 
against women. Accordingly, reservation of seats for 
women in election to a Municipality was upheld as 
protected by Article 15(3) of the Constitution of 
India. 
The Allahabad High Court in Cracknell v. State 
of UP,^9 declared Section 8 (i)(b) of the Court of 
Wards Act, 1912, unconsti tut ional as it was 
violative of Article 15(1) of the Constitution of 
India. Section 8 (i)(b) of the Act provided that 
"proprietors shall be deemed to be disqualified to 
manage their own property when they are females 
declared by the Provincial Government to be 
incapable of managing their own property." It is 
submitted that the Court had rightly declared 
Section 8(i)(b) of the Court of Wards Act 1912, 
unconsti tutional as violative of Article 15 (3), 
because the discrimination was solely based on 
"sex". 
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In Smt. Choki v. State of Rajasthan/-^^^ the 
ll()n'l)l(^ Court uphold Sortion 497 of Criminnl 
Procedure Code 1898 which prohibits release of a 
person accused of a capital offence on bail except 
women and children under 16 years of age and sick 
men. The court held that the State can make 
special provision for the benefit of women and 
children. 
Article 15 (3) of the Constitution of India must 
be treated as applying to both existing and future 
laws for making special provisions in favour of 
women. In Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay,^^ 
Yusuf was charged with an offence of adultery 
under Section 497 of Indian Penal Code as violative 
of Articles 14 and 15. The challenge under Article 
15(1) was based on the last Para of Section 497, 
which provides that the wife not to be punished as 
an abettor. The Chief Just ice of Bombay High 
Court, Mr. M. C. Chhagla repelled the challenge 
under Article 15(1) by observing that the 
differential t reatment was not based only on the 
ground of sex, but on the ground of social position 
of women in India. On appeal, Bose J . held that the 
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challenge under Article 15(1) was effectively met by 
referring to Article 15(3). In dismissing the appeal 
he observed: 
"It was argued that clause (3) of Article 15 
should be confined to provisions which are 
beneficial to women and cannot be used to give 
them a license to commit and abet crime. We are 
unable to read any such restriction in to the 
clause; no are we able to agree that a 
provision, which prohibits punishment is 
tantamount to a license to commit the offence of 
which punishment has been prohibited. 
"The two Articles 14 and 15 read together 
validate the impugned clause in Section 497 of the 
IPC." 
In Girdhar Gopal v. State,^^ it was held that 
section 354 of Indian Penal Code, which makes an 
assault or use of criminal force, whether by a man 
or woman, with intent to outrage the modesty of a 
woman punishable, is based on a valid 
classification under Article 14, and does not violate 
Article 15(1) as it did not discriminate on grounds 
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"only" of sex but also on consideration of property, 
public morals, decency decorum and recti tude. It is 
submitted that the decision is correct but it should 
be rested on the ground that the section is covered 
by Article 15(3). Under clause (3) of Article 15 of 
the Constitution discrimination can be made 
favouring the women and not against them. 
Further, this clause protects both the pre-
Constitution and post-Constitution laws: 
Numerous laws^s have been enacted relating to 
prohibition of female infanticide, dowry, exposure 
of women in advertisements and films, female child 
marriage, atrocities and molestation, abduction and 
rape, maternity benefits, medical termination of 
pregnancy, prohibition of prosti tution and 
trafficking in women, protection in employment etc. 
The decisions of the courts have served as a 
st imulus for the Indian legislatures to enact new 
laws or to bring about the changes in the existing 
ones with a view to afford better protection to 
women. 
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(c) Equality of Opportunity 
Another specific example of equality of s ta tus is the 
right to equality of opportunity for citizens of India 
provided under Article 16 of the Constitution of 
India. Clause (1) of Article 16 provides equality of 
opportunity in matters relating to employment or 
appointment to any office under the State. This 
right to equality is only in employment or 
appointment under "the State" that is in mat ters of 
recruitment, promotion, wages, termination of 
employment, periodical increments, leave, gratuity, 
pension, age of superannuat ion, etc. But this 
equality envisaged under Article 16 of the 
Constitution is the equality amongst equally placed 
persons-equality amongst the same class of persons 
and not amongst different classes of persons. 
Clause (2) of Article 16 of the Constitution lays 
down specific grounds on which citizens are not to 
be discriminated against each other in mat ters of 
opportunity and offices under the State. These are 
religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, 
residence or any of them. Discrimination on the 
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basis of sex has been specifically prohibited under 
the Constitution so as to bring women at par with 
men. Sex shall not be the sole ground of 
ineligibility for any post. In Punjab the Governor 
promulgated an ordinance making women ineligible 
for the post of warden in men's Jai l . It was held by 
the Court that such order can not be said to be 
discriminatory on the ground of sex alone and 
remains immune to challenge even after the 
commencement of the Constitution.2^ Denial of 
promotion to a woman from the post of typist to the 
post of Stenographer in Police Department on the 
ground of the nature of the Stenographer duty 
(touring with officers and working at off hours) is 
discrimination on the ground of sex Article 15 (3) 
can also be invoked to justify the discrimination in 
favour of female under Article 16 (2). The sole 
reservation of Reservation-cum-booking clerks in 
metropolitan cities by Railways has been held to be 
violative of Article 16 (1) and (2) of the Constitution 
of India24. 
Constitution of India has provided in Part IV 
the Directive Principles of State Policy. These 
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principles lay down certain economic and social 
goals to be achieved by the various Governments in 
India i.e. the Central Government and the State 
Governments. These directives impose certain 
obligations on the State to take positive action in 
certain directions in order to promote the v^^elfare of 
the people. Though these principles are "non-
justiciable," they are constitutional directions 
which the "State" is supposed to abide by, Mathew 
J. has aptly observed: 
The moral rights embodied in Part TV of the 
Constitution are equally an essential feature of it. 
The only difference being, that the moral rights 
embodied in Part IV were not specially enforceable 
as against the State by Citizen in a Court of Law in 
case State fails to implement it 's duty but, 
nevertheless, they are fundamental in the 
government of the country and all the organs of the 
State, including the judiciary, are bound to enforce 
those directives.25 
Another manifest declaration of the 
Constitution to achieve equality of s ta tus is a 
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directive under Article 39. It provides: (a) that the 
citizens, men and women, equally have the right to 
an adequate means of livelihood. The State shall, in 
particular direct its policy towards securing, (b) 
That there is equal pay for equal work for both men 
and women (c) That the health and strength of 
workers, men and women are not abused and 
that citizens are not forced by economic necessity 
to enter a vocation unsui ted to their age and 
strength. The principle underlying this provision is 
"equal wages for equal work" irrespective of "sex". 
In Randhir singh v. Union of India^^, applying 
this principle, it was explained that it is true that 
the principle of "equal pay for equal work" is nor 
expressly declared by our Constitution to be 
fundamental right, but it certainly is a 
constitutional goal. Article 39 (d) of the 
Constitution of India proclaims "equal pay for equal 
work for both men and women" as Directive 
principle of State policy means equal pay 
for equal work for every one and as between the 
sexes. 
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The above principle of "equal pay for equal 
work" has also been reiterated by the Supreme 
Court in Bhagwan Das v. State of Haryana^'^ and R. 
D. Gupta V. Lt. Governor Delhi Administration^^ It 
has also been made clear by the Supreme Court 
that this principle has to be read in the light of 
Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution. 
The Constitution of India provides some other 
principles of State policy also to elevate the s ta tus 
and position of women, viz. "Article 42 provides 
that the State shall make provision for securing 
jus t and humane conditions of work and maternity 
relief," Article 43 of the Constitution provides that 
"The State shall endeavour to secure by suitable 
legislation, or economic organization or in any way, 
to all workers, agricultural industrial or otherwise, 
work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a 
decent s tandard of life " 
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li] CRIMINAL LAWS 
Offences relating to the Domestic Violence 
under IPC 
The Indian Penal Code, in general, does not 
make any distinction on the basis of sex it is 
uniformly applicable to all. The Indian Penal Code 
was enacted in the year 1860 and came into force 
in 1861. Looking to the social conditions and 
norms prevailing in the Indian Society, the Indian 
Penal Code has provided special provisions, which 
afford protection to woman who could be a victim of 
the offences relating to her sex. It must be clear 
that the special provisions relating to women are 
not exceptions but are special offences because a 
woman faces many problems in her public and 
private life because of her womanhood, her social 
position. For example, the offence of adultery under 
Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, which 
provides that the woman, who has voluntarily 
participated, in the offence of adultery cannot be 
punished. Under IPC there are number of 
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provisions to protect the dignity and s ta tus of the 
women: The Table given below: 
Offence 
Dowry 
death 
Abetment of 
suicide 
Cruelty 
Hurt 
Hurt us ing 
dangerous 
weapons or 
means 
Grievous 
hu r t 
Grievous 
hur t us ing 
dangerous 
weapons or 
means 
Wrongful 
restraint 
Wrongful 
confmemen 
t 
-4-> 
Oi m o 
304B 
306 
498A 
323 
324 
325 
326 
341 
342,343 
and 344 
« 
M 
to 
0 
O « 
V 
V 
V* 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
1 
•* • i C 
B h 
S e 
V 
n 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
4) 
11 
V 
V 
V 
V 
0 
p . « 
V 
V 
V 
•0 
0 
V 
V 
V 
V 
v 
V 
Who can What is the 
try the punishment 
offence? i for the 
offence? 
Court of Imprisonment 
sessions for not less 
t han 7 years , 
and as much 
as 
imprisonment 
for life 
Court of Imprisonment 
sessions for 10 years 
and fine 
Magistrate Imprisonment 
of the First for 3 years 
Class and fine 
Any Imprisonment 
Magistrate for 1 yeeu- or 
fine of 
Rs.lOOO. or 
both 
Any Imprisonment 
Magistrate for three 
years , or fine, 
or both 
Any Imprisonment 
Magistrate for 7 years : 
and fine 
Magistrate Imprisonment 
of the First for life and 
Class fine 
Any Simple • 
Magistrate imprisonment i 
for 1 month , 1 
or fine of 
Rs.500. or 
both 
Any Imprisonment 
Magistrate for 1,2 or 3 
years 
depending on • 
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Outrage of 
modesty 
Sexual 
intercourse 
during 
separation 
Criminal 
breach of 
trust 
Bigamy 
Adultery 
354 
376A 
406 
494 and 
495 
497 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V V 
V 
V 
** 
V 
Any 
Magistrate 
Court of 
Sessions 
Magistrate 
of the First 
Class 
Magistrate 
of the First 
Class 
Magistrate 
of the First 
Class 
the period for ; 
which the ' 
subject is 
confined 
Imprisonment 
for 2 years, or 
fine, or both 
Imprisonment 
for 2 years • 
and fine | 
i 
Imprisonment 
for three 
years of fine 
Imprisonment 
for 7 or 10 
years 
depending on 
whether the 
first marriage 
was ' 
concealed 
Imprisonment ; 
for 5 years, or 
fine, or both 
Indira Jaisingh, Law of Domestic Violence. 
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304B. Dowry death 
(1) Where the dea th of a woman is c a u s e d by any 
b u r n s or bodily injury or occurs o therwise t h a n 
u n d e r no rma l c i r cums tances within seven yea r s of 
her mar r i age and it is shown tha t soon before her 
dea th she was subjected to cruel ty or h a r a s s m e n t 
by her h u s b a n d or any relative of he r h u s b a n d for, 
or in connec t ion with any demand for dowry, such 
dea th shal l be called "dowry dea th" , and such 
h u s b a n d or relat ive shal l be deemed to have caused 
her dea th . 
Explanation-For the purpose of th i s sub - sec t ion , 
"dowry" shal l have the meaning as in sec t ion 2 of 
the Dowry Prohibi t ion Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). 
(2) Where commits dowry dea th shal l be p u n i s h e d 
with i m p r i s o n m e n t for a te rm which shal l not be 
less t h a n seven yea r s bu t which may ex tend to 
i m p r i s o n m e n t for life. 
3 0 6 . A b e t m e n t of su ic ide - If any p e r s o n commits 
su ic ide , whoever abe t s the commiss ion of such 
suic ide , shal l be pun i shed with i m p r i s o n m e n t of 
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ei ther descr ip t ion for a te rm, which may ex tend to 
ten yea r s , and shal l also be liable to fine. 
3 5 4 . Assaul t of criminal force to w o m e n wi th 
i n t e n t to outrage her modes ty - Whoever a s s a u l t s 
or u s e s cr iminal force to any woman, i n t end ing to 
ou t rage or knowing it to be likely t h a t he will 
the reby ou t rage her modesty, shal l be p u b l i s h e d 
with i m p r i s o n m e n t of e i ther descr ip t ion for a t e rm 
which may extend to two yea r s , or with fine, or 
with bo th . 
367A. Intercourse by a man with h is wife during 
separat ion - Whoever h a s sexual i n t e r c o u r s e with 
his own wife, who is living sepa ra te ly from him 
u n d e r a decree of separa t ion or u n d e r any c u s t o m 
or u s a g e wi thou t her consen t shal l be p u n i s h e d 
with i m p r i s o n m e n t of e i ther descr ip t ion for a t e rm 
which may extend to two yea rs and sha l l a lso be 
liable to fine. 
3 7 7 . Unnatural offence - Whoever vo lun ta r i ly h a s 
ca rna l i n t e r c o u r s e aga ins t the order of n a t u r e with 
any m a n , woman or an imal , shal l be p u n i s h e d with 
i m p r i s o n m e n t for life, or with i m p r i s o n m e n t of 
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ei ther descr ip t ion for a term which may extend to 
ten yea r s , and shal l also be liable to fine. 
498A. Husband or relat ive of husband of a 
woman subjec t ing her to crue l ty - Whoever, be ing 
the h u s b a n d or the relative of the h u s b a n d of a 
woman, sub jec t s such woman to cruel ty shal l be 
p u n i s h e d with impr i sonment for a te rm which may 
extend to th ree yea r s and shal l also be liable to 
fine. 
Explana t ion- For the purpose of th i s sec t ion , 
"cruelty" m e a n s -
fa) any willful conduct which is of s u c h a n a t u r e 
as is likely to drive the woman to commit 
suic ide or to cause grave injury or danger to 
life, l imb or hea l th (whether m e n t a l or 
physical) of the woman ' or 
(b) h a r a s s m e n t of the woman where s u c h 
h a r a s s m e n t I with a view to coercing her or 
any pe r son re la ted to her to mee t an}^ unlawful 
d e m a n d for any properly or va luab le secur i ty 
or is on accoun t of failure by h e r or any 
pe r son re la ted to her to meet s u c h d e m a n d . 
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304B. Dowry death- (1) Where the death of a 
woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or 
occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances 
within seven years of her marriage and it is shown 
that soon before her death she was subjected to 
cruelty or harassment by her husband or any 
relative of her husband for, or in connection with 
any demand for dowry, such death shall be called 
"dowry death", and such husband or relative shall 
be deemed to have caused her death. 
Explanation-For the purpose of this sub-section, 
"dowry" shall have the meaning as in section 2 of 
the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). 
(2) Where commits dowry death shall be punished 
with imprisonment for a term which shall not be 
less than seven years but which may extend to 
imprisonment for life. 
Les us go through case law:-
Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab^ reflected the scope 
of the sections in the IPC. The Court held that 
Section 306 IPC, read with Section 113-A of the 
Indian Evidence Act, has only enabled the court to 
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punish a husband or his relatives who subjected a 
woman to cruelty as envisaged in Section 498-A, 
IPC and such woman commits suicide within seven 
years of her marriage. 
In Premwati v. State of M.P. 2 it was held that 
Section 304-B (1) would be attracted not only when 
the death is caused by someone but also when the 
death occurs "unnaturally". If occurrence of death 
is preceded by cruelty or harassment by in-laws for 
or in connection with a dowry demand and if the 
connection between the two is established, mere 
occurrence of death is enough though death may 
not have been caused by the in-laws. 
Wazir Chand v. State of Haryana^, was a case 
involving the death by burning of a newly-married 
woman In this case, the fact that a large number of 
articles were taken back by the father of the 
deceased after her death from her matrimonial 
house, showed that pressure was being exerted by 
the in-laws for money and articles which continued 
to be exerted till her death. 
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Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi'^, that a demand for 
dowry entitles the wife to get a decree for 
dissolution of marriage. Thus Section 304-B, IPC 
has given a new dimension to the concept of cruelty 
for the purpose of matrimonial remedies. 
In State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh?' the court 
while convicting the husband held that : 
"The legislative intent behind 
incorporation of Section 113-A of the 
Indian evidence Act and Section 304-B of 
Indian Penal Code was to strengthen the 
hands of the prosecution in a crime 
generally committed within the privacy of 
residential houses." 
In Shamnsahed M.Multtani v. State of 
Karnataka^' the court confronted with the question 
whether the accused could be convicted in a case of 
an offence under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal 
Code without the said offence forming part of the 
charge. When a person is charged with an offence 
under Sections 302 and 498-A of the Indian Penal 
Code on the allegation that he caused the death of 
a bride after subjecting her to harassment with a 
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demand for dowry within a period of 7 years of 
marriage, a situation may arise, as in this case, 
that the offence of murder, is not es tabhshed 
against the accused. Nonetheless, all the other 
ingredients necessary for the offence under Section 
304-B would stand established 
"If the prosecution succeeds in showing 
that soon before her death she was 
subjected by the husband to cruelty or 
harassment for or in connection with any 
demand for dowry and that her death had 
occurred (within 7 years) otherwise than 
in normal circumstances the court shall 
presume that such person had caused the 
dowry death. In view of Section 4 of the 
Evidence Act the court has no option but 
to presume that the accused had caused 
dowry death unless the accused disproves 
it. It is a statutory compulsion on the 
court. However, it is open to the adduce 
such evidence for disproving the said 
compulsory presumption as the burden is 
unmistakably on him to do so. He can 
discharge such burden either by eliciting 
answers through cross-examination of the 
witnesses of the prosecution or b}' 
adducing evidence on the defence side or 
by both" 
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498A. Husband or relative of husband of a 
woman subjecting her to cruelty - Whoever, being 
the husband or the relative of the husband of a 
woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be 
punished with imprisonment for a term which may 
extend to three years and shall also be liable to 
fine. 
Explanation- For the purpose of this section, 
"cruelty" means-
(a) any willful conduct which is of such a 
nature as is likely to drive the woman to 
commit suicide or to cause grave injury 
or danger to life, limb or health (whether 
mental or physical) of the woman' or 
(b) harassment of the woman where such 
harassment with a view to coercing her or 
any person related to her to meet any 
unlawful demand for any properly or 
valuable security or is on account of 
failure by her or any person related to her 
to meet such demand. 
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In Madhuri M/S Chitnis v. Mukund M. Chitnis^, 
it was held that the meaning and definition of 
cruelty given in Section 498-A IPC is not vague. 
The ordinary dictionary meaning of cruelty does not 
apply to Section 498-A which has been inserted in 
a s tatute with the purpose of meeting a social 
challenge to save the married woman from ill-
t reatment and ensure that women live with dignity 
in their matrimonial homes. The sole consti tuent , 
the court held, of an offence under Section 498-A of 
the Indian Penal Code is willful conduct. Willful 
contemplates obstinate and deliberate behaviour on 
the part of the offender for it to amount to cruelty. 
But from the point of view of practice and 
procedure and to avoid technical defects, it is 
necessary in such cases to frame charges under 
both the sections and if the case is established 
they can be convicted under both the sections bu t 
no separate sentence need be awarded under 
Section 498-A in view of the substantive sentences 
being awarded for the major offence under Section 
304-B. 
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In Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana « and 
harassment for non-fulfilment of dowry demands 
was proved, it was held that conviction under 
Sections 304-B and 498-A was sustainable. 
In S. Faisal Nabi v. State ^ the husband ' s illicit 
relation with his sister-in-law were protested by the 
wife and the husband had snubbed her. It was held 
that it was not harassment and husband was not 
guilty under Section 498-A. 
In Meesala Ramakrishnan v. State of A.PJo^ 
the Supreme Court held that where a woman who 
was not in a position to speak at the time of giving 
the dying declaration and as such her dying 
declaration was recorded by a Magistrate on the 
basis of nods and gestures made by her, making it 
clear that she was burnt, not accidentally but by 
her husband, such a dying declaration was held to 
be admissible and relied upon for conviction of the 
accused. 
In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chattisgarh^^ 
where the wife (deceased) was teased and ill-treated 
by her husband to the extent of turning her out of 
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the house a t odd hou r s , for m i s t a k e s which were 
pa rdonab le , it was held t ha t the facts a m o u n t e d to 
cruel ty and the conviction of the appe l l an t was 
uphe ld . 
High Cour t reduced the s e n t e n c e merely 
b e c a u s e in a revision before the High Cour t t he 
accused p e r s o n s h a d not chal lenged the i r s e n t e n c e . 
The S u p r e m e Cour t observed while m a i n t a i n i n g 
conviction: 
"The High Court h a s modified the 
s e n t e n c e wi thou t recording any r e a s o n s 
and wi thou t consider ing the cr ime 
p reva len t in the society for unjus t i f ied 
d e m a n d of dowry." 
In Ram Badan Sharma v. S ta te of Bihar^^, 
In Soni devrajbhai Babubhai v. State of Gujarat & 
Others (1991)^3.This Court deal t with t he objects 
and phi losophy beh ind e n a c t m e n t of sec t ion 304B 
IPC. In th i s case , it h a s been men t ioned t h a t 
sect ion 304B and the cognate provis ions a re m e a n t 
for e rad ica t ion of the social evil of dowry, which 
h a s been the bane of Indian society and c o n t i n u e s 
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u n a b a t e d . For eradica t ion of social evil, effective 
s teps can be t aken by the society itself and social 
s anc t ions of communi ty can be more de t e r r en t , yet 
legal s anc t ions in the form of i ts prohibi t ion and 
p u n i s h m e n t are some s teps in t ha t d i rect ion. 
In Hem Chand v. State of Haryana, (1994)1^ «A 
reading of sect ion 304-B IPC would show t h a t when 
a ques t ion a r i ses whe ther a person h a s commi t ted 
the offence of dowry dea th of a woman wha t all t h a t 
is neces sa ry is it should be shown t h a t soon before 
her u n n a t u r a l dea th , which took place wi thin seven 
yea r s of the mar r iage , for or in connec t ion with 
d e m a n d for dowry. If t ha t is shown then the cour t 
shal l p r e s u m e t h a t such a pe r son h a s c a u s e d the 
dowry d e a t h . 
In Hira Lai & Others v. State ^5 Sect ion 304-B 
IPC and sect ion 113-B of the Evidence Act were 
inse r t ed with a view to combat the i n c r e a s i n g 
menace of dowry d e a t h s . Pe rhaps the Legis la t ions 
are ou tcome of publ ic opinion and a comprehens ive 
91st Report on "Dowry Dea ths and Law Reform: 
Amending the Act, 1872" submi t t ed on 10 .8 .1983 
177 
by the Law Commission of India. In the 
introductory chapter of the report, it is mentioned 
that the last few months have witnessed an 
alarming increase in the number of cases in which 
married women die in circumstances which, to say 
the least, are highly suspicious. In the popular 
mind, these deaths have come to be associated with 
dowry, which is why, in popular parlance; they 
have come to be called "dowry deaths" 
In Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab,i^ 
It is not enough that harassment or cruelty 
was caused to the woman with a demand for dowry 
at some time, if section 304-B is to be invoked. 
Before her death, no doubt, is an elastic expression 
and can refer to a period either immediately before 
her death or within a few days or even a few weeks 
before it. But the proximity to her death is the 
pivot indicated by that expression. The legislative 
object in providing such a radius of time by 
employing the words "soon before her death" is to 
emphasize the idea that her death should, in all 
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probabi l i t ies , have been the a f t e rmath of such 
cruel ty or h a r a s s m e n t . 
In Hira Lai and Others v. State^^ (Govt, of NOT) 
Delhi (2003), th i s cour t observed tha t : 
"The express ion "soon before her dea th" u s e d in the 
subs t an t ive sect ion 304-B IPC and sect ion 113-B of 
the Evidence Act is p re sen t with the idea of 
proximity t es t . No definite period h a s been 
indica ted and the express ion "soon before" is not 
defined. It p r e s u m e tha t a m a n who is in the 
possess ion of goods "soon after the theft , is e i the r 
the thief or h a s received the goods knowing t h e m to 
be s to len, u n l e s s he can a c c o u n t . The 
de t e rmina t ion of the period which can come wi th in 
the te rm "soon before" is left to be d e t e r m i n e d by 
the c o u r t s , depending upon facts and 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s of each case . Suffice, however , to 
indica te t h a t the express ion "soon before" would 
normally imply t h a t the in terval shou ld not be 
much be tween the cruel ty or h a r a s s m e n t conce rned 
and the dea th in ques t ion . There m u s t be ex i s tence 
of a p rox imate and live link be tween the effect of 
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cruelty based on dowry demand and the death 
concerned. 
In K. Prema S. Rao (supra), ^ ^ 
"Both the courts below have found the husband 
guilty of cruel t reatment of his wife and as a result 
the wife committed suicide within seven years of 
their marriage. On such evidence the presumption, 
which arises under section 113-A of the Evidence 
Act is that the husband abetted the suicide. The 
word "cruelty" as mentioned in the Explanation 
below section 113-A of the Evidence Act has been 
given the same meaning as contained in the 
Explanation below section 498A IPC. On the facts 
found, "the willful" conduct of the husband in 
forcing the deceased to part with her land, which 
she had received in marriage as "stridhana" and for 
that purpose concealing her postal mail was so 
cruel that she was driven to commit suicide. A case 
of conviction and sentence of Accused has thus 
clearly been made out even though his acquittal for 
commission of the offence of "dowry death" 
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punishable under section 304B is not found liable 
to be disturbed." 
In Satvir Singh (supra)'^ Learned Senior 
Counsel submitted that since the word "cruelty" 
employed therein is a virtual importation of that 
word from section 498-A IPC, the offence envisaged 
in section 306 IPC is capable of enveloping all 
cases of suicide within its ambit, including dowry-
related suicide. 
For the purposes of this section, 'cruelty' means-
"Harassment of the woman where such 
harassment is with a view to coercing her 
or any person related to her to meet any 
unlawful demand for any property or 
valuable security or is on account of 
failure by her or any person related to her 
to meet such demand". 
L.V. Jadhav v. Shankarrao Absaheb Pawar,2<^ 
The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 is intended to 
prohibit the giving or taking of dowry, and 
Parliament has made every offence under the Act 
non-compoundable by s.8 of the Act. By S.5 it has 
been enacted that any agreement for the giving or 
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taking of dowry shall be void. Section 3 makes 
abetment of the giving or taking of dowry an 
offence. 
Let us go through case law of IPC 304, 498-A: 
Arun Garg v. State of Punjab,21 
The Courts below have carefully gone through 
the facts of the case and the evidence on record 
and have found that the appellant is liable for the 
offence under section 304-B IPC. The courts below, 
after appreciation of the facts and evidence 
recorded have reached the conclusion that Seema 
Garg died an unnatura l death at the house of her 
in-laws within a period of seven years of her 
marriage with the appellant due to intake of 
poisonous substance. 
Section 304-B was inserted by the Dowry 
Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 with a view to 
combating the increasing menace of dowry death. 
By the same Amendment Act, section 113-B has 
been added in the Evidence Act, 1872 for raising a 
presumption. 
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Our attention was also drawn to section 498-
A. In our view, sections 304-B and 498-A are not 
mutually exclusive. They deal with different and 
distinct offences. In both the sections, 'cruelty' is a 
common element. Under section 498-A, however, 
cruelty by itself amounts to an offence and is 
punishable. Under section 304B, it is the dowry 
death that is punishable and such death must have 
occurred within seven years of the marriage. No 
such period is mentioned in section 498-A. 
Moreover, a person charged and acquitted under 
section 304-B can be convicted under section 498-
A without a specific charge being there, if such a 
case is made out 
In the result , the appeals are partly allowed 
confirming the sentence of imprisonment for a 
period of 10 years. 
Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of Karnataka,^^ 
The postulates needed to establish the said 
offence are: 
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(1) Death of a wife should have occur red 
otherwise t h a n u n d e r normal c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
within seven yea r s of her marr iage ; 
(2) Soon before her dea th she should have been 
subjec ted to cruel ty or h a r a s s m e n t by the 
accused in connect ion with any d e m a n d for 
dowry. Now reading sect ion 113-B of the 
Evidence Act, as a pa r t of the said offence, the 
posi t ion is th i s : If the p rosecu t ion s u c c e e d s in 
showing t h a t soon before he r d e a t h she was 
subjec ted by him to cruel ty or h a r a s s m e n t for 
or in connec t ion with any d e m a n d for dowry 
and t h a t her dea th had occurred (within seven 
yea r s of her marriage) otherwise t h a n u n d e r 
no rma l c i r c u m s t a n c e s the cour t shal l p r e s u m e 
t h a t such pe r son had caused dowry d e a t h . 
Kans Raj v. S ta te of Punjab,23 
"The object of th is Bill is to p roh ib i t the evil 
p rac t ice of giving and taking of dowry. This 
ques t ion h a s been engaging the a t t e n t i o n of the 
Government for some time pas t , and one of the 
184 
methods by which this problem, which is 
essentially a social one, was sought to be tackled, 
was by the conferment of improved property rights 
on women by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It is, 
however, felt that a law, which makes the practice 
punishable and at the same time ensures that any 
dowry, if given does ensure for the benefit of the 
wife will go a long way to educating public opinion 
and to the eradication of this evil. There has also 
been a persistent demand for such a law both in 
and outside Parliament, Hence, the present Bill." 
Rajayyan v. State of Kerala,2* 
Having analysed the entire evidence on record 
we are in complete agreement with the High Court 
that the deceased was subject to cruelty b}^  the 
appellant for payment of dowry soon before her 
death for which she committed suicide. The 
conviction of the appellant under section 304-B 
IPC. 
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Satvir Singh v. State of Punjabzs 
It is not enough that harassment or cruelty 
was caused to the woman with a demand for dowry 
at some time, if section 304B is to be invoked. But 
is should have happened soon before her death. 
The said phrase , no doubt, is an elastic expression 
and can refer to a period either immediately before 
her death or within a few days or even a few weeks 
before it. But the proximity to her death is the 
pivot indicated by that expression. If the interval 
elapsed between the infliction of such harassment 
or cruelty and her death is wide the court would be 
in a position to gauge that in all probabilities the 
death would not have been the immediate cause of 
her death. It is hence for the court to decide, on 
the facts and circumstances of each case, whether 
the said interval in that particular case was 
sufficient to snuff its cord from the concept soon 
before her death. 
Taiyab Khan v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand),^^ 
It is a case of an unnatura l death, that is, 
death which occurs otherwise than under normal 
186 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The first th ree ing red ien t s are 
clearly e s t ab l i shed . The only o ther ingred ien t , 
which needs to be considered is the h a r a s s m e n t of 
the woman by the h u s b a n d or his re la t ives in 
connect ion with demand for dowry. 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 
Like the Indian Penal Code, the Criminal 
Procedure Code h a s also provided some provis ions 
in favour of women. These special provis ions 
protect the weaker lot of the society. These 
protect ive provis ions have been made in view of the 
special social and cu l tu ra l background of women in 
India and keeping in view the Cons t i t u t i ona l 
protect ive d iscr imina t ion . As th i s h a s been 
d i scussed , special laws can be m a d e in favour of 
women within the framework of the cons t i t u t i on of 
India. The repea l ing Criminal P rocedure Code of 
1898 also had some of these special c l a u s e s in 
favour of women. But now the new Code of 1973 is 
a l together a revised Code and provides some new 
c l auses to pro tec t women, is cons i s t en t with the 
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constitutional provisions and other social changes. 
As reflected in Sections 125 to 128 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code has also been included making it 
optional on the choice of both the part ies, under 
Section 5 of the Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. Now, it seems that 
the husband would never make the second choice 
unless he is very magnanimous or a fool. The 
choice is to be exercised by both the part ies and on 
the date of the hearing. Under the Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, a 
divorced Muslim woman is not entitled to claim 
maintenance from her former husband. She is 
entitled to such maintenance from the persons 
referred to in Sect. 4 of the said Act. It, however, 
seems that in appropriate cases the provisions of 
Sections 125 to 128 of the Cr. P.C. are applicable 
all the same. The husband is bound to maintain the 
wife even if she has sufficient means to maintain 
herself. 
This Section of the Code provides summary 
remedy to obtain maintenance which otherwise may 
take long to claim in civil law or other special laws. 
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In a writ petition under Article 32 of the 
Constitution of India the validity of Section 125 Cr. 
P. C. was challenged on the ground that the section 
unreasonably limits the maintenance to Rs.500 for 
individual. It was observed that, "Section 125 of Cr. 
P. C. provides a speedy remedy against starvation 
of the civil liabilities of parties. The order made 
there under is tentative and it is subject to the 
final determination of the rights in civil court. 
Therefore, there is no reason to issue rule nisi." 
Writ petition was, thus , accordingly dismissed 125. 
It is worth-mentioning that the Law Commission in 
its 133rd report in 1989 had pointed out that the 
ceiling of Rs. 500 / - made in 1955 has no rational 
basis as apart from other factors the cost of living 
index had risen nine times since then. While 
recommending that the ceiling should be completely 
done away with, the commission had pointed out 
that if one were to retain the ceiling it would have 
to be raised from Rs. 500/ - to Rs. 4, 5 0 0 / -
Therefore, the Code of Criminal Procedure 
(Amendment) Bill, 1994 recommending that the 
ceiling on maintenance to be raised to Rs. 1,500/-
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is completely arbitrary and has no rational basis.^^5 
It may be observed that there is no inconsistency 
between this self-contained provision and 
provisions of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance 
Act of 1956. Section 125 is wide in its scope equally 
applicable to all persons irrespective of their 
religion, and the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance 
Act is applicable to Hindus and does not provide 
summary remedy. 
The Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act of 
1983 has introduced a sub-Section of 174 of the 
Code. This amendment was felt necessary as the 
number of dowry deaths or cases of cruelty or 
married women culminating in suicide were 
increasing day by day. This provision has been for 
in quest by Executive Magistrate and for post 
mortem in all cases where a woman has within 
seven years of her marriage, committed suicide or 
died in circumstances raising a reasonable 
suspicion that some other persons has committed 
an offence. Post mortem in all cases is necessary 
where a married woman has died within seven years 
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of her mar r iage and a relative of such woman h a s 
made a r eques t in th is behalf. 
Cr PC specially empowers police officers to 
make invest igat ion into cases of su ic ides and o ther 
u n n a t u r a l or susp ic ious d e a t h s . The object of the 
proceeding is merely to ascer ta in whe the r a pe r son 
h a s died u n d e r susp ic ious c i r c u m s t a n c e s or an 
u n n a t u r a l dea th and if so what is the a p p a r e n t 
cause of the dea th . 
Section 174(3) gives discre t ion to a police 
officer not to send a body for pos t mor t em 
examinat ion only in one case , namely, where the re 
can be no doub t as to the cause of d e a t h . The 
a m e n d m e n t in t roduced by the Cr iminal Law 
(Second Amendment) Act, 1983, m a k e s it 
manda to ry for the police officer to send the body 
for pos t -mor t em examinat ion if: 
(a) the case involves suicide by a woman 
within seven years of her mar r i age ; 
(b) the case re la tes to the dea th of a woman 
within seven years of he r mar r i age in 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ra is ing r e a s o n a b l e 
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susp ic ion tha t the woman was the victim 
of an offence; 
(c) t h a t any relative of the woman made a 
r e q u e s t in tha t behalf when she died 
within seven years of her mar r i age ; and 
(d) t he re is any doubt regard ing the cause of 
dea th . 
By a m e n d i n g the First Schedule to the Code of 
Criminal P rocedure , the offence of dowry dea th h a s 
been made cognizable, non-bai lable and t r iable by 
the Court of Sess ion. 
Presumpt ion as to dowry death- When the 
ques t ion is whe the r a person h a s commi t ted the 
dowry dea th of a woman and it is shown t h a t soon 
before he r dea th , such woman had been sub jec ted 
by such pe r son to cruelty or h a r a s s m e n t for, or in 
connect ion with, any demand for dowry, the cour t 
shal l p r e s u m e t h a t such person had c a u s e d the 
dowry dea th . 
For the p u r p o s e s of th i s sect ion, 'dowry d e a t h ' 
shal l have the same meaning as in Sect ion 304-B of 
the Indian Penal Code.27 
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The provis ions of th i s sect ion, a l though 
manda to ry in n a t u r e , simply enjoin upon the cour t 
to draw such p re sumpt ion of dowry dea th on proof 
a c i r c u m s t a n c e s ment ioned there in which a m o u n t s 
to shifting the onus on the accused to show t h a t 
the mar r i ed woman was not t r ea ted with cruel ty by 
her h u s b a n d soon before her dea th . This was held 
in Krishna Lai v. Union of India 28 Where the dea th 
was c a u s e d by s t r angu la t ion and evidence avai lable 
(in Hem Chand v State of Haryana'^^) showed t h a t 
dowry was being demanded and the a c c u s e d 
h u s b a n d was also subject ing his decea sed wife to 
cruel ty , it was held t ha t the p r e s u m p t i o n u n d e r the 
sect ion appl ied with full force. 
Law can be ahead of publ ic opinion bu t , if t he 
gulf is too wide, the re is every likelihood of i ts non-
obse rvance and violation. 3o 
S u p r e m e Cour t in Bhagwant Singh v. Commr of 
Police, Delhi^i 
"Young women of educa t ion , in te l l igence and 
c h a r a c t e r do not set fire to themse lves to welcome 
the e m b r a c e of dea th u n l e s s provoked and 
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compelled to t h a t despe ra t e s tep by the in to le rance 
of their misery." 
In Malan v. Balasaheb Bhimrao Gawade 
Where the wife proves pe r fo rmance of ce r ta in 
marr iage ce remonies , it is immate r i a l w h e t h e r the 
same sat isf ies all the r e q u i r e m e n t s of a valid 
marr iage . It is for the h u s b a n d to have gone to a 
competen t civil cour t and got h is mar r i age 
annu l l ed . In t he absence of a dec la ra t ion by a civil 
cour t abou t the legality or o the rwise of the 
marr iage t he cour t h a s to p r e s u m e t h a t the said 
mar r iage is legal . 
Sub sect ion (1) co r re sponds to s u b - s e c t i o n (1) 
488 of the old Code of 1898. The law h a s been 
improved in the following m a n n e r : 
(a) In the case of wife, t he o rder for 
m a i n t e n a n c e can be p a s s e d only if she is 
u n a b l e to ma in ta in herself. 
(b) A woman who h a s been divorced from her 
h u s b a n d so long a s she h a s not r e m a r r i e d 
after the divorce is now also en t i t l ed to 
m a i n t e n a n c e a l lowance. 
194 
(c) A mar r i ed daugh te r shall not be ent i t led 
to an order u n d e r th is section if she h a s 
a t t a ined majority. In the case of a minor 
mar r i ed daugh te r the father may be made 
liable to pay ma in t enance u n l e s s she 
a t t a i n s majority if her h u s b a n d is not 
p o s s e s s e d of sufficient m e a n s . 
(d) A child who h a s a t t a ined majority shal l 
be ent i t led to ma in t enance only when the 
child is by reason of any physica l or 
m e n t a l abnormal i ty or injury u n a b l e to 
m a i n t a i n herself. 
(e) The powers u n d e r the new Code can be 
exercised now by a Jud ic ia l Magis t ra te of 
the Firs t Class . 
(f) Where a father or mother is u n a b l e to 
m a i n t a i n himself or herself, a son who is 
p o s s e s s e d of sufficient m e a n s may be 
d i rec ted to pay m a i n t e n a n c e . If t he re are 
two or more chi ldren, the p a r e n t s may 
seek the remedy agains t any one or more 
of t hem. 
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An app l ican t had to wait for several year for 
gett ing relief from the court . Therefore, it was felt 
t ha t the following provisions should be made by the 
Cr PC (Amendment) Act, 2 0 0 1 . 
(1) Provision for in ter im Ma in t enance 
Allowance. 
Dur ing the pendency of the p roceed ings 
the Magis t ra te may order p a y m e n t of 
in te r im m a i n t e n a n c e al lowance and s u c h 
e x p e n s e s of the p roceed ings as t he 
Magis t ra te cons iders r e a s o n a b l e , to t he 
aggrieved pe r son . 
(2) Ceiling on Main tenance Allowance 
abol i shed . 
The ceiling of r upees five h u n d r e d h a s 
been repea led , as with t he cos t of living 
index cons is ten t ly r is ing, r e t e n t i o n of a 
m a x i m u m ceiling is no t jus t i f ied . If a 
ceiling is p rescr ibed and r e t a i n e d , it 
would requi re periodic revis ion t ak ing 
into accoun t the periodic inflat ion, which 
would unnecessa r i ly be t ime c o n s u m i n g . 
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Accordingly consequential changes mere 
made to remove the ceiling of 
maintenance allowance. 
There is no inconsistency between Section 125 
Cr PC and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance 
Act, 1956. The scopes of the two laws are different. 
This section provides a summary remedy and is 
applicable to all persons. It has no relationship to 
the personal law of the parties. It has been 
recognized that the Court must administer the 
personal law for Muslims in Ibrahim Fatima v. 
Mohd. Saleem^^ on the basis of ancient textual 
authorit ies, whose validity as of law can hardly be 
questioned. An order of maintenance cannot be 
struck down on the ground of its inconsistency 
with the personal law of the parties.33 
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To know the exact position of crime against 
woman Data of NCRB, 2004 (National Crime Record 
Bureau) were consulted, which are a s follows. 
Crime rate (Crime rate.... 14.2) 
The rate of crime has increased by 7.6 per 
cent from 13.2 during the year 2003 to 14.2 during 
2004. Delhi, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh 
were top three States in the order of crime rate at 
24 .1 , 24.0 and 23.5 respectively. 
23.50% 
crime rate in States 
24.10% 
•Andhra Pradesh 
•UttarPardesh 
D Delhi 
D Madhya Pradesh 
Trend Analysis 
The crime head-wise details of the reported crimes 
during 2000 to 2004 along with percentage 
variation is presented in Table-5 (A). The crime 
against women h a s increased by 9.8 per cent over 
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2000. The IPC component of crimes against women 
has accounted for 93 per cent of total crimes and 
the rest 7 per cent were SLL crimes against women. 
However, Tripura h a s reported the highest 
crime rate 4.8 as compared to national average of 
7. 
Rape cases have been further categorized as 
Incest Rape and other Rape cases . 
Incest Rape (Incidence 505) 
As compared to 15,0% increase in overall 
Rape cases, Incest cases have increase by 26.5% 
from 399 cases in 2003 to 505 cases in 2004. 
Chhatt isgarh (78) h a s accounted for the highest 
15.4% of the total such cases reported in the 
country. 
600n 
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Trends of Incest Rape cases 2003-2004 
399 
1 
D2003 
• 2004 
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Rape Victims 
Out of 18,233 reported Rape cases in the 
country, There were 18,239 Victims of Rape, of the 
total victims of Rape, 8.9% (1,622) were girls under 
the 15 years of age, while 11.0% (2,004) were 
teenaged girls (15 to 18 years). Nearly two-third 
(11,343) (62.2%) Were women in the age group 19-
30 years , 3,189 victims (17.5%)were in the age 
group of 31-50 years while only 0.4% (81) were over 
50 years of age. 
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D Girls Under age 
15 
• Girls 15-18 
D Women 19-30 
D Women 31-50 
Offenders were known to the victims in as 
many as 15.619 (85.6%) cases. Of these, pa ren t s / 
close family members were involved in 3.2% (505 
out of 15,619) cases, neighbor 's were involved in 
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34 .3% cases (5,358 out of 15,619) and relatives 
were involved in 6.6% (1033 out of 15,619) cases . 
Kidnapping & Abduction 
(Incidence 15,578) (Rate 1.4) 
These cases have reported an increase of 
17.2% as compared to previous year (13,296), Uttar 
Pradesh (2,324) has accounted for 14.9% of the 
Total case at the National level. Delhi ha s reported 
the highest rate at 5.8 a s compared to the National 
average of 1.4. 
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Table-5(A) 
Crime Head-wise Incidents of Crime Against 
Women during 2000 -2004 and % variation in 
2 0 0 4 over 2003 
S.NO 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Crime Head 
Rape 
Kidnapping & 
Abduction 
Dowry Death 
Torture 
Molestation 
Sexual 
Harassment 
Importation of 
Girls 
Sati Prevention 
Act 
Immoral 
Traffic (P) Act 
Indecent Rep. 
if Women (P) 
Act 
Dowry 
Prohibition Act 
Year 
2000 
16496 
15023 
6995 
45778 
32940 
11024 
64 
0 
9515 
662 
2876 
2001 
16075 
14645 
6851 
49170 
34124 
9746 
114 
0 
8796 
1052 
3222 
2002 
16373 
14506 
6822 
49237 
33943 
10155 
76 
0 
6598 
2508 
2816 
2 0 0 3 
15847 
13296 
6208 
50703 
32939 
12325 
46 
0 
5510 
1043 
2684 
2 0 0 4 
18233 
15578 
7026 
58121 
34567 
10001 
89 
0 
5748 
1378 
3592 
% 
Variation 
in 
2004Over 
2003 
15.0 
17.1 
3.2 
14.6 
4.9 
-18.8 
93.5 
4.3 
32.1 
33.8 
Total 141373 43795 143034 140601154333 9.8 
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% crime against women in cfflrent head 
100 
-20 
-^0 
a Immoral 
Tmffic(FOA« 
• Indecent Rep 
ifWbmen(P) 
Act 
DDowy 
Prohibition 
Act 
• Sat) 
Prawntion 
Act 
• Impoitation of 
Girls 
• Sexual 
Harassment 
• Molestaiion 
•Torture 
• Dowry Death 
• Kidnapping & 
Abduction 
Table-5(B) 
Proportion of crime against Women (IPC) towards 
total IPC crimes 
S.No 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Total IPC 
Crimes 
17,71,084 
17,69,308 
17,80,330 
17,16,120 
18,32,015 
Crimes Against 
women(IPC cases) 
1,28,320 
1,30,725 
1,31,112 
1,31,364 
1,43,615 
% to total 
IPC CRIMES 
7.2 
7.4 
7.4 
7.6 
7.8 
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The proportion of IPC crimes committed 
against women towards total IPC crimes has 
increased continually during last 5 years from 7.2 
% in 2000 to 7.8 % during 2004. 
Crime head-wise analysis (IPC) 
Rape 
(Incidence.... 18 ,233 (Rate 1.7) 
Rape cases have reported mixed t rends over 
last 5 years with a decrease of 2 .5% in 2001 over 
2000, an increase of 1.8% in 2002 over 2001 , a 
decrease of 3.2% in year 2003 over 2002 and 
substant ia l increase of 15.0% in current year. 
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Madhya Pradesh has reported the highest number 
of Rape cases (2,875) accounting for 15.8% of total 
such cases reported in the country (1,220) followed 
by Orissa (532), which also reported the highest 
crime at 1.4 as compared to 0.3 at National level. 
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Crime against Women in Cities 
(All-India.. . .1,54,333 (Cities 20 ,492) 
As per population census 2001, 35 cities 
having population over 10 lakh (See Chapter-2) 
were identified as Mega cities. A total of 20,492 
cases of crimes against women were reported from 
these 35 cities as compared to 19,573 cases in the 
year 2003 reporting an increase of 4.7%. The rate 
of crime in cities at 19.0 was comparatively higher 
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as compared to National rate of 14.2. Among 35 
cities, Delhi (3,334) has accounted for 16.3% of 
total crimes followed by Hyderabad (1,979) (97%). 
The crime rate was significantly higher in 
Vijayawada (109.) city as compared to all-cities 
rate of 19.0 only. 
Crimes against Women in Cities 
4000 
2000 
04 
3331 
D DELHI 
•HYDERABAD 
D V U A Y A W A D A 
Delhi city h a s accounted for 30 .3% of Rape 
cases, 33.3%of kidnapping and 18.3% of 
Molestation cases, 14.8% of Cruelty of Husband 7 
Relatives among 35 cities. Faridabad of Haryana 
h a s reported 17.8% of Eve-Teasing cases (434 out 
of 2,434 cases). 
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CRIMES IN DELHI UNDER 
DIFFERENT HEADS 
sRape 
• Kidnapping 
0 Molestation 
D Cruelty 
It is worthwhile mentioning tha t Bangalore, 
Chennai, Coimbatore, Hyderabad and Mumbai were 
more vigilant in curbing these crimes as more cases 
under Special Laws &, Local Acts were booked in 
these cities. 32 .3% (422 out of 1,907) of cases 
under Immoral Traffic IPC Act and 79.4% (247 out 
of 311) of Dowry Prohibition Act cases in were 
booked in Bangalore city alone. 20 .5% (392 out of 
19.7) cases in Chennai, 13.4% (255 out of 1907) 
cases in Coimbatore and 12 .1% (231 out of 1907) 
cases in Mumbai were booked under Immoral 
Traffic (P) Act were booked under Hyderabad city 
only. 
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STATE IMMORAL TRAFFIC 
D Bangalore 
•Channai 
aCoimbatofe 
DMumbai 
The increase in cases booked under SLL 
represent preventive policing of State/UT police. 
Keeping th is in view, an at tempt has also been 
made to analyse the Crime Against Women by 
excluding SLL crime i.e. Sati Prevention Act, 
Immoral Traffic (P) Act, Dowry Prohibition Act and 
Indecent Representation of Women (P) Act. 
Dowry Deaths 
(Incidence 7 ,026 Rate 0.6) 
These cases have increased by 13.2 % over the 
Previous year (6,208),Out of the total such cases 
reported in the country around 24 .3% cases were 
reported from Uttar Pradesh (1,708) alone followed 
by Bihar (1,029) (14.6%) .The highest ra te of crime 
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(1.2) was, however, reported from Bihar and 
Madhya Pradesh as compared to the National 
average of 0.6 only. 
DOWRY DEATH 
Dlittar Pradesh 
•Bihar 
Torture (Cruelty by Husband & Relative) 
(Incidence... . 58 ,121 Rate 5.4) 
'Torture' cases in the country have 
increased by 14.6% over the previous year (50,703). 
14.4% over these were reported from Andhra 
Pradesh (8,388). The highest rate at 11.2 was 
reported from Rajasthan as compared to the 
National rate at 5.4. 
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Molestation 
(Incidence . . . .34,567 Rate... .3.2) 
Incidents of Molestation in the country have 
increased by 4.9% over the previous year (32,939) , 
19.4% of total such cases were reported from 
Madhya Pradesh (96,690) which also reported the 
highest rate (10.3) as compared to the National 
average of 3.2. 
Molestation 
35000i 
WWi -
32000 
32939 
-34567 
DPrewousyear 
I Current Year 
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Sexual Harassment (Eve-teasing) 
(Incidence.. . lO,001 Rate...0.9) 
The number of such cases has significantly 
declined by 18.9% over the previous year (12,325). 
Uttar Pradesh has reported 25 .8% of cases (2,682) 
followed by Andhra Pradesh 23.8% (2,310). 
Haryana has reported the highest crime rate 3.8 as 
compared to the National average of 0.9. 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT (EVE TEASING) 
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The law, both substantive and procedural, 
appears to have gone to the farthest limits to 
facilitate the punishment of guilty and create terror 
in the mind, which are criminally inclined. Thus, 
the legislature has done all it could but the 
problem remains and perhaps assumes alarming 
proportions. The law may be adequate but its 
enforcement is below expectations with a marginal 
impact in society. A custom consistently followed 
and increasingly glamourised cannot be wished 
away by criminal sanctions and legislative 
contrivances. 
It can safely be concluded that where the 
society is lacking in institutional framework and 
organizational framework on a large scale to 
safeguard women against the atrocities. Women 
themselves should come forward to guard it with 
the help of the armory of legislator enacted for 
their well being by the legislatures in India. 
212 
References: 
1. (2001) 8 sec 633 sec (Cri) 48 
2. 1991 Cri LJ 268 (MP) 
3. (1989) 1 sec 244 1989 (SCC(Cri) 105 
4. (1989) 1 sec 105: 1988 SeC(Cri) 60 
5. (1991) 3 see 1:1991 see (Cri) 513 
6. (2001) 2 see 577:2001 SCC (Cri) 358 
7. 1992 Cru IJ III (Bom) Also see Krishan Lai 
V. Union of India, 1994 Cri LJ 3472 (P&H): 
Balkrishna Moghe v. State. 1998 Cri LJ 
4496 (Bom) 
8. (1998) 3 see (309: 1998 SCC (Cri) 740 
9. 2001 (Cri) LJ 1598 (MP) 
10. (1994) 2 Crimes 114 (SC) 
11 . (2001) 9 SCC 618 
12. AIR 2006 SC 2855 
13. State of Gujarat & Others (1991) 
14. State of Haryana, (1994) 
15. (Govt, of NCT), De/hi,(2003) 
16. AIR 2006 SC 2855 
213 
17. (Govt, of NOT) Delhi (2003) 
18. K.Prema S.Rao (supra), 
19. Satvir Singh (supra) 
20. AIR 1983 SC 1219 
21. (2004) 8 sec 251 
22. (2001) 2 sec 577 
23. AIR 2000 Se 232 
24. AIR 1998 SC 1211 
25. AIR 2001 SC 2828 
26. AIR 2006 SC 673 
27 . Ins by Act 43 of 1986 S. 12 
2 8 . 1994 Cri LJ 3472 (P&H) 
29 . (1994) 6 s e c 727: 1995 SCC (Cri) 36 . 
Also see Sta te of UP V. R a m e s h P ra sad 
Mishra , (1996) 10 SCC 360: 1996 SCC 
(Cri) 1278 
30. N. R. Madhaya Menon: "The Dowry 
Prohibi t ion Act: Does the law provide 
solut ion or itself cons t i tu te the problem 
Indian Bar Review, Vol. 14 (4) 1987 
214 
3 1 . (1983) 3 s e c 352 
32 . AIR 1980 Mad 82 
3 3 . Hussa in Saheb , In re, 1985 Cr LJ 1505 
(HP) 
215 
Part-B 
(ii) FAMILY LAWS 
The issue of dowry has acquired pernicious 
overtones in almost gdl the communities of India 
culminating into the phenomenon of conjugal violence. The 
newly wedded bride is often subjected to gruesome 
atrocities, tortures, humiliations by none others but either 
by her husband or her in-laws in the marital home. At 
times such inhuman treatment often results into suicide or 
the bride burnings. 
The concept of 'cruelty' has drastically changed in 
the present materialistic society. The courts have also been 
interpreting the concept of cruelty in order to bring it in 
conformity with the social facts and compelling needs of the 
present society. Thus, where the wife has reasonable 
apprehension arising out from the conduct of the husband 
or the in-laws that she is likely to be harmed due to 
persistent demands of dowry, such an apprehension would 
manifestly be a reasonable justification for the wife's refusal 
to live with her husband. Nagging, scolding, withdrawal of 
marital intercourse and even incompatibility of the 
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temperaments of the spouses have been included within the 
purview of cruelty. 
Cruelty 
While there are a variety of grounds upon which 
divorce and judicial separation can be obtained, this 
manual concentrates on cruelty, as this is the ground most 
likely to apply in a case of domestic violence. Cruelty is a 
ground for both judicial separation and divorce. 
The factors that the Courts typically take into 
consideration in deciding whether the husband's conduct 
can be regarded as cruel are: 
• The social and cultural background of the parties; the 
Courts tend to be more critical of domineering and 
violent behaviour on the part of the husband when 
the woman is educated. 
• The physical and mental health of the parties. 
• The day-to-day relations of the parties. 
Here are some examples of acts, which the courts 
have found to constitute cruelty: 
• Beatingi 
• Forcing unnatural sexual practices upon the wife2 
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• Husband's insisting on sexual contact with the wife 
despite this being painful to her owing to 
gynecological problems.3 
• Rough and domineering conducf^ 
• Beating combined with refusal to give the \^ dfe enough 
money for running the household and spending such 
money on alcohol. 
• Willful and unjustifiable interference by the husband 
in the life of the wife ^ 
• Harassment for dowry (this has been found to 
constitute mental cruelty to the wife)^ 
• Unfounded allegations of adultery^ 
• Visiting the wife's place of residence in a drunken 
state and causing annoyance to her and her 
neighbours^ 
• Attempt by the husband to strangle the child and the 
wife's brother has been found to constitute mental 
cruelty to the wife^ 
• Distress of mind caused to the wife by persistent 
drinking habit of husband^o 
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Mental distress caused b}^  disappearing without 
leaving any information as to her whereabouts, 
threatening to commit suicide, disinclination to sexual 
intercourse and general depression^ 
Studied unkindnessi2 
False and defamatory allegations against spouse to 
his or her employers and colleagues^^ 
These examples are taken from cases decided under 
the HMA and falling under definition of cruelty. The courts 
technical nuances of this word under the law. 
Cruelty itself was not a ground for relief by way of 
divorce prior to the Amendment of 1976 but was only a 
ground for the relief of judicial separation under Section 10. 
Clause (b) of Section 10(1) lays down: 
"...has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to 
cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the 
petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the 
petitioner to live with the other party." 
"cruelty" has nowhere been defined in the Act. But 
"Legal Cruelty" was explained in Ray den on Divorce^'^ and 
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referred to at length with approval in Sarvana Perumal v. 
Shashi Kana Perumal^^ It was held in this case that the 
concept legal cruelty involves a conduct of such character 
as to have caused danger to life, limb or health or as to give 
rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger. Rassel 
v.Russel^^ 
In Bhagat v. Bhagat^'^, the wife, a Vice-President in 
a public sector corporation, made allegations in her written 
statement that the husband was a mental patient, that he 
was not a normal person and that he required psychological 
treatment and that his family members were a bunch of 
lunatics, the Supreme Court held that these allegations 
could not but constitute mental cruelty of such a natural 
that she cannot reasonably be asked to live v^ith the 
respondent thereafter and therefore directed dissolution of 
marriage under Section 13(l)(i-a). 
In Shobha rani v. Madhukar Reddy ^^ the Supreme 
Court examined Section 13(l)(i-a) and stated the proper 
approach to cases of cruelty and reiterated the legal 
position after the Amending Act of 1976. In this case, the 
Supreme Court had to consider whether persistent demand 
of dowry by parents of husband with the support of the 
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husband amounted to cruelty. It was held that the demand 
for dowry was prohibited by law and that the totality of the 
facts and circumstances of the case justified the inference 
of cruelty. It was observed by the Supreme Court that there 
could be cases where the conduct complained of itself may 
be bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then, the 
impact of the act or injurious effect on the other spouse 
need not be inquired into or considered. In such cases 
cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or 
admitted. 
The Supreme Court further observed that cruelty 
may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are 
accustomed to, or their economic and social condition. It 
may also depend upon the culture and human values to 
which they attach importance. Quoting Lord Denning in 
Sheldon v. Sheldon}^ they observed, "the categories of 
cruelty are not closed". Each case may be different and a 
new type of cruelty may crop up in any case. The Supreme 
Court made a special reference to Section 498-A, IPC that 
any harassment of a woman with a view to coerce her to 
meet any unlawful demand for any property or any valuable 
security also constitutes cruelty. They further held that 
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cruelty requires to be proved on the preponderance of 
probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt. 
Geeta v. Mohan^o that the distress, pain and 
suffering of the mind resulting from continuous drinking 
transforms his individual weakness into such injury to the 
mind of a wife that the susceptibilities, broken aspirations 
and other circumstances that consuming alcohol becomes 
matrimonial cruelty. 
Some other instances of cruelty are: 
Husband lethargic, not working, providing no 
money for household, refusing to look after or 
make payments for treatment of his ill wife.21 
Constantly insulting and accusing of adulterous 
behaviour. 22 
Wife not caring to see her husband in hospital, 23 
Wife visited by persons in her house and leads 
immoral life.24 
Termination of pregnancy twice by wife in spite of 
insistence by husband to the contrary.25 
• Constant nagging by mother-in-law.26 
222 
• Refusal or voluntary acts of the husband depriving 
the other of society and cohabitation or sexual 
intercourse for a long time amounts to cruelty-.2^ 
• Wife leaving the country without knowledge of her 
husband. 28 
• Wife becoming Brahma Kumari29 
• Excessive sexual intercourse affecting health.^o 
• Derogatory and disparaging remarks against spouse 
and close relatives, allegations of illicit sexual 
relations and sexual perversity will amount to 
cruelty.31 
Supreme Court observed in Indira Gangele v. 
Shailendra L^^ sometimes the temperaments of the parties 
are not conducive to each other which may result in petty 
quarrels.33. Also, one isolated instance would not amount 
to34 cruelty so as to grant a decree for divorce, rather, the 
behaviour of the other party has to be persistently and 
repeatedly treating the other spouse with such cruelty so as 
to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the 
husband or wife that it will be harmful or injurious to live 
with the other party. 
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In A V. i^s that sdlegations made in the written 
statement can never be the basis of divorce on the ground 
of cruelty. The petitioner must have been treated with 
cruelty prior to the filing of the petition. A petitioner 
approaching court with a petition for divorce on the ground 
of cruelty can succeed only if he proves the act of cruelty on 
which he has based his petition. No subsequent acts, either 
by way of allegations in written statement, responsible or 
not, baseless or not, can be taken help of in order to show 
cruelty. 
Taiyab Khan v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand),^^ 
It is a case of an unnaturad death, that is, death 
which occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances. 
The first three ingredients are clearly established. The only 
other ingredient, which needs to be considered is the 
harassment of the woman by the husband or his relatives 
in connection with demand for dowTy. 
First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the 
cruel treatment. Second, the impact of such treatment in 
the mind of the spouse, whether it caused reasonable 
apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live 
with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be 
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drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and 
its effect on the complaining spouse. 
Pandit Dattaraya Kulkarni v. Laxmi Pandit 
Kulkarni37 
A wife may claim maintenance from the husband 
notwithstanding a decree of restitution of conjugal rights 
obtained by the husband. If the wife has sufficient grounds 
for not joining the husband despite a restitution order, 
such restitution order would not stand in the way of her 
seeking maintenance under the provision of section 125 of 
the Cr.P.C. 
Ashabi B Takke v. Bashasab Takke^^ 
"The question of the wife deserting the husband or the 
husband deserting the wife pales into insignificance in the 
light of this development [i.e. the husband's second 
marriage]. The fact that the wife could not get maintenance 
earlier under section 125, Cr. PC proceedings also cannot 
have any bearing in a suit for maintenance filed subsequent 
to the defendant husband having contracted a second 
marriage. This is so even if the personal law of the 
defendant permits him to contract more than one marriage. 
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The second marriage of the husband per se is 
sufficient justification for a wife to leave him and claim 
maintenance. When that is proved, nothing else needs to be 
established. 
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Section 125 Cr PC 
The proceedings under Section 125, Cr PC and 
section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 are distinct and 
different and they are applied for different purposes by 
courts of competent jurisdiction. It was held in Rajendra 
Singh v. Maya Deut^° that they do not overlap over one 
another. As such, where interim maintenance is granted 
under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act that does not 
warrant cancellation of the maintenance allowed under 
Section 125 of Cr PC, the maintenance granted by the 
criminal court under Section 125, Cr PC shall also continue 
to be paid. The grant of maintenance pendent elite under 
Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act does not effect the 
right of the wife to claim maintenance under Section 125, 
Cr PC. The mere fact that an order, under Section 24 of the 
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has been passed does not divest 
the jurisdiction of the courts to pass an order under Section 
125, Cr PC.41 
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Kongini Balan v. M.Visalakshy^^ 
The fact that under section 125(4) of Cr P.C, a wife 
living separately from the husband by mutual consent 
without divorce was not entitled to maintenance does not 
mean that a wife upon divorce would not be entitled to 
m.aintenance either, merely because she obtained divorce 
by mutual agreement. Had that been the intention of the 
legislators, it would have been made explicit, the court held. 
MUSLIM LAW 
"Maintenance comprehends food, raiment and 
lodging though in common parlance it is limited to the 
fir St". 43 
In Amir Mohammed v. BushrO^'^ it was held that if 
the husband has not paid prompt dower the wife does not 
lose her right to maintenance. Similarly in Badruddin v. 
Aiyasha Begum"^^ it was held that where a husband 
marries a second wife of keeps a mistress, the wife may 
refuse to live with the husband and still claim maintenance. 
However, cases of disobedience of husband by wives 
are on a different plain. According to Tyabji: 
"....it is impossible to hold that a Mussalman 
wife defying her husband refusing to live with 
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him and bringing scandalous charge against 
him, can yet claim to be maintained separately 
at the expense of her husband." 
In Bai Fatima v. Ali Mohomed Aiyeb^^ a person who 
had a wife living and wanted to marry another had entered 
into an agreement with his first wife that he would pay her 
a certain allowance as maintenance if any disagreement 
took place between her and him thereafter. The agreement 
here was treated as opposed to public policy because if 
encouraged a separation between the husband and wife. 
In Muin-ud-din v. Jamal Fadma^'^ was executed 
before marriage in order to restrain the prospective 
husband from ill-treating his wife or behaving improperly 
towards her or capriciously turning her out. In view of the 
circumstances established, the agreement did not offend 
Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 
In Mansur v. AzxzuX^^ an agreement between a 
Muslim and his first wife, made after his marriage with a 
second wife, providing for a certain maintenance for her if 
she could not in future get on with the second \Wfe was not 
held void on grounds of public policy. Agreeing with this 
view Mulla held that, "if a Mohammedan wife can lawfully 
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stipulate for a divorce....There is no reason why she cannot 
stipulate for future separation at all events if the separation 
is for a justifiable cause. Such stipulations can hardly be 
said to be against the policy of Mohammedan law."- '^-
According to Ameer Ali, the following stipulations 
are enforceable: 
(1) The husband will not contract a second 
marriage during subsistence of first. 
(2) The husband will not remove the wife from the 
conjugal domicile without her consent. 
(3) The husband will not absent himself from the 
conjugal domicile beyond a certain period. 
(4) The husband aind wife will live in a specified 
place. 
(5) Certain amount of dower will be payable 
immediately after marriage or within a stated 
period. 
(6) The husband will pay to the wife a fixed sum for 
maintenance. 
(7) The husband will maintain the children of the 
wife from her former husband. 
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(8) The husband will not prevent her from receiving 
visits from her relations whenever she likes, so 
In Mohd. Rahinulla In re i^ it was held that: 
The foundation upon which the wife's right 
vested was the relationship of husband and wife. When 
that relationship was lawfully dissolved and there was no 
marital tie either in reason or upon any canon of justice 
or even upon the language of Section 488 and 489, how 
the husband could be directed to continue to maintain 
his divorced wife. 
Danial Latifi v. Union of India^^ 
The constitutional validity of the Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (MWA), was 
challenged on the ground that it infringed Articles 14. 15 
and 21 of the Constitution. The five Judges Bench, upheld 
its validity. 
The court analysed the Shah Bano and the 
provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act in detail. It conceded that the Act appears to 
be, prima fade, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, 
which mandates equality and equal protection of law to all 
persons and also Article 15, which prohibits discrimination 
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on grounds, inter alia, of religion. It, however, observed that 
the validity or otherwise of a statute would depend on the 
interpretation of the same and the court decided to 
interpret it in a manner so as to uphold the validity of the 
Act on the ground that "the legislature does not intend to 
enact unconstitutional laws." 
CHRISTIAN LAW 
Section 37 of the Indian Divorce Act, which deals with 
permanent alimony authorities the court to make an order 
for the payment of a lump sum amount for permanent 
maintenance. In this section the husband can have a 
payment order varied from time to time in accordance with 
his means. Section 37 original ran as follows (prior to the 
2001 Amendment Act): 
"The High Court may if it thinks fit, on any decree 
absolute declaring a marriage to be dissolved, or on any 
decree of judicial separation obtained by his wife and the 
District Judge may, if he thinks fit, on the confirmation of 
any decree of his declaring a marriage to be dissolved, or on 
any decree of judicial separation obtained by their wife. 
Order that the husband shall, to the satisfaction of the 
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court, secure to the wife such gross sum of money, or such 
annual sum of money for any term not exceeding her own 
life, as, having regard to her fortune (if any), to the abilit}' of 
the husband, and to the conduct of the parties, it thinks 
reasonable; and for that purpose may cause a proper 
instrument to be executed by all necessary parties." 
No doubt there aire effective legal provisions of prevent 
the evil of dowry-death but how for there provisions 
safeguard to women's interest? To meet this challenge of 
increasing domestic violence, the Criminal Act were 
amended in 1983 and 1986 and introduced a Dowr}-
Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1984 and 1986 to cerate 
special categories of offences and punishment dealings with 
cruelty to wives, dowry harassment and dowr>^-death. It is 
wide enough to cover the incident of domestic violence. 
These amendments introduced new sec. 498-A of I.P.C. for 
cruelty of wives and 304-B for dowry-death. 
Section 113-A also added in Indian Evidence Act by 
the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 to create 
the presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married 
women, and Amendment Act, 1986 added a sec. 113-B 
presumption as to dowry death. But these provisions fail 
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to achieve its objective. In fact the implementation of law 
have more important. 
There are many loopholes in our existing criminal 
justice system because in many cases the husband and in 
laws escape from punishment. The system needs a 
complete overhauling. 
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THE DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1 9 6 1 
Sec t ion -2 : Definition of Dowry: In th i s Act, "dowry" 
m e a n s any proper ty or valuable secur i ty given or 
agreed to be given e i ther directly or indirect ly 
(a) by one par ty to a mar r iage to the o ther pa r ty 
to the mar r i age ; or 
(b) by the p a r e n t s of e i ther par ty to a mar r i age or 
by any o ther person to e i ther pa r ty to the 
mar r i age or to any o ther pe r son ; a t or before 
or any t ime after the mar r i age in connec t ion 
with the mar r iage of said pa r t i e s b u t does not 
inc lude dower or m a h r in the case of p e r s o n s 
to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) 
app l i es . 
S u p r e m e Cour t h a s given definit ion of dowry in 
var ious c a s e s , which are as follows: 
In Satbir S ingh v. S ta te of Punjab^ 
(i) The word 'dowry' should be any p roper ty 
or va luable given or agreed to be given in 
connec t ion with the mar r i age . The c u s t o m a r y 
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payments in connection with birth of child or other 
ceremonies are not involved within ambit of dowry; 
In Arjun Dhondiba Kamble v. State of 
Maharashtra,2 
(ii)"Dowry" in the sense of expression contemplated 
by Dowry Prohibition Act is a demand for property 
of valuable security having an inextricable nexus 
with the marriage, i.e., it is a consideration from 
the side of the bride's parents or relatives to the 
groom or his parents and / or guardian for the 
agreement to wed the bride-to-be. But where the 
demand for property or valuable security has no 
connection with the consideration for the marriage, 
it will not amount to a demand for dowry; 
In Rajeev v. Ram Kishan Jaiswal ^ 
(iii)Any property given by parents of the bride need 
not be in consideration of the marriage, it can even 
be in connection with the marriage and would 
constitute dowry; 
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In Vemuri Venkateswara Rao v. State of Andhra 
Pradesh* 
(iv)The definition of dowry is wide enough to 
include all sorts of properties, valuable securit ies, 
etc., given or agreed to be given directly or 
indirectly;, 
In Shankar Prasad Shaw v. Stated 
(V) There had been no agreement between either 
parties to give any property or valuable securit}' 
to the other party at or before or after the marriage. 
The demand of T.V, refrigerator, gas connection, 
cash of Rs 50,000 and 15 tolas of gold are not 
demand of dowry but demand of valuable security 
in view section 2; 
In Hakam Singh v. State of Punjab^ 
(vi) While dowry signifies presents given in 
connection with marriage to the bridal couple as 
well as others, stridhan is confined to property 
given to or meant for the bride; 
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In Y.K. Bansal v. Anju'^ 
(vii) Dowry, means, any property given or agreed to 
be given by the parents of a party to the marriage 
at the time of the marriage or before marriage or at 
any time after the marriage in connection with the 
marriage. So, where the husband had demanded a 
sum of Rs. 50,000 some days after the marriage 
from his father-in-law and on not being given 
became angry, tortured the wife and threatened to 
go for another marriage, it was held that the 
amount was being demand in connection with the 
marriage and it was a demand for dowry though it 
was demanded after the marriage;. 
In Madhu Sudan Malhotra v. K.C Bhandari^ 
(viii) The furnishing of a list of ornaments and other 
household articles such as refrigerator, furniture, 
electrical appliances, etc, at the time of the 
settlement of the marriage amounts to demand of 
dowry within the meaning of section 2 of the Dowry 
Prohibition Act. 1961; 
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In Kunju Moideen v. Syed Mohamed^ 
(ix) A sum of money paid by a Mohemmadan in 
connection with his daughter 's marriage to 
prospective bridegroom for the purchase of a piece 
of land in the joint name of his daughter and 
would-be son-in-law is not 'dowry' within the 
meaning of the Act; 
In Nirdosh Kumar v. Padma Rani^*' 
(x) Where the demand was made after the marriage 
for the purchase of a car, it was held that it did not 
fall within the definition; 
In L.V. Jadhav v. Shankar Rao^^ 
(xi) Where the demand was made at the time when 
marriage ceremony was in progress and was 
repeated after the marriage, it was held tha t it fell 
within the definition of dowry; 
In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raj Gopal Aswa^^ 
(xii) Definition of 'dowry' is not restr icted to 
agreement or demand for payment of dowry before 
and at the marriage but also includes demands 
made subsequent to marriage; 
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In Reena Agrawal v. Anupami^ 
(Xiii) Demand of dowry in respect of invalid 
marriage would not be legally recognizable; 
Sec. 3: Penalty for giving or taking dowry-
(1) If any person, after the commencement of this 
Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of 
dowry, he shall be punishable^'* with imprisonment 
for a term which shall not be less than [five years , 
and with fine which shall not be less than five 
years, and with fine which shall not be less than 
fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value 
of such dowry, whichever is more^^; 
Provided that the Court may, for adequate a 
special reasons to be recorded in the judgment , 
impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 
less than five years. 5[(20 Nothing in sub -sect ion 
(1) shall apply to, or in relation to^^,-
(a) presents which are given at the time of marriage 
to the bride (without any demand having been made 
in that behalf): 
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In Indravati v. Union of India,i*^ 
The offence is founded in the relationship of the 
property demanded as abettor with the nature of 
demand. It should not bear a mere connection with 
marriage; Madan Lai V. Amar Nath,i8 
(ii) Abetment is a preparatory act and connotes 
active complicity on the party of the abettor 
at a point of time prior to the actual 
commission of the offence; Muthummal v. 
Maruthal,i9 
Sec. 4. Penalty for demanding dowry.20 
If any person demands, directly or 
indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or 
guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may 
be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with 
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less 
than six months, but which may extend to two 
years and with fine which may extend to ten 
thousand rupees: 
Provided that the Court may, for adequate 
and special reason to be mentioned in the 
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judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a 
term of less than six months. 
AMENDEMENTS TO THE DOWRY PROHIBITION 
ACT 
The issue relating to the deep-rooted evil of 
dowry was taken up in the Convention organized by 
the National Commission For Women on the 22"^ ^ of 
November 2005, at the Symposia Hall of the NASC, 
Pusa, New Delhi. 
Though the legislation. The Dowry Prohibition 
Act, 1961, aptly prohibits the giving or taking of 
dowry, it was felt that the present law has been 
totally ineffective to curb this social evil. The 
convention, which was attended by chairpersons of 
various State Commissions for Women, members of 
NGOs', Civil Servants as well as retired and 
working police officers from various s ta tes , felt that 
there was a dire need to make the requisite 
amendments to the Act so as to make it effective. 
The background note prepared by the lawyers 
collective as well as the inputs provided by the 
NCW and other delegates was discussed and on 
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basis of which, the following recommendations are 
being made suggesting suitable amendments to the 
Act. The justifications for amendments have been 
mentioned in the background note: 
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PRESENT LAW AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
SECTION 2; DEFINITION OF DOWRY: 
Brief note on changes recommended:-
The misinterpretation of the term in 
connection with marriage' is manifested in the 
recent case of the Supreme Court-Satvir Singh v. 
State of Punjab. The Court held, there are three 
occasions related to dowry. One is before the 
marriage, second is at the time of marriage and the 
third is at any time after the marriage. The third 
occasion may appear to be an unending period. But 
the crucial words are in connection with the 
marriage of the said parties. This means that giving 
or agreeing to give any property or valuable security 
on any of the above three stages should have been 
in connection with the marriage of the part ies. 
There can be many other instances for payment of 
money or giving property as between the spouses. 
For example, some customary payments in 
connection with birth of a child or other ceremonies 
are prevalent in different societies. Such payments 
are not enveloped within the ambit of dowry. 
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Therefore it is felt that the term 'in connection with 
marriage should be deleted. 
"Indirectly"- At present the term remains 
undefined: 
> How do you define what indirectly is? Does 
indirectly mean that in case the in laws do not 
demand for it but create such situations for the 
bride that she has no choice but to bring home 
lavish gifts for her in laws? 
> Does it include situations where the bride is 
not coerced but expected to bring a part icular item 
from her parents? 
Leaving this term undefined leaves the Dowry 
victims and their families, with the burden of 
providing that Dowry was demanded in an "indirect" 
way. The definition of "indirect" has been left to the 
courts to determine on an ad-hoc basis, which 
resul ts in inconsistent precedent at the trial court 
and at the appellate court levels. 
The sub-section (2) to Section 3 is proposed to 
be included within the broad definition of dowry. 
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2.SECTION 3: PENALTY FOR GIVING OR TAKING 
DOWRY: Equally responsible in the prevalence of 
dowry in our society. It would thus be logical to 
prosecute not only the taker, but also the given if 
the need arises. But at the same time the language 
of Section 3 should not be such as to discourage 
the given of dowry to complain, even if dowry has 
been given under a threat or coercion and has not 
been the result of a voluntary decision. In this 
scenario, the given can be treated as an aggrieved 
and it becomes important to state that such an 
aggrieved will not be liable to prosecution. Hence, 
Section 7(3) of the present Act should be imported 
in Section 3 itself. 
3. SECTION 6 : REVERSION OF DOWRY: 
Present Law Proposed Amendments 
1. Dowry to be for the 
benefit of the wife or her 
heirs-(l) where any 
dowry is received by any 
person other than the 
woman in connection 
with whose marriage it 
is given, that person 
shall transfer it to the 
woman. 
Dowry, stridhan or 
gifts to be for the 
benefit on the wife or 
her heirs-(l) where 
any dowry or stridhan 
or gifts is received by 
any person other than 
the woman in 
connection with whose 
marriage it is given, 
that person shall 
transfer it to the 
woman. 
Inclusion of 
stridhan and 
gifts. 
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4. SECTION 7; COGNIZANCE OF OFFENCES: 
Present Law Proposed a m e n d m e n t s 
(1) The Court of 
Jud ic i a l Magis t ra te of 
the first c l a s s or the 
Metropoli tan 
Magis t ra te , a s the 
case may be, wi thin 
the local l imits of 
which. 
(a) the person 
aggrieved p e r m a n e n t l y 
res ides or ca r r i e s on 
b u s i n e s s or is 
employed; or 
(b) the r e s p o n d e n t 
res ides or ca r r i e s on 
b u s i n e s s of is 
employed; or 
© the cause of ac t ion 
has a r i sen , 
Shall be the 
competen t cou r t to try 
offences u n d e r t h i s 
Act. 
(1) No twi th s t and ing 
any th ing con ta ined in the 
Code of Cr iminal 
Procedure , 1973 (2 of 
1974). 
(2) No twi ths t and ing 
any th ing con ta ined in 
the Code of Cr iminal 
Procedure , 1973 (2 of 
1974). 
(a)no cour t inferior to t h a t 
of a Metropol i tan 
Magis t ra te or a J u d i c i a l 
Magis t ra te of the first 
c lass sha l l try any offence 
unde r th i s Act. 
(b) no cour t sha l l t ake 
cognizance of an offence 
unde r t h i s Act except 
upon . 
(a) No cour t shal l t ake 
cognizance of an 
offence u n d e r th i s Act 
except upon . 
(i) i ts own knowledge or a 
police repor t of the facts 
which c o n s t i t u t e such 
offence, or 
(i) i ts own knowledge 
or a police repor t of 
the facts which 
cons t i t u t e such 
offence, or 
(ii) a compla in t by the 
person aggrieved by the 
offence or a p a r e n t or 
(ii) a compla in t by the 
person aggrieved by 
the offence or a 
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other relative of such 
person, or by any 
recognized welfare 
institution or 
organization. 
£ it shall be lawful for a 
Metropolitan Magistrate or 
a Judicial Magistrate of 
the first class to pass any 
sentence authorized by 
this Act on any person 
convicted of any offence 
under this Act. 
Explanation: For the 
purposes of this sub-
section, "recognized 
welfare institution or 
organization" means a 
social welfare insti tution 
or organization recognized 
in this behalf by the 
Central or State 
Government. 
(2) Nothing in Chapter 
XXXVI of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 
(2 pf 1074), shall apply to 
any offence punishable 
under this Act.). 
(3) Notwithstanding 
anything contained in any 
law for the time being in 
force, a statement made 
by the person aggrieved 
by the offence shall not 
subject such person to a 
prosecution. 
parent of other 
relative of such 
person, or by any 
recognized service 
provider or protection 
officer. 
(b) it shall be lawful 
for a Metropolitan 
Magistrate or a 
Judicial Magistrate of 
the first class to pass 
any sentence 
authorized by this Act 
on any person 
convicted of anj' 
offence under this 
Act. 
Explanation 1: For the 
purposes of this sub-
section, 'service 
provider" has the 
same meaning as in 
the Protection of 
Women from Domestic 
Violence. Act. 
Explanation 2: for the 
purposes of this sub-
section, 'protection 
officer' will have the 
same meaning as in 
Section 8B of the Act. 
(3) Nothing in Chapter 
XXXVl of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 
1973 (2 of 1974), shall 
apply to any offence 
punishable under this 
Act.). 
shifted as above 
mentioned. 
i 
i 
I 
1 
! 
1 
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5. Insertion of a new section- section 7a- procedure 
for obtaining orders of relieTs: 
SECTION 7A (1) An aggrieved person, or a 
parent or relative of such person, or a protection 
officer or a service provider may present an 
application to the Magistrate seeking one or more 
relief's under Chapter IV of the Protection Of 
Women From Domestic Violence Act. 2005. 
Justification for adding Section 7A to the 
Present Act: 
The Protection of Women from Domestic 
Violence Act, 2005 has moved in a positive 
direction from mere punishments and ar res ts to the 
necessity of providing victim protection. It must be 
realized that jus t empowering the law to give 
punishments to the accused will not help the victim 
overcome her economic or mental strain which has 
occurred due to the act of violence or ha rassment . 
In this situation it is important for the law to take 
a human step towards the aggrieved and provide 
her with the necessary protection orders. 
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The term 'dowry' is stated to have the same 
meaning in the Protection of Women from Domestic 
Violence Act, 2005 as given in Section 2 of the 
Dowry Prohibition Act. 1961. This automatically 
implies that all the protection and residence orders 
which can be given under the Act also applies to 
violence of harassment in connection to a demand 
for dowry. But the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 only 
deals with punishment or penalty imposed with 
regard to the giving or taking of dowry. It does not 
authorize the magistrate to issue any protection 
orders, monetary relief's or residence orders in 
favour of the victim. Thus if a case is registered 
with regard to the taking or demanding of dowry, 
the Magistrate, if reading the sections of the Dowry 
Prohibition Act, 1961 might not be able to issue the 
required protection orders in favour of the victim. It 
thus becomes imperative that the necessary orders, 
which can be passed to benefit the victim, be also 
incorporated in the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 
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5. SECTION 8B-DOWRY PROHIBITION OFFICERS: 
Present Law 
(1) The State 
Government may 
appoint as many Dowry 
Prohibition Officers as it 
thinks fit and specify 
the areas in respect of 
which they shall 
exercise their 
jurisdiction and powers 
under this Act. 
(2) Every Dowry 
Prohibition Officers 
shall exercise and 
perform the following 
powers and functions, 
namely. 
(a) to see that the 
provisions of this Act 
are complied with: 
(b) to prevent, as far as 
possible, the taking or 
abetting the taking of, 
or the demanding of, 
dowry. 
© to collect such 
evidence as may be 
necessary for the 
prosecution of persons 
committing offences 
under the Act; and 
Proposed Amendments 
(1) The State Government 
shall appoint such number 
of Protection Officers in each 
district as it may consider 
necessary and shall also 
specify the areas in respect 
of which they shall exercise 
their jurisdiction and powers 
under this Act. 
(2) Every Protection Officer 
shall exercise and perform 
the following powers and 
functions, namely. 
(a) to see that the provisions 
of this Act are complied with, 
(b) to prevent, as far as 
possible, the taking or 
abetting the taking of, or the 
demanding of, dowry. 
© to authenticate and sign 
the list of presents which are 
given at the time of marriage 
to the bride or bridegroom. 
(d) to collect such evidence 
as may be necessary for the 
prosecution of persons 
committing offences under 
the Act. 
(e) to create awareness 
among the people about the 
evils of dowry and give wide 
publicity through the 
concerned Government 
Department. 
(f) To issue directions that 
schools and colleges be given 
awareness about dowry as a 
social evil and to this effect 
take assistance of the 
advisory boards and/or 
! 
Shall and 
Protection Officers. 
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voluntary organizations. 
(d) to perform such 
additional functions as 
may be assigned to him 
by the State 
Government, or as may 
be specified in the rules 
made under this Act. 
(g) to perform such 
additional functions as may 
be assigned to him by the 
State Government, or as may 
be specified in the rules 
made under this Act. 
(h) to perform such duties as 
assigned to him in the 
Protection of Women From 
Domestic Violence Act, 2005. 
(3) The State 
Government may, by 
notification in the 
Official Gazette, confer 
such powers of a police 
officer as may be 
specified in the 
notification on the 
Dowry Prohibition 
Officer who shall 
exercise such powers 
subject to such 
limitations and 
conditions as may be 
specified by rules made 
under this Act. 
(3) The State Government 
may, by notification in the 
Official Gazette, confer such 
powers of a police officer as 
may be specified in the 
notification on the Protection 
Officer who shall exercise 
such powers subject to such 
limitations and conditions as 
may be specified by rules 
made under this Act. 
(4) The 
Government 
State 
may, for 
the purpose of advising 
and assisting the Dowry 
Prohibition Officers in 
the efficient 
performance of their 
functions under this 
Act, appoint an advisory 
board consisting of not 
more than five social 
welfare workers (out of 
whom at least two shall 
be women) from the 
area in respect of which 
such Dowry Prohibition 
Officer exercises 
jurisdiction under sub-
section (1). 
(4) The State Government 
shall, for the purpose of 
advising and assisting the 
Protection Officers in the 
efficient performance of their 
functions under this Act, 
appoint an advisory board 
consisting of not more than 
five social welfare workers 
(out of whom at least two 
shall be women) from the 
area in respect of which 
such protection officer 
exercises jurisdiction under 
sub-section (1). 
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VIII. SECTION 9; POWER TO MAKE RULES; 
l . T h e Cent ra l Government may, by notif ication in t h e 
Official Gazet te , make ru les for car ry ing out t h e 
p u r p o s e s of th i s Act. 
2. In pa r t i cu l a r , and wi thout pre judice to t h e 
general i ty of the foregoing power, such ru l e s may 
provide for. 
(a) the form and m a n n e r in which, and t h e 
p e r s o n s by whom, any list of p r e s e n t s refer red 
to in sub- sec t ion (2) of sect ion 3 shal l be 
m a i n t a i n e d and all o ther m a t t e r s connec t ed 
the rewi th , and 
(b) the be t t e r co-ordinat ion of policy and ac t ion 
with r e s p e c t to the admin i s t r a t ion of th i s Act. 
3 . Every r u l e s made u n d e r th i s sec t ion shal l be 
laid as soon a s may be after it is made before e a c h 
House of Pa r l i amen t while it is in sess ion for a to ta l 
period of th i r ty days which may be compr i sed in 
one sess ion or in two success ive s e s s ions , and if 
before the expiry of the sess ion in which it is so 
laid or t he sess ion immediate ly following bo th 
Houses agree in making any modificat ion in t he 
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rule or both Houses agree t h a t the ru le should not 
be made , the rule shall thereaf ter have effect only 
in such modified form or be of no effect, a s the case 
may be, so however t ha t any such modification or 
a n n u l m e n t shal l be without prejudice to the validity 
of any th ing previously done u n d e r t h a t ru le . 
RECOMMENDATION SECTION 9: 
SECTION 9 (1) The Central Government , may, 
by notification in the Official Gazet te , m a k e ru l e s 
for carrying out the pu rposes of th i s Act. 
2. In pa r t i cu la r , and wi thout pre judice to the 
general i ty of the foregoing power, such ru l e s may 
provide for-
(a) the form and m a n n e r in which, and the 
p e r s o n s by whom, any list of p r e s e n t s 
referred to in sub-sec t ion (2) of sect ion 3 
shal l be ma in ta ined and all o ther m a t t e r s 
connec ted therewi th , and 
(b) The be t t e r co-ordinat ion of policy and act ion 
with r e spec t to the admin i s t r a t i on of th i s 
Act. 
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(c) The qual i f icat ions and exper ience which a 
Protect ion Officer shal l p o s s e s s u n d e r 
Section 8B of the Act. 
(d) Shall i s sue such i n s t r u c t i o n s to t he effect 
t h a t every government s e rvan t and publ ic 
se rvan t shal l after h is mar r i age fu rn i sh a 
dec la ra t ion on affidavit to h i s h e a d of office 
s t a t ing t h a t he h a s not t a k e n any dowry and 
such dec la ra t ion may be s igned by h i s wife 
or he r re la t ive . 
(e) The cen t ra l government shal l t a k e all s t e p s 
to e n s u r e t h a t the provis ions of t he Act a re 
given wide publici ty t h r o u g h pub l i c med ia 
inc luding television, radio and p r i n t med ia 
at r egu la r in te rva l s . 
(3) Every ru l e s made by the cen t r a l g o v e r n m e n t 
shal l be laid a s soon as may be after it is m a d e 
before each House of Pa r l i amen t while it is in 
sess ion for a to ta l period of th i r ty days which may 
be compr ised in one sess ion or in two success ive 
se s s ions , and if before the expiry of t he s e s s ion in 
which it is so laid or the sess ion immed ia t e ly 
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following both Houses agree in making any 
modification in the rule or both Houses agree that 
the rule should not be made, the rule shall 
thereafter have effect only in such modified form or 
be of no effect, as the case may be, so however that 
any such modification or annulment shall be 
without prejudice to the validity of anything 
previously done under that rule. 
IX. SECTION 10; POWER OF STATE GOVERNMENT 
TO MAKE RULES 
l .The State Government may, be notification in 
the Official Gazette, make rules for carrying 
out the purposes of this Act. 
2. In particular and without prejudice to the 
generality of the foregoing power, such rules 
may provide for all or any of the following 
mat ters , namely: 
(a) The additional functions to be performed 
by the Dowry Prohibition Officer under 
sub-section (2) of Section 8B. 
(b) Limitations and conditions subject to 
which a Dowry Prohibition Officer may 
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exercise his funct ions u n d e r s u b - s e c t i o n 
(3) of sect ion 8B. 
(c) Every rule made by the S ta te Gove rnmen t 
u n d e r th i s section shal l be laid as soon a s 
may be after it is m a d e before the S ta t e 
Legis la ture . 
RECOMMENDATION SECTION 10: 
1. The S ta te Government may, by not i f icat ion in 
the Official Gazet te , make ru l e s for ca r ry ing 
out the p u r p o s e s of th i s Act. 
2. In pa r t i cu l a r , and wi thout p re jud ice to t h e 
genera l i ty of the foregoing power, s u c h r u l e s 
may provide for all or any of the following 
m a t t e r s namely:-
(a) The addi t iona l funct ions to be per formed by 
the Protect ion Officer u n d e r s u b - s e c t i o n (2) of 
sect ion 8B. 
(b) Limi ta t ions and condi t ions sub jec t to whj^ch a 
Dowry Prohibi t ion Officer may exerc ise h i s 
func t ions u n d e r sub-sec t ion (3) of sec t ion 8B. 
264 
3. The State Government, in case where 
registration of marriages is compulsory under 
certain laws, may provide for powers to the 
competent authority registering marriage to 
order the list as per the dowry prohibition 
(maintenance of lists of presents to the bride 
and bridegroom rules) 1985 to be annexed to 
the memorandum required for obtaining 
marriage certificate. 
4. The State Government shall issue such 
instructions to the effect that every 
government servant and public servant shall 
after his marriage furnish a declaration on 
affidavit, to his head of office stating that he 
has not taken any dowry and such 
declaration may be signed by his wife or her 
relative. 
5. Every rule made by the State Government 
under this section shall be laid as soon as 
may be after it is made before the State 
Legislature. 
o/;<: 
Recommendations on The better Co-ordination 
of policy and action with respect to the 
administration of this Act. 
• There should be a central and state monitoring 
committee. 
• Representatives from the National Commission 
for women and state women commissions 
should be included in the committee. 
• The committee may function under the 
Ministry looking into women issues. 
• Power to issue advisories to the state 
government and central government on 
effective implementation of the Act and Rules. 
• Monitor the role, functions and effectiveness of 
Protection Officer. 
Recommendation 11: Section 304 B IPC: 
304B. Dowry Death (Indian Penal Code (45 of 
I860)- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by 
any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than 
under normal circumstances within seven years of 
her marriage and it is shown that soon before her 
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death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment 
by her husband or any relative of her husband for, 
or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such 
death shall be called "dowry death" and such 
husband or relatives shall be deemed to have 
caused her death. 
Explanation - For the purposes of this sub-section, 
"dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 
2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 
2. Whoever commits dowry death shall be 
punished with imprisonment for a term which shall 
not be less than seven years but which may extend 
to imprisonment for life. 
• The words 'soon before' used in section 304B 
(1) must be deleted and replaced by the words 
'any time before'. 
• The minimum punishment in section 304 B(2) 
be raised from seven years to ten years. 
• After the words "imprisonment for life" 
occurring in section 304B (2) the words ''or 
death" may be added. 
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Rationale- The p u n i s h m e n t is to be e n h a n c e d for 
the following r e a s o n s -
fa) To keep th i s offence at par with m u r d e r and by 
no s t r e t ch of imaginat ion it is less grave an 
offence t h a n the murde r . 
(b) To crea te de te r rence in the minds of the people 
indulging in such he inous c r imes . By now it is 
more t h a n clear t h a t ne i the r the Dowry 
Prohibi t ion Act nor the amended provis ions of 
I.P.C, could deter the people and could not 
regis ter the succes s . The commit tee found t h a t 
b e c a u s e of the above said d i sc repanc ie s in the 
provision the law h a s failed in i ts objective. By 
incorpora t ing the above changes law can be 
m a d e effective. 
(c) Also the t imes limit of p r e s u m p t i o n may be 
inc reased b e c a u s e seven yea r s is very shor t a 
t ime and often the offence is execu ted in a p re -
p l a n n e d m a n n e r . 
(d) The m i n i m u m p u n i s h m e n t should be inc reased 
from seven to ten yea r s . 
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So conclusion is that the legal reform has achieved 
little in transforming the social order and uprooting 
dowry as a social evil. The records of court 
documents reflect the failure of the legal system to 
protect woman. On many occasions it is because of 
the bias att i tude of the judiciary towards a serious 
crime against woman that result in miscarriage of 
justice as the accused are acquitted and the cases 
are usually dismissed as suicides or accidents. 
Significantly. It has led to a situation in which the 
law as a whole can easily be taken to be an 
instrument of patriarchal oppression. 
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THE PROTECTION FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACTS, 
2005 
Since the early eighties, women's group' have 
been campaigning to bring about effective 
legislation to counter Domestic Violence in 2005, 
the Laywers' Collective formulated the Domestic 
Violence against Women (Prevention) Act. It takes 
into consideration several prevalent forms of 
violence against women and girls within the family 
and proposes a mechanism for women to approach 
the Court for a protection order to prevent further 
violence and to ensure that they do not have to 
leave their home. The Act was given to the 
government for consideration. In December 2001 , 
the Government of India circulated another Act 
"Protection from Domestic Violence Act. 2005, also 
providing for protection orders and protection 
officers. 
But the December 13 terrorist a t tack on Indian 
Parliament prevented introduction of a legislation 
for women suffering from domestic violence. The 
legislation is likely to have far reaching impact on 
the society. The Draft Act, now part of the 
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Governments over all policy for empowerment of 
women, seeks to provide a remedy under the civil 
Law which is intended to preserve family life while 
providing protection to victims of domestic violence. 
The draft 'Protection from Domestic Violence 
Act 2005 empowers the State Government to 
appoint a number of 'Protection Officers (PO) it 
deems necessary through a gazette notification. A 
judicial Magistrate can upon a complaint from the 
victim; issue a Protection order violation of the 
orders of the magistrate, the PO, or failure of a PO 
to act in a manner that would provide relief to the 
victim would constitute an offence. 
On the object of the legislation HRD minister 
Mr. Murli Manohar Joshi said that domestic 
violence is undoubtedly a human rights issue and 
serious deterrent to development. The phenomenon 
is widely prevalent but has remained largely 
invisible in public domain. 
He further said that while cruel behaviour 
against a woman by her husband or his relatives is 
recognized as an offence under Section 498-A of the 
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Indian Penal Code, 1860, the civil law does not 
address this phenomenon in its entirely. 
The existence of this social malaise has been 
acknowledged in the Vienna Accord of 1994 and the 
Beijing Platform of Action (1995). The intervention 
of the state to protect women against violence of 
any kind especially that occurs within the family 
has been strongly recommended by the UN 
committee on Convention on Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 
On 8th March 2002, the Government of India 
(GOI) Introduced the Protection from Domestic 
Violence Act No. 13 of 2002 in the Lok Sabha. 
It is heartening to note that the s tate has 
recognized the existence of the rampant "domestic 
violence in our society. 
Innumerable women who silently suffer 
assaul ts and abuses everyday inside every second 
home across the country can perhaps look forward 
to a remedy that protects their vulnerable position. 
The phenomenon of domestic violence is widely 
prevalent but has remained largely unseen . 
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It was the Department of Women & Children 
under the Union Ministry for Human Resource 
Development, which took the initiative to draft the 
Act. 
Extensive consultations among representat ives 
of several NGOs such as the Lawyers Collective, the 
National Human right Commission, the National 
Commission of Women and the Ministries of Home 
Affair Health and Family Welfare, Social Jus t ice 
Empowerment, Elementary Education, Jus t ice and 
Legal Affairs and Legislative Department during the 
past few years led to the drafting of the Act, which 
seeks to meet existing gap in the legal framework. 
After debates and discussions it finally came into 
existence in 2005 known as Domestic Violence act 
2005. The provisions of Act protecting the women 
from violence are as follows: 
II Domestic Violence Act 2005: 
Section-3: For the purpose of this Act may act 
omission or commission or conduct of the 
respondent shall constitute domestic violence in 
case it-
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(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, 
safety, hfe, limb or well-being, whether 
mental or physical, of the aggrieved person 
or tends to do so and includes causing 
physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and 
emotional abuse and economic abuse; or 
(b) harasses , harms, injures or endangers the 
aggrieved person with a view to coerce her 
or any other person related to her to meet 
any unlawful demand for any dowry or other 
property or valuable security; or 
(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved 
person or any person related to her by any 
conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause 
(b); 
Sec. 4 Information to Protection Officer and 
Exclusion of Liability of Information: 
1. Any person who has reason to believe that an 
act of domestic violence has been or is being 
or is likely to be committed may give 
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information about it to the concerned 
Protect ion Officer. 
2. No liability civil or cr iminal shal l be incur red 
by any pe r son for giving in goods faith of 
information for the pu rpose of subsec t i on (1). 
Sec . 5 Dut ies of Pol ice Officers Serv ice 
Providers and Magistrate: 
A police officer Protect ion Officer service 
provider or Magis t ra te who h a s received a complain 
of domest ic violence or is o therwise p r e s e n t at the 
place of an inc ident of domest ic violence or when 
the inc ident of domest ic violence is r epor ted to him, 
shall inform the aggrieved person . 
(a) of he r r ight to make an appl ica t ion for 
obta in ing a relief by way of a pro tec t ion order , an 
order for mone ta ry relief, a cus tody order , a 
r es idence order , a compensa t ion order or more t h a n 
one such order u n d e r th i s Act; 
(b) of the availabili ty of service p rov iders ; 
(c) of the availabili ty of services of the 
Protect ion Officers; 
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(d) of he r r ight to free legal services u n d e r 
the Legal Services Author i t ies Act, 1987 
(39 of 1987); 
(e) of her r ight of file a compla in t u n d e r 
sect ion 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 
of 1860) wherever re levant : 
Provided t h a t no th ing in th i s Act shal l be 
cons t rued in any m a n n e r as to relieve a police 
office form his duty to proceed in accordance with 
law upon receipt of information as to the 
commiss ion of a cognizable offence. 
Sec . 6 Dut i e s of Shel ter Homes: 
If an aggrieved person or on he r behalf a 
Protect ion Officer or a service provider r e q u e s t s the 
pe r son in charge of a she l te r home sha l l provide 
she l te r to the aggrieved person in the she l t e r home . 
Sec . 7 Dut ies of Medical Fac i l i t i es : 
If an aggrieved person or on he r behalf a 
Protect ion Officer or a service provider r e q u e s t s the 
pe r son in charge of a medical facility to provide 
may medica l aid to her such pe r son in charge of the 
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medical facility shall provide medical aid to the 
aggrieved person in the medical facility. 
Sec. 10 Service Providers: 
(i) Subject to such rules as may be made in 
this behalf any voluntary association 
registered under the Societies Registration 
Act 1860 (21) of 1860 or a company 
registered under the Companies Act 1956 (1 
of 1956) or any other law for the time being 
in force with the objective of protecting the 
rights and interests of women by any lawful 
means including providing of legal aid, 
medical financial or other assis tance shall 
register itself with the State Government as 
a service provider for the purpose of this 
Act. 
(ii) A service provider registered under sub 
section 91 shall have the power; 
(a) record the domestic incident report in the 
prescribed form if the aggrieved person so 
desires and forward a copy thereof to the 
Magistrate and the Protection Officer having 
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ju r i sd ic t ion in the a r ea where the domes t i c 
violence took place. 
(b) get the aggrieved person medical ly examined 
and forward a copy of the medica l r epor t to 
the Protect ion Officer and the police s t a t i o n s 
wi thin the local l imits of which the domes t i c 
violence took place; 
(c) e n s u r e t h a t the aggrieved p e r s o n is provided 
she l te r in a she l te r home, if she so r e q u i r e s 
and forward a repor t of the lodging of t he 
aggrieved pe r son in the she l t e r home to t he 
police s ta t ion within the local l imi ts of which 
the domes t ic violence took place; 
Sec . 11 Dut ies of Government: 
(a) the provis ions of th i s Act a re given wide 
publ ici ty t hough t publ ic med ia inc lud ing the 
television, ra t io and the p r in t m e d i a a t 
r egu la r in te rva ls ; 
(b) the Cent ra l Government a n d S ta t e 
Government Officers inc lud ing the police 
officers and the m e m b e r s of t he jud ic i a l 
services are given periodic sens i t i za t ion and 
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a w a r e n e s s t ra in ing on the i s s u e s a d d r e s s e d 
by th i s Act; 
(c) effective co-ordinat ion be tween the services 
provided by concerned Minis t r ies and 
D e p a r t m e n t s deal ing with law, home affairs 
inc lud ing law and order , h e a l t h a n d h u m a n 
r e s o u r c e s to a d d r e s s i s s u e s of domes t i c 
violence is e s t ab l i shed and per iodica l review 
of the s ame is conduc ted ; 
(d) protocols for the va r ious Minis t r ies 
conce rned with the delivery of se rv ices to 
women u n d e r th i s Act inc lud ing the c o u r t s 
are p r e p a r e d and pu t in place; 
Sec . 12 Appl icat ion to Magistrate: 
(i) An aggrieved pe r son or a Pro tec t ion Officer or 
any pe r son on behalf of the aggrieved p e r s o n 
an appl ica t ion to the Magis t ra te s eek ing one 
or more relief u n d e r th i s Act Provided t h a t 
before p a s s i n g any order on s u c h app l i ca t ion 
the Magis t ra te shal l t ake into c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
any domes t i c inc iden t r epo r t rece ived by h im 
281 
from the Protection Officer or the service 
provider. 
(j) The relief sought for under sub-section (1) 
may include a relief for issuance of an order 
for payment of compensation or damages 
without prejudice to the right of such person 
to insti tute a suit for compensation or 
damages for the injuries caused by the acts 
of domestic violence committed by the 
respondent. 
Sec. 13 Service of notice: 
(i) A notice of the date of hearing fixed under 
Section 12 shall be given by the Magistrate 
to the Protection Officer who shall get it 
served by such means as may be prescribed 
on the respondent and on any other person 
as directed by the Magistrate within a 
maximum period of two days or such further 
reasonable time as may be allowed by the 
Magistrate from the date of its receipt. 
(j) A declaration of service of notice made by 
the Protection Officer in such form as may 
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be prescribed shall be the proof that such 
notice was served upon the respondent and 
on any other person as directed by the 
Magistrate unless the contrary is proved. 
Sec. 14 Counseling: 
(i) The Magistrate may at any stage of the 
proceedings under this Act direct the 
respondent or the aggrieved person either 
single or jointly to undergo counseling with 
any member of a service provider who possess 
such qualifications and experience in 
counseling as may be prescribed. 
(ii) Where the Magistrate has issued any direction 
under sub-section (i) he shall fix the next 
date of hearing of the case within a period 
not exceeding two months. 
Sec. 15 Assistance of Welfare Expert: 
In any proceeding under this Act the 
Magistrate may secure the services of such person 
preferably a woman whether related to the 
aggrieved person or not including a person engaged 
in promoting family welfare as he thinks fit for the 
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purpose of assisting him in discharging his 
functions. 
Sec. 16 Proceeding to be held in Camera: 
If the Magistrate considers that the 
circumstances of the case so warrant and if either 
party to the proceeding so desires he may conduct 
the proceeding under this Act in Camera. 
Sec. 17 Right to reside in a shared household: 
(i) Notwithstanding anything contained in any 
other law for the time being enforce every 
woman in a domestic relationship shall have 
the right to reside in the shared household 
whether or not she has any right title or 
beneficial interest in the same? 
(ii) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or 
excluded from the shared household or any 
part of it by the respondent save in accordance 
with the procedure established by law. 
Sec. 18 Protection Orders: 
The Magistrate may after giving the aggrieved 
person and respondent an opportunity of being 
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heard and on being pr ima facie satisfied t h a t 
domest ic violence h a s t aken place or is likely to 
take place p a s s a protect ion order in favor of the 
aggrieved pe r son and prohibi t the r e s p o n d e n t from-
(a) commit t ing any act of domest ic violence; 
(b) aiding or abe t t ing in the commiss ion of ac t s 
of domest ic violence; (c) en te r ing the place 
of employment of the aggrieved person or, if 
the pe r son aggrieved is a child, i ts school or 
any o ther place f requented by the aggrieved 
person ; 
(c) a t t empt ing to communica te in any form, 
whatsoever , with the aggrieved pe r son , 
inc luding persona l , oral or wr i t ten or 
e lectronic or te lephonic cont rac t ; 
(d) a t t emp t ing to communica te in any form 
whatsoever , with the aggrieved pe r son ; 
inc luding persona l , oral or wr i t ten or 
e lectronic or te lephonic contac t ; 
(e) a l t e rna t ing any a s s e t s , opera t ing b a n k 
lockers or b a n k accoun t s u s e d or held or 
enjoyed by both the pa r t i e s , jo int ly by the 
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aggrieved person and the r e s p o n d e n t or 
singly by the r e sponden t , inc luding he r 
stridhan or any other proper ty held e i the r 
joint ly by the pa r t i e s or s epa ra t e ly by t h e m 
wi thou t the leave of the Magis t ra te ; 
(f) caus ing violence to the d e p e n d a n t s , o the r 
re la t ives or any pe r son who give t he 
aggrieved person a s s i s t a n c e from domes t ic 
violence; 
(g) commit t ing any order act a s specified in the 
pro tec t ion order . 
Sec . 19 R e s i d e n c e Orders: 
While d ispos ing of an appl ica t ion u n d e r s u b -
sect ion (i) of sect ion 12 the Magis t ra te may on 
being sat isf ied t h a t domest ic violence h a s t a k e n 
place p a s s a r e s idence order-
(a) r e s t r a i n i n g the r e s p o n d e n t from 
d i spos se s s ing or in any o the r m a n n e r 
d i s tu rb ing the possess ion of the aggrieved 
pe r son from the sha r ed househo ld , w h e t h e r 
or not the r e s p o n d e n t h a s a legal or 
equ i t ab le in t e res t in the s h a r e d h o u s e h o l d ' 
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(b) d i rect ing the r e sponden t to remove himself 
from the sha red household ; 
(c) r e s t r a in ing the r e sponden t or any of his 
relat ive from enter ing any port ion of the 
s h a r e d household in which the aggrieved 
pe r son res ides ; 
(d) r e s t r a in ing the r e sponden t from a l iena t ing 
or d ispos ing off the sha red househo ld or 
e n c u m b e r i n g the samic; 
(e) r e s t r a in ing the r e sp onden t from r e n o u n c i n g 
his r ights in the sha red househo ld except 
with the leave of the Magis t ra te ; or 
(f) d i rec t ing the r e sponden t to secu re same 
level of a l t e rna te ' accommodat ion for the 
aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the 
sha r ed household or to pay r e n t for the 
s ame , if the c i r cums tances so r equ i re ; 
(g) Provided t h a t no order u n d e r c l ause (b) 
shal l be p a s s e d aga ins t any p e r s o n who is a 
woman. 
(h) The Magis t ra te may impose any addi t iona l 
condi t ions or p a s s any order d i rec t ion , 
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which he may deem reasonably necessary to 
protect or to provide for the safety of the 
aggrieved person or any child of such 
aggrieved person. 
(i) The Magistrate may require from the 
respondent to execute a bond with or 
without sureties for preventing the 
commission of domestic violence. 
(j) An order under sub-section (3) shall be 
deem to be an order under chapter VIII of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (2 of 
1974) and shall be dealt with accordingly. 
(k) While passing an order under sub-section 
(1) sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) the 
court may also pass an order directing the 
officer in charge of the neares t police 
station to give protection to the aggrieved 
person or to assist her or the person making 
an application on her behalf in the 
implementation of the order. 
(1) While making an order under sub-section (1) 
the Magistrate may impose on the 
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respondent obligations relating to the 
discharge of rent and other payments having 
regard to the financial needs and resources 
of the parties. 
(m) The Magistrate may direct the officer in 
charge of the police station in whose 
jurisdiction of Magistrate has been 
approached to assist in the implementation 
of the protection order. 
(n) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to 
return to the possession of the aggrieved 
person her stridhan or any other property or 
valuable security to which she is entitled to. 
Sec. 20 Monetary relief: 
(h) While disposing of an application under 
Sub-section (1) of Section 12 the Magistrate 
may direct the respondent to pay monetary 
relief to meet the expenses incurred and 
losses suffered by the aggrieved person and 
any child of the aggrieved person as a resul t 
of the domestic violence and such relief may 
include but not limited to: 
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(a) the loss of ea rn ings ; 
(b) the medical expenses ; 
(c) the loss caused due to the des t ruc t ion 
damage or removal of any proper ty from 
the control of the aggrieved pe r son and 
(d) the m a i n t e n a n c e for the aggrieved pe r son 
as well a s her chi ldren, if any, inc luding 
an order u n d e r or in addi t ion to an order 
of m a i n t e n a n c e u n d e r sect ion 125 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure , 1973 (2 of 
1974) or any other law for the t ime being 
in force. 
(2) the mone ta ry relief g ran ted u n d e r th i s 
sect ion shal l be adequa t e , fair and r e a s o n a b l e 
and cons i s t en t with the s t a n d a r d of living to 
which the aggrieved person is a ccus tomed . 
(3) The Magis t ra te shall have the power to order 
an app rop r i a t e lump s u m p a y m e n t or 
month ly p a y m e n t s of m a i n t e n a n c e , a s the 
n a t u r e and c i r cums tances of the case may 
requ i re ; 
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(4) The Magis t ra te shal l send a copy of the order 
for mone ta ry relief made u n d e r s u b sec t ion 
(1) to the pa r t i e s to the appl ica t ion and to t he 
in charge of the police s ta t ion with in t he 
local l imits of whose j u r i sd i c t i on t h e 
r e s p o n d e n t r e s ides . 
(5) The r e s p o n d e n t shal l pay the m o n e t a r y relief 
g ran ted to the aggrieved p e r s o n with in t he 
period specified in the order u n d e r s u b 
sect ion (1). 
(6) Upon the failure on the p a r t of t he 
r e s p o n d e n t to make p a y m e n t in t e r m s of t h e 
order u n d e r sub sect ion (1), the Magis t r a t e 
may direct the employer or a deb to r of the 
r e s p o n d e n t , to directly pay to the aggrieved 
pe r son or to deposi t with the cou r t a por t ion 
of wages or sa la r ies or debt due to a c c r u e d to 
the credi t of the r e s p o n d e n t , which a m o u n t 
may be ad jus ted towards the m o n e t a r y relief 
payable by the r e s p o n d e n t . 
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Sec. 21 Custody Orders: 
Notwithstanding anything contained in any 
other law for the time being in force, the Magistrate 
may, at any stage of hearing of the application for 
protection order or for any other relief under this 
Act grant temporary custody of any child or 
children to the aggrieved person or the person 
making an application on her behalf and specify, if 
necessary, the arrangements for visit of such child 
or children by the respondent. 
Provided that if the Magistrate is of the 
opinion that any visit of the respondent may be 
harmful to the interests of the child or children, the 
Magistrate shall refuse to allow such visit. 
Sec. 22 Compensation Orders: 
In addition to other relief as may be granted 
under this Act, the Magistrate may on an 
application being by the aggrieved person, pass an 
order directing the respondent to pay compensation 
and damages for the injuries, including mental 
torture and emotional distress, caused by acts of 
domestic violence committed by that respondent . 
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This Act has been enacted keeping in view the 
rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of 
the Constitution besides the provisions provided 
under section 304B and 498A of Indian Penal Code. 
The act empowers the Magistrate to pass 
protection orders in favour of the aggrieved person 
to prevent the respondent form aiding or 
committing an act of domestic violence or any other 
specified act, entering a workplace or any other 
place frequented by the aggrieved person, 
attempting to communicate with her, isolating any 
assets used by both the parties and causing 
violence to the aggrieved person, her relatives or 
others who provide her assistance form the 
domestic violence. 
The Act inter alia provides for appointment of 
Protection Officers and registration of non-
government organizations as Service Providers for 
providing assistance to the aggrieved person with 
respect to her medical examination, obtaining legal 
aid, safe shelter etc. 
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On the day of coming into forced of this Act the 
women abuse in domestic sphere was reduced. A 
survey2 revealed the data after the Act came into 
force. 
The first arrest was made in the State of Tamil 
Nadu^ under this new Act jus t 2 days after i t 's 
coming into effect^. The Act fully protects the 
women from violence by her husband. Further the 
wife of Pondicherry Welfare Minister has filed a 
cases against her husband under section 498A of 
Indian Penal Code, But she sought for registration 
of case under the Domestic Violence Act but police 
as she claimed did not apply this Act due to some 
political pressure . 
In Delhi on 6^ ^ November, 2006 a case^ was 
filed by one Seema against her husband and in-
laws under section 12 of the Act and sought for 
protection order against them and monetary 
compensation for subjecting her to cont inuous 
domestic violence and economic abuse . The 
Metropolitan Magistrate Mr, Sunil Sharma has 
accepted the petition for hearing, 
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Further on Qth December, 2006 one Ms. 
Santosh filed a case'^ under the alternative 
residence and maintenance from her husband. 
From these current data it is revealed t hat 
this Act was in need for Indian women and girls. 
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Reference: 
1. 26th October 2006 
2. Conducted by S a u r a s h t r a - K u t c h Network on 
Violence Against Women, wide Times of India 
Dated 29th October 2006 
3. Time of India, da ted 29th October 2006 . 
4. October 2006 
5. Times of India, S'-d November 2006 
6. Times of India , 7th November 2006 
7. Times of India, 12th November, 2006 
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CHAPTER - 4 
Role of Police: 
A Case study 
^ n 
Role of Police: A Case Study 
The rudimentary problem is that most of the 
police officers simply do not believe that 
responding to domestic violence calls is an 
appropriate police responsibility. They clearly 
prefer law enforcement functions where the 
prospects for 'action' and an arrest are higher. In 
contrast, they almost uniformly dislike tasks that 
imply an additional social worker type of role. The 
fact of course, is that police officers have a variety 
of non-law enforcement tasks where the use of 
arrest powers would clearly be inappropriate or at 
least highly unlikely such duties include 
performing rescues, providing transportat ion to 
hospitals, and delivering of subpoenas and 
warrants . 
Using this frame of reference, the response to 
a domestic violence call has little occupational 
value to an officer. It does not give him a chance to 
protect his compatriots, and most officers don't 
view the crime as serious. Arrests have typically 
been infrequent, and since the offender is known 
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and it is a "minor" crime, any arrest that resul ts 
from the intervention would be considered a 
"garbage arrest," not worthy of recognition. 
In effect, these evaluation criteria may be seen 
to provide a major, if unintentional, disincentive for 
performing domestic violence tasks . If an officer 
spends the necessary time to adequately handle a 
domestic assaul t case and substantively assis ts a 
victim with referrals, he lessens the chance that he 
will have a major felony arrest by having used his 
time "unproductively" in an organizational sense. 
In modern times, the police have repeatedly 
been made painfully aware of significant legal limits 
to their own use of power. Common examples are in 
the use of force to extract s ta tements from suspects 
or the ability to conduct search and seizures on 
private property. As a result, they are sensitive to 
an offender's potential claims of violations of his or 
her constitutional rights. It is not surprising that 
officers would tend to be more comfortable with the 
public order/pr ivate dispute dichotomy typified by 
their preferred response to domestic violence. 
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There is always an initial reluctance to register 
cases against the police personnel and cases 
against them are withdrawn from the court without 
even framing the charge sheet. 
Police people blame the rules of evidence, 
which rely so heavily on the evidence of the 
witnesses. Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act 
also handicap the police. The statement of a 
witness to the police is an unsigned note and 
becomes useless the moment a witness turns 
hostile. 
It was observed that often, when case is 
presented at the Sessions Court, the prosecutor is 
rarely present and a policeman argues the charge. 
The investigating officer is not present either. Any 
information sought by the judge is presented by the 
defence counsel or a policeman. The family 
members of the victim are rarely informed about 
the date of hearing by the police. 
The police have distanced themselves from the 
public by their corrupt ways of working and rude 
behaviour. There are several instances where clear 
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cases of murder are closed by the police as cases of 
accidental death, e.g. in Tripta Sharma's case. 
There were 50% burns on her hands , abdomen, 
thighs and cheeks. The police held that they were 
caused by the falling of the kerosene lamp at her 
in-laws place and ignoring obvious circumstantial 
evidence, they closed the case. It was due to the 
perseverance of her parents that the Supreme Court 
ultimately issued notice to the SSP to reopen the 
case and make thorough investigations in this 
prima facie case. 
Our relations with the public are at lower side. 
It is because of pressures from top and political 
interference that we cannot do our work 
impartially, asserted an assis tant sub-inspector. 
Our compulsions are not understood. The same 
officer who would ask us to be strict in one case, 
because the complainant happens to be a friend or 
some influential person, would have no qualms in 
getting him hanged for excess if the case becomes 
public. 
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Frustration erupts every now and then in the 
poUce force in isolated cases, policemen have even 
committed suicides. 
Domestic violence has usually been 
characterized as simple assault , a misdemeanor, 
unless accompanied by aggravating circumstances 
such as use of a weapon, intent to commit murder 
or to inflict grievous bodily harm, or a sexual 
assault . Therefore, until recently, police officers 
were legally unable to make warrant less arres ts 
unless the violence continued in their presence or a 
previously existing warrant had been issued. Prior 
issuance of arrest warrants was never widely used 
to prevent future acts of domestic assaul t . 
Even apart from the other factors noted above, 
it is not surprising that recurrent spouse abuse 
calls would receive a lower response priority in 
such circumstances; at least absent knowledge of 
past violence or imminent threats to a potential 
victim's life. 
Embarrassment , inability to make a call 
without alerting the offender, and previous negative 
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experiences with the criminal justice system all 
contribute to victim reluctance to report incidents 
to police. One estimate, underest imated, is that 
only 2% of domestic violence cases are ever 
reported by victims to the police. 
Although the police ostensibly have only been 
given the power to enforce penal sanctions-
consistent with the penal style of intervention this 
form of intervention is not usually appropriate for 
most si tuations of low-intensity interpersonal 
conflict. A more complex repertoire of responses 
has necessarily evolved. For si tuations of verbal 
altercation, low-level violence, or threa ts there of 
the therapeutic style is probably the most likely to 
prevent the escalation of violence by reducing or on 
occasion eliminating the sources of situational 
s t ress . 
To know exactly the present position of crime 
against women and role of police in tackling these 
crime various cities were selected adjacent to 
Aligarh. The field study in various cities e.g. 
Meerut, Bulandshahar , Noida, Ghazibad 
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Ques t ionna i r e s were d i s t r ibu ted to va r ious sec t ion 
of the society including police officers. The r e s u l t s 
of the var iab les are as follows: "To u n d e r s t a n d the 
poin ts clearly Pie Cha r t s a s well as the 
ques t i onna i r e s h a s also been a t t a c h e d he rewi th . 
NOIPA 
1. As r ega rds VAR No. 1 3 5 % gives opinion in 
favor of A, 3 1 % gives opinion in favor B. 07*^ 0 
gives opinion in favor of C and 5 3 % gives 
opinion in favour of D respect ively . 
2. As r ega rds VAR No. 2 80% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 13% gives opinion in favour B, 
2 3 % gives opinion in favour of C and 14*^ 0 
gives opinion in favor of D respect ive ly . 
3 . As r ega rds VAR No. 3 40% gives opinion in 
favor of A, 56% gives opinion in favour B. 13°o 
gives, opinion in favour of C a n d 18% gives 
opinion in favour of D respect ively . 
4. As r ega rds VAR No. 4 12% gives opin ion in 
favour of A, 46% gives opinion in favour B, 
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2 8 % gives opinion in favour of C and 5% gives 
opinion in favour of D respect ively. 
5. As r ega rds VAR No. 5 2 1 % gives opinion in 
favour of A, 52% gives opinion in favour B, 
22% gives opinion in favour of C and 17% 
gives opinion in favour of D, 1 1 % in favour of 
E, 7% in favour of F, 6.84% in favour of G 
respect ively. 
6. As r ega rds VAR No. 6 84% gives opinion in 
favour of A and 49% gives opinion in favour of 
B respect ively. 
7. As r ega rds VAR No. 7 30% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 3 1 % gives opinion in favour B, 
0 8 % gives opinion in favour of C and 57% 
gives opinion in favour of D respect ively . 
8. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 8 1 1 % gives opinion in 
favour of A, 5 1 % gives opinion in favour B, 
19% gives opinion in favour of C and 49°'o 
gives opinion in favour of D respect ively . 
9. As r ega rds VAR No. 9 0% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 4 1 % gives opinion in favour B, 
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25% gives opinion in favour of C and 64'^ 'o 
gives opinion in favour of D respect ively . 
10. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 10 26% gives opinion in 
favour of A and 107% gives opinion in favour 
of B respect ively. 
11 . As r e g a r d s VAR No. 11 5% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 3 3 % gives opinion in favour B, 
09% gives opinion in favour of C and 4% gives 
opinion in favour of D, 2 3 % in favour of E, 8*^ 0 
in favour of F, 6 .8% in favour of G 
respect ively. 
12. As r ega rds VAR No. 12 36% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 16% gives opinion in favour B, 
5 3 % gives opinion in favour of C and IQ'^ 'o 
gives opinion in favour of D, 1 1 % in favour of 
E, 0% in favour of F, 4% in favour of G 
respect ively . 
13. As r ega rds VAR No. 13 34% gives opinion in 
favour of A and 96% gives opinion in favour of 
D respect ively . 
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14. As r ega rds VAR No. 14 9 3 % gives opinion in 
favour of A and 3 1 % gives opinion in favour of 
D respect ively. 
15. As r ega rds VAR No. 15 7 3 % gives opinion in 
favour of A and 57% gives opinion in favour of 
B respect ively. 
16. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 16 56% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 42% gives opinion in favour B and 
27% gives opinion in favour of C and 92% 
given opinion in favour of D respect ively . 
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MEERUT 
1. As r ega rds VAR No. 1 22% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 56% gives opinion in favour B, 0% 
gives opinion in favour of C and 4 8 % gives 
opinion in favour of D respect ively. 
2. As r ega rds VAR No. 2 87% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 2 3 % gives opinion in favour B, 2% 
gives opinion in favour of C and 16% gives 
opinion in favour of D respect ively. 
3 . As r ega rds VAR No. 3 14% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 4 5 % gives opinion in favour B, 7% 
gives opinion in favour of C and 6 1 % gives 
opinion in favour of D respect ively. 
4. As r ega rds VAR No. 4 12% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 14% gives opinion in favour B, 4% 
gives opinion in favour of C a n d 18% gives 
opinion in favour of D respect ively . 77% in 
favour of E 
5. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 5 0% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 22% gives opinion in favour B, 
13% gives opinion in favour of C, 10% gives 
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opinion in favour of D, 72% gives opinion in 
favour of E, 3% gives opinion in favour of F 
and 0% gives opinion in favour of in G 
respect ively. 
6. As r ega rds VAR No. 6 4 8 % gives opinion in 
favour of A and 7 1 % gives opinion in favour of 
B respect ively. 
7. As r ega rds VAR No. 7 19% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 7% gives opinion in favour B, 7% 
gives opinion in favour of C and 9 2 % gives 
opinion in favour of D respect ively . 
8. As r ega rds VAR No. 8 20% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 8% gives opinion in favour B, 26'^b 
gives opinion in favour of C a n d 6 8 % gives 
opinion in favour of D respect ively . 
9. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 9 10% gives opin ion in 
favour of A, 26% gives opinion in favour B, 
2 3 % gives opinion in favour of C and 64°o 
gives opinion in favour of D respec t ive ly . 
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10. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 10 60% gives opinion in 
favour of A and 53% gives opinion in favour of 
B respect ively . 
11 . As r ega rds VAR No. 5 9% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 6% gives opinion in favour B, 0°o 
gives opinion in favour of C, 1% gives opinion 
in favour of D, 2% gives opinion in favour of E. 
44% gives opinion in favour of F and 54% gives 
opinion in favour of in G respect ively . 
12. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 5 40% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 3 5 % gives opinion in favour B, 7*^ 0 
gives opinion in favour of C, 1 1 % gives opinion 
in favour of D, 28% gives opinion in favour of 
E, 0% gives opinion in favour of F and O^ o^ 
gives opinion in favour of in G respec t ive ly . 
13. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 13 77% gives opinion in 
favour of A and 34% gives opinion in favour of 
D respect ively . 
14. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 14 2 5 % gives opinion in 
favour of A and 9 1 % gives opinion in favour of 
D respect ively . 
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15. As r ega rds VAR No. 15 2 3 % gives opinion in 
favour of A and 104% gives opinion in favour 
of D respect ively. 
16. As r ega rds VAR No. 16 3 1 % gives opinion in 
favour of A, 7 5 % gives opinion in favour B and 
13% gives opinion in favour of C respect ively . 
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BULANDSHAHAR 
1. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 1 19% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 26% gives opinion in favour B, 3 % 
gives opinion in favour of C and 60% gives 
opinion in favour of D respectively. 
2. As r ega rds VAR No. 2 68% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 8% gives opinion in favour B, 2 1 % 
gives opinion in favour of C and 8% gives 
opinion in favour of D respect ively. 
3. As r ega rds VAR No. 3 3 3 % gives opinion in 
favour of A, 7% gives opinion in favour B, 9% 
gives opinion in favour of C and 5 3 % gives 
opinion in favour of D respect ively. 
4. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 4 9% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 17% gives opinion in favour B, 
16% gives opinion in favour of C and 6% gives 
opinion in favour of D and 54% gives opinion 
in favour of E respectively. 
5. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 5 0% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 3 3 % gives opinion in favour B, 
4 5 % gives opinion in favour of C, 14% gives 
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opinion in favour of D, 7% gives opinion in 
favour of E, 3% gives opinion in favour of F 
and 0% gives opinion in favour of in G 
respect ively . 
6. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 6 20% gives opin ion in 
favour of A and 74% gives opinion in favour of 
B respect ively . 
7. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 7 17% gives opin ion in 
favour of A, 16% gives opinion in favour B, 3% 
gives opinion in favour of C a n d 7 3 % gives 
opinion in favour ofT) respect ively . 
8. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 8 44% gives opin ion in 
favour of A, 18% gives opinion in favour B, 
2 3 % gives opinion in favour of C and 18*^ 0 
gives opinion in favour of D respec t ive ly . 
9. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 9 26% gives opin ion in 
favour of A, 4 5 % gives opinion in favour B, 8 '^o 
gives opinion in favour of C a n d 17% gives 
opinion in favour of D respect ively . 
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10. As r ega rds VAR No. 10 20% gives opinion in 
favour of A and 74% gives opinion in favour of 
B respect ively. 
11. As r ega rds VAR No. 5 19% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 4% gives opinion in favour B, 4% 
gives opinion in favour of C, 7% gives opinion 
in favour of D, 7% gives opinion in favour of E, 
13% gives opinion in favour of F and 4 1 % gives 
opinion in favour of in G respectively. 
12. As r ega rds VAR No. 5 29% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 35% gives opinion in favour B, 
18% gives opinion in favour of C, 9% gives 
opinion in favour of D, 2% gives opinion in 
favour of E, 0% gives opinion in favour of F 
and 5% gives opinion in favour of in G 
respect ively. 
13. As r ega rds VAR No. 13 60% g.Ves opinion in 
favour of A and 36o/„ gives opinion . „ f , . , „ , „ , 
D respect ively. 
325 
10. As regards VAR No. 10 20% gives opinion in 
favour of A and 74% gives opinion in favour of 
B respect ively. 
11 . As r ega rds VAR No. 5 19% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 4% gives opinion in favour B, 4% 
gives opinion in favour of C, 7% gives opinion 
in favour of D, 7% gives opinion in favour of E, 
13% gives opinion in favour of F and 4 1 % gives 
opinion in favour of in G respect ively. 
12. As r ega rds VAR No. 5 29% gives opinion in 
favour of A, .35% gives opinion in favour B, 
18% gives opinion in favour of C, 9% gives 
opinion in favour of D, 2% gives opinion in 
favour of E, 0% gives opinion in favour of F 
and 5% gives opinion in favour of in G 
respect ively . 
13. As r ega rds VAR No. 13 60% gives opinion in 
favour of A and 36% gives opinion in favour of 
D respect ively. 
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14. As r ega rds VAR No. 14 34% gives opinion in 
favour of A and 64% gives opinion in favour of 
D respect ively. 
15. As r ega rds VAR No. 15 25% gives opinion in 
favour of A and 9 1 % gives opinion in favour of 
D respect ively. 
16. As r ega rds VAR No. 16 3 1 % gives opinion in 
favour of A, 7 5 % gives opinion in favour B and 
13% gives opinion in favour of C respect ively . 
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GHAZIABAD 
1. As r ega rds VAR No. 1 84% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 75% gives opinion in favour B, 
24% gives opinion in favour of C and 129% 
gives opinion in favour of D respective!}' . 
2. As r ega rds VAR No. 2 202% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 30% gives opinion in favour B, 
47% gives opinion in favour of C and 58% 
gives opinion in favour of D respect ively . 
3 . As r ega rds VAR No. 3 86% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 76% gives opinion in favour B, 
42% gives opinion in favour of C and 125% 
gives opinion in favour of D respect ively . 
4. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 4 98% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 106% gives opinion in favour B, 
50% gives opinion in favour of C and 39% 
gives opinion in favour of D and 9 8 % gives 
opinion in favour of E respect ively. 
5. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 5 28% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 82% gives opinion in favour B, 
97% gives opinion in favour of C, 59% gives 
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opinion in favour of D, 3 3 % gives opinion in 
favour of E, 24% gives opinion in favour of F 
and 8% gives opinion in favour of in G 
respect ively . 
6. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 6 152% gives opinion in 
favour of A and 172% gives opinion in favour 
of B respect ively. 
7. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 7 5 3 % gives opinion in 
favour of A, 8 1 % gives opinion in favour B. 
70 26% gives opinion in favour of C and 160 
gives opinion in favour of D respect ively . 
8. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 8 46% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 103% gives opinion in favour B. 
66% gives opinion in favour of C and 128°o 
gives opinion in favour of D respect ively . 
9. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 9 32% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 110% gives opinion in favour B. 
67% gives opinion in favour of C and 124% 
gives opinion in favour of D respect ively . 
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10. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 10 5 1 % gives opinion in 
favour of A and 256% gives opinion in favour 
of B respect ively. 
11 . As r ega rds VAR No. 5 46% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 79% gives opinion in favour B, 5% 
gives opinion in favour of C, 16% gives opinion 
in favour of D, 3 1 % gives opinion in favour of 
E, 46% gives opinion in favour of F and 134% 
gives opinion in favour of in G respect ively . 
12. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 5 57% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 59% gives opinion in favour B, 
99% gives opinion in favour of C, 76% gives 
opinion in favour of D, 2 3 % gives opinion in 
favour of E, 0% gives opinion in favour of F 
and 15% gives opinion in favour of in G 
respect ively . 
13. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 13 7 1 % gives opinion in 
favour of A and 237% gives opinion in favour 
of D respect ively . 
14. As r ega rds VAR No. 14 164% gives opinion in 
favour of A and 153% gives opinion in favour 
of D respect ively. 
15. As r ega rds VAR No. 15 143% gives opinion in 
favour of A and 177% gives opinion in favour 
of D respect ively. 
16. As r e g a r d s VAR No. 16 181% gives opinion in 
favour of A, 94% gives opinion in favour B and 
50% gives opinion in favour of C respect ively . 
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The geographical description of cites with the 
prevalent crime rate against women in these cities 
will give impetus to the study area. 
Geographical location of Bagpat 
Baghpat district is situated in between 77-13'-
12" East and 28-56'-36" North latitude on the 
western end of Utter Pradesh in the Doab of Ganga 
and Yamuna. 51 km. in length and 26.3 km in 
width. This is a newly formed district and falls 
within the national capital region. 
Baghpat district is A level and well watered 
tract bounded by Hindon and Yamuna rivers which 
from its eastern and western boundaries separating 
it from district Meerut and Haryana respectively, 
while on the north and south lie Muzaffarnagar and 
Ghaziabad district. The district having good fertile 
plain of very rich soil. The Khadar areas of the two 
rivers are comparatively small. Since it is near 
Delhi, which affects the law and order and political 
situation in the district in various ways. The total 
population is 11,64,388 according to 2001 census. 
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GEOGRAPHY OF THE DISTRICT 
Ghaziabad district is a leveled and well-
watered TRACT bounded by Ganga in the east , 
J a m u n a and Delhi in the west. District Meerut in 
the north and district Bulandshahar in the south. 
Its western boundary separates it from the capital 
of India New Delhi. The district consist of a fertile 
plain of rich soil, khadar areas of the two main 
rivers are very small. The geographical area of this 
district is mostly in the East-West directions. Being 
adjacent of Delhi the problems of law and order of 
the political si tuation is affected by Delhi in 
various ways. 
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There are four tehsils-Ghaziabad, Hapur, 
Modinagar and Garhmukteshwar and 22 Police 
stations in the district. Babugarh is a cantonment 
area in the district. 
WOMEN HARASSMENT IN DISTRICT GHAZIABAD DURING 
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Thirdly disruption of the Meerut city is given 
as below: 
FACTS AND FIGURES OF THE DISTRICT. 
(1) Geographical location of the district 
Meerut district is si tuated in between 77 to 78 
degree longitude and 28 degree 45 Minutes to 29 
degree .15 Minutes North lati tude on the Western 
end of Uttar Pradesh in the Doab of Gangas and 
Yamuna. It's 93 K.M. in length and 49 K.M. in 
width. This falls within one of the most developed 
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districts of UP and falls within the national capital 
region. 
Meerut district is a level and well watered 
tract bounded by Ganga and Yamuna rivers which 
forms its eastern and western boundaries 
separat ing it from Rahilkhand and Hariyana 
respectively while on the north and south lie 
Muazaffarnagar and Ghaziabad distr icts with the 
artificial boundaries . The district consists of a level 
fertile plain of very rich soil. The khadar areas of 
the two rivers are comparatively small in extent. 
The district is adjacent to Delhi, the capital of 
India which affects the laws and order and political 
si tuation in the district in various ways. 
(2) Population data community wise :-
The district of Meerut has the total Population 
34,47,912 in according to 1991 census :-
District Meerut comprises of 5 Tehsils and 18 
development blocks. Tehsil Meerut has Meerut, 
Rajpura, J an i , Rohta and Kharkhoda blocks which 
are 5 KM, 7 KM, 16 KM, 19 KM away from the 
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district headquar ter respectively. The second tehsil 
of the district is Sardhana comprising of 3 blocks 
i.e. Sarurpur , Shardhana and Daurala. Block away 
from headquar ter , Sarurpur 25 KM, and Sardhana 
20 KM Block Daurala is 14 KM away from 
headquar ter . The third Tehsil is Mawana which is 
25 KM from headquarter , Hast inapur 36 KM, 
Par ikshatgarh 24 KM and block Machara is s i tuated 
at a dis tance of 23 KM from the district H.Q.. The 
Forth Tehsil is Baghpat which consis ts of three 
blocks namely baghpat, Khekra and Pilana are 
si tuated at a distance of 51,64 and 36 KM from the 
district H.Q.. The fifth tehsil is Baraut which 
consists of three blocks namely Chaprauli , Baraut 
and Binauli and its distance from Headquarters is 
68 KM, 53 KM and 39 KM respectively. 
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Now let us discuss about the role of police in disposal and 
registration of cases in various crimes against women. The 
researcher has tried to clear the position by the help of 
graphs which are as follows: 
Cases 
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BULANDSHAHR 
It is si tuated between Aligarh and Meerut consist of 
main Tehsils Khurja and Sikandarabad. It is 
famous for sugar and wheat production. It has 
mixed population of Hindu and Muslim community 
and total population is about 13 Lac. The crime 
rate of Bulandshahr is shown below: 
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Then I did case study of various cases falling 
under section 498 A & 304 B of IPC in of- quoted 
districts. 
Case 1 
Case Study of dowry death no.2 
Case crime No. : 38 /06 
Police station : Dankaur Distt. Noida 
Sections of Act : 498A,304B IPC and ^A 
Dowry Act 
Date of incident : 14.3.06 
Time of incident : 
Time of information to police: 15.3.06 time 2030 pm 
Place of incident: Vill Fathepur Makrandpur, PS 
Dankaur, Distt. Ghaziabad 
Complainant: Raj Singh s/o Jawahar Singh r / o 
Firozpur PS Palwal, Faridabad, Haryana 
Accused: 1. Subhash s/o Angat Thakur 
2. Arvind s/o -do-
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3. Manoj s/o -do-
4. Sunil s/o -do-
5. Harish s/o Subhash 
6. Smt Rajwati w/o Subhash 
Deceased: Smt Usha w/o Arvind , 20 yrs(sister of 
complainant) 
Investigating Officer: Mr Sarvanand Singh Yadav, 
CO, Greater Noida, Distt. Ghaziabad 
Supervising Officer of Investigation : S K Singh, 
SP(Rural) Distt. Ghaziabad 
First Information Report of the case: 
Complainant Raj Singh reported to police 
station Dankaur on 15.3.06 that his sister Usha 
has been murdered by her husband and in-laws by 
setting her on fire. He has two sisters Usha and 
Kaushal. Usha was married to Arvind s /o Angat 
Thakur vill Fatehpur Makrandpur, PS Dankaur . His 
other sister Kaushal was married to his brother 
'i C/L 
Manoj. Usha was married on 21.5.05 to her 
husband according to Hindu customary and rites. 
After marriage, she was subjected to torture 
and beating frequently due to demand of dowry. Her 
husband used to demand 1 lakh cash after having 
received Rs .31000/ - cash, one motor cycle, 10 
items of gold make, 8 items of silver made, colour 
TV and other household items etc at the time of 
marriage. On 14.3.06, the accused person informed 
us on telephone regarding killing of Usha. By 10 
AM on 15.3.06, when complainant reached to Vill-
Fathepur Makrandpur, cremation of her dead body 
had already been done. 
It was reported by Kaushal sister of Usha that 
on 14.3.06 at around 9 pm, she (Usha) was beaten 
up by her in-laws and was set on fire. 
Complainant made request for registrat ion of a 
criminal case under 498A and 304B and requested 
for investigation of the case. 
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Investigation by Police: 
1. Investigating Officer visited the spot and made 
map of the scene of crime. He prepared 
supervision report. 10 prepared recovery 
memo. He also made recovery memo of bones 
and ashes of the victim. 
2. Sta tement of Kaushal, sister of victim, was 
taken under 161 CrPC. Her s ta tement was also 
recorded by Magistrate under section 164 
CrPC in which she made the same averments . 
3. Accused Arvind was arrested on 21.4.06 and 
his s ta tement was also recorded by police. 
4. Other two accused namely Manoj and Sunil 
arres ted. 
5. Non-bailable warrants to other three 
absconders were issued by Court. They later 
sur rendered in Court on 23.5.06. 
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Case Study of dowry death no.3 
Case crime No. : 92 /06 
Police stat ion : PS Dankaur, Distt Noida 
Sections of Act : 498A, 304B IPC and % 
Dowry Act 
Date of incident : 23-24.6.06 
Time of incident : 
Time of information to police: 30.6.06 time 2125 pm 
Place of incident: Vill Faridpur, PS Dankaur , Distt. 
Ghaziabad 
Complainant: Paramjit Singh s/o Khema Singh r /o 
Sakoli H/No.122, Railway Road PS-Nand Nagari, 
Delhi 
Accused : l .Subhash s/o Ja ip rakash 
2.Krishna w/o Ja ip rakash 
S.Harinder s /o -do-
4. Manoj s /o -do-
S.Jaipraksh s/o not known 
6.Asha d /o Ja iprakash 
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Deceased : Smt Babita w/o Subhash (sister of 
complainant) 
Investigating Officer : Mr Sarvanand Singh Yadav, 
CO, Greater Noida, Distt. Ghaziabad 
Supervising Officer of Investigation : S K Singh, 
SP(Rural) Distt. Ghaziabad 
First Information Report of the case: 
Complainant Paramjit Singh reported to police 
station Dankaur on 30.6.06 that his sister Babita 
has been murdered by her husband and in-laws by 
setting her on fire. His sister Babita was married to 
Subhash s /o Ja iprakash , r / o Faridpur, PS Dankaur 
on 27.4.03 to her husband according to Hindu 
customary and rites. She had a daughter of two 
years old named Priya and was 8 months pregnant 
at the time of death. 
After marriage, she was subjected to torture 
and beating frequently due to demand of dowry. Her 
husband used to demand 1 lakh cash. On 23-
24.6.06, some unknown person informed us on 
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telephone regarding incident. We went to 
Safdurjung Hospital, where she (Babita) was 
admitted in almost burnt condition and later 
succumbed to injuries on 28.6.06 at 1455 pm. 
During course of treatment, she gave birth to a son 
who later died on 25.6.06. 
Complainant made request for registrat ion of a 
criminal case under 498A and 304B and requested 
for investigation of the case. 
Investigation by Police: 
1. Investigating Officer visited the spot and made 
map of the scene of crime. He prepared 
supervision report and recovered i tems from 
scene of incident. 
2. Accused Subhash was arrested on 8.7.06 and 
sent to jail . 
3 . Other accused in the case are still to be 
arrested. 
Case Study of dowry death no.4 
Case crime No. : 101/06 
Police station : Dankaur Distt Noida 
Sections of Act : 498A,304B IPC and ¥4 
Dowry Act 
Date of incident : 23.4.06 
Time of incident : 1000 am 
Time of information to police: 7.7.06 time 1820 pm 
Place of inciden : Vill Rilkha ,PS Dankaur, Distt. 
Ghaziabad 
Complainant: Joginder Singh s/o Jai Ram r /o Vill 
Devata PS Dankaur 
Accused : 1. Pramod s/o Babu Singh 
2. Prabhu s/o Babu Singh 
3. Babu Singh s/o Jaipal Singh 
4. Kiran w/o Babu Singh 
5. Jaggo w/o Jaipal Singh 
6. Ja ipal Singh s/o 
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7. Sonu s/o Babu Singh 
Deceased : Smt Rekha w/o Pramod , 25 
yrs(daughter of complainant) 
Investigating Officer: Mr Sarvanand Singh Yadav, 
CO, Greater Noida, Disst. Ghaziabad 
Supervising Officer of Investigation : S K Singh, 
SP(Rural) Distt. Ghaziabad 
First Information Report of the case: 
Complainant Joginder Singh reported to police 
stat ion Dankaur on 7.7.06 that his daugher has 
been murdered by her husband and in-laws by 
setting her on fire. He has two daughters Rekha 
and Sumitra. Usha was married to Pramod s/o 
Babu Singh vill Rilkha, PS Dankaur . His other 
daughter Sumitra married to his brother Prabhu. 
Rekha was married on 12.3.04 to her husband 
according to Hindu customary ri tes. 
After marriage, she was subjected to tor ture 
and beating frequently due to demand of dowry. Her 
husband and other members of his family used to 
demand of one marut i car and Rs. one lakh cash. 
363 
It was informed on telephone by Sumitra sister 
of Rekha and Lakhan brother of Rekha(aged 10 yrs) 
who were present at the time of incident that on 
23.4.06 at around 1000 am, she (Rekha) was set on 
fire by her husband Pramod and his family 
members. We went to see her at Safdurjung 
Hospital where she found completely burn and dead 
Complainant made request for registration of a 
criminal case under 498A and 304B and requested 
for investigation of the case. 
Invest igation by Police: 
1. Investigating Officer visited the spot and made 
map of the scene of crime. He prepared 
supervision report. lO prepared recovery 
memo. 
2. Statement of Sumitra, sister of victim, was 
taken under 161 CrPC. 
3. None of the accused has been arres ted so far. 
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Case Study of dowry death no.5 
Case crime No. : 74 /06 
Police stat ion : Phase-II Noida, Distt Noida 
Sections of Act : 498A,304B,201,352,504 
IPC and ¥4 Dowry Act 
Date of incident : 11.5.05 to 9.4.06 
Time of incident : 
Time of information to police: 10.4.06 time 1725 pm 
Place of incident: Vill Nagli Wazidpur ,PS Phase-II 
Noida, Distt. Ghaziabad 
Complainant: Rakesh s/o Ja i Lai r / o Sisana, PS 
Kotwali, Distt-Baghpat 
Accused: 1. Suresh s/o Rajinder 
2. Rajinder s/o Panna Lai 
3. Smt Charno w/o Rajinder 
4. Ramesh s/o Rajinder 
5. Shyam s/o Panna Lai 
6 Bobby @ Narinder s/o Baleram 
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Deceased: Smt Rajesh w/o Suresh , (sister of 
complainant) 
Investigating Officer: Mr. K K Gautam, CO, Phase-II 
Noida, Disst.GBN 
Supervising Officer of Investigation: Saumitra 
Yadav, SP (City) Distt. Ghaziabad 
First Information Report of the case: 
Complainant Rakesh reported to police station 
Phase-II Noida on 10.4.06 that his sister has been 
murdered by her husband and in-laws by setting 
her on fire. His sister Rajesh was married to Suresh 
s/o Rajinder vill Nagli Wazidpur, PS Phase-II Noida 
on 11.5.05 according to Hindu customary and ri tes. 
After marriage, she was subjected to tor ture 
and beating frequently due to demand of dowry. Her 
husband and other members of his family used to 
demand of one Rs. 50 ,000 / - cash which was 
fulfilled. They kept on demanding one marut i car 
and Rs one lakh cash. 
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It was informed on telephone by some 
unknown person that Smt Rajesh had been 
murdered by her in-laws. On reaching vill-Nagli 
Wazidpur, family members of Suresh manhandled 
the complainant and others and had already been 
cremated the dead body of his sister. 
Complainant made request for registration of a 
criminal case under 498A, 304B,201,352,504 IPC 
and requested for investigation of the case. 
Investigation by Police: 
1. Investigating Officer visited the spot and made 
map of the scene of crime. He prepared 
supervision report. lO prepared recovery 
memo. He also made recovery of bones and 
ashes of the victim. 
2. All accused persons except Shyam have been 
arrested by the police and sent to jail . 
3. Police Final report section 172 CrPC was filed 
in court and trial of the case has not started 
yet. 
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Case Study of dowry death no. 6 
Case crime No. : 3 /06 
Police stat ion : Dankaur Distt Noida 
Sections of Act : 498A,304B(302),201 IPC 
Date of incident : 24.1205 
Time of incident : 
Time of information to police: 5.1.06 time 1700 pm 
Place of incident: Vill Chachula, PS Dankaur , Distt. 
Ghaziabad 
Complainant: Mahinder Singh s/o Late Nathi Singh 
r / o Vill J a u n t h PS Orangabad Diss-Bulandhsahar 
Accused: 1, Rakesh s/o Sukhbir Singh(Husbabd) 
2. Smt Sanjay Devi w/o Satte Singh 
(Mother-in-law) 
3 . Surinder Singh s/o Baldev Singh 
Deceased: Smt Anita w/o Rakesh, (daughter of 
complainant) 
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Investigating Officer: Mr Sarvanand Singh Yadav, 
CO, Greater Noida, Disst, Ghaziabad 
Mr.Rashid Ali, CO PS Dankaur 
Supervising Officer of Investigation: S K Singh, 
SP(Rural) Distt. Ghaziabad 
First Information Report of the case: 
Complainant Mahinder Singh reported to 
police stat ion Dankaur on 5.1.06 that his daughter 
Anita has been murdered by her husband and in-
laws. Anita was married to Rakesh s/o Late 
Sukhbir Singh vill Chachula PS Dankaur about 6 
years back according to Hindu customary ri tes. 
After marriage, she was subjected to tor ture 
and beating frequently due to demand of dowry. Her 
husband used to demand Rs 20 ,000 / - cash and one 
motor cycle. On 24.12.05, it was informed on 
telephone regarding missing of miy daughter Anita. 
In the process of her search, her dead body was 
found from the jungles of vill Sunpeda in lake, 
which was still lying in lake. 
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Complainant made request for registration of a 
criminal case under 498A, 304B,201 IPC and 
requested for investigation of the case. 
Investigation by Police: 
1. Investigating Officer visited the spot and made 
map of the scene of crime. He prepared 
supervision report. 10 prepared recovery 
memo. 
2. Accused Rakesh was arrested and produced in 
court on 19.1.06. 
3 Other accused namely Smt Sanjay Devi 
produced in court on 3.3.06 
4. Involvement of accused namely Surinder Singh 
withholds. 
5. Police Final Report under section 172 CPC was 
filed in court . 
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Case Study of dowry death no.7 
Case crime No. : 342 /05 
Police station : Kasana Distt. Noida 
Sections of Act : 498A,304B,323 IPC and % 
Dowry Act 
Date of incident : 18.9.05 
Time of incident : 
Time of information to police : 19.9.05 time 0530 
am 
Place of incident : Vill Jamalpur Kirat, PS Nurpur, 
Distt. Bijnour 
Complainant: Harish Chander Devra s /o Hori Singh 
r /o Vill Gohawar PS Nurpur Distt-Bijnour 
Accused : 1. Manoj s /o Tejpal (Husbabd) 
2. Smt Sheela Devi w/o Tejpal (Mother-in-
law) 
3. Sachin s/o Tejpal 
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Deceased : Smt Shilu w/o Manoj, 25 yrs (daughter 
of complainant) 
Investigating Officer : Mr Sarvanand Singh Yadav, 
CO, Greater Noida, Disst.GBN 
Supervising Officer of Investigation : Saumitra 
Yadav, SP{Cityl) Distt.GBN 
First Information Report of the case: 
Complainant Harish Chander Devra reported 
to police stat ion Kasana on 19.9.05 that his 
daughter Shilu has been murdered by her husband 
and in-laws by strangulation. Shilu was married to 
Manoj s /o Tejpal vill Jamalpur Kirat PS Nurpur on 
21.2.2002 according to Hindu customary and ri tes. 
After marriage, she was subjected to tor ture 
and beatien frequently due to demand of dowry. Her 
husband used to demand Rs .60 ,000/ - for 
construct ion of house which was fulfilled and again 
demanded Rs 40 ,000 / - . On 18.9.05, my daughter 
Shilu was s trangulated to death by her husband 
and in-laws. 
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Complainant made request for 
registration of a criminal case under 498A, 304B 
IPC and requested for investigation of the case. 
Investigation by Police; 
1. Investigating Officer visited the spot and made 
map of the scene of crime. He prepared 
supervision report. 10 prepared recovery 
memo. 
2. Accused Manoj was arrested on 22.9.06. , 
Sachin on 16.11.05 and Smt Sheela Devi 
surrendered herself in court on 9.1.06 and all 
sent to jail 
3. Police Final Report under section 172 CPC was 
filed in court on 20.1.06 
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Case Study of dowry death no.8 
Case crime No. : 247 /05 
Police stat ion : Surajpur Distt Noida 
Sections of Act : 498A,304B,323 IPC and % 
Dowry Act 
Date of incident : 30.6.01 to 13.10.05 
Time of incident : 2 pm 
Time of information to police: 14.10.05 time 0500 
am 
Place of incident: J -18 , Delta II, Greater Noida, 
Distt. Ghaziabad 
Complainant: Harpal Singh s/o Lakhpat Singh r / o 
Vill J u n p a t PS Surajpur, Distt- Ghaziabad 
Accused: 1, Mukesh Kumar s/o Nathu Singh 
(Husbabd) 
2. Vir Singh s/o -do-
3. Munni Devi w/o Vir Singh 
4. Simla d/o Nathu Singh 
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Deceased : Smt Munesh w/o Mukesh, (daughter of 
complainant) 
Investigating Officer : Mr Sarvanand Singh Yadav, 
CO, Greater Noida, Disst. Ghaziabad 
Supervising Officer of Investigation : Saumitra 
Yadav, SP(Cityl) Distt. Ghaziabad 
First Information Report of the case: 
Complainant Harpal Singh reported to police 
station Kasana on 14.10.05 that his daughter 
Munesh has been killed by her husband and in-
laws by giving poison. Munesh was married to 
Mukesh s /o Nathu Singh vill J-18 Delta II Greater 
Noida on 30.6.2001 according to Hindu customary 
and r i tes. 
After marriage, she was subjected to tor ture 
and beating frequently due to demand of dowry. Her 
husband and his family members used to demand 
motor car. On 13.10.05, my daughter Munesh was 
killed by giving some poison by her husband and 
in-laws and later died in a nurs ing home at Noida. 
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Complainant made request for registration of a 
criminal case under 498A, 304B IPC and requested 
for investigation of the case. 
On the basis of these cases conclusion of result as 
follows 
Investigation by Police: 
1. Investigating Officer visited the spot and made 
map of the scene of crime. He prepared 
supervision report. lO prepared recovery 
memo. 
2. No arres t has been made 
3. Case transferred to CBCID Department for 
further course of action. 
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Conclusion 
The field research conducted on the subject leads 
to the conclusions which are as follows: 
1. The crimes in India are occurring in lower and 
middle s t ra ta of society due to poverty. 
2. There is delay in trial of cases which make the 
laws infratuous. 
3. Normally in such cases husband and mother-
in-law are involved. 
4. In some cases names of unmarr ied sister of 
husband in accused family is dragged in 
investigation based on sec. 161 related to 
s ta tement of witness of witnesses. Majority of 
cases young and unmarr ied girls in the family 
have no role to play in commission of offence. 
5. Community lacks spirit in providing the 
permission to police in advance so tha t such 
crime may be stopped. 
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6. Setting up of counseling centers by police or 
NGOs may help in reduction of this kind of 
crimes. 
7. Education young girls regarding laws on dowry 
prohibition, Schools may go along (The way in 
helping society to get rid of the deceases). 
8. Setting up of special cells for investigation in 
police department will help success in trial of 
cases. Economic independence is necessary for 
every woman. 
9. Legal awareness must be created with the 
cooperation of NGOs 
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m 
CHAPTER - 5 
Role of judiciary 
ROLE OF JUDICIARY; CASE STUDIES 
The Indian judiciary has always recognized the 
importance of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and has been giving effect to the provisions 
of the Declaration in letter and spirit while 
interpreting the constitution and the municipal 
laws. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of Ind ia l , a bench 
of seven judges relied on article 13(2) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
reiterated that although the freedom to go abroad 
was not specifically named in the Indian 
constitution as a fundamental right in article 19 it 
was included in the right to personal liberty 
guaranteed by article 21 . In M.H. Hoskot v. State of 
Maharashtra^, the Supreme Court on article 8 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
article 14(3) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political rights for reading into article 21 the 
right to legal assistance to defend in a criminal 
proceeding. In Hussainara Khatoon v. Home 
Secretarys, the court relied on the Sixth 
Amendment to the US Constitution as well as 
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article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Right for holding that the right to personal liberty 
guaranteed by article 21 includes the right to a 
speedy trial of the offence with which a person is 
charged. A larger bench affirmed this right in A.R. 
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak'^. In Randhir Singh v. Union 
of IndiaS, the Court read into article 14 of the 
constitution, the concept of equal pay for equal 
work incorporated in clause (20 of article 23 of the 
Universal Declaration according to which "everyone 
without any discrimination, has a right to equal 
pay for equal work". The court relied on analogous 
provisions of the Hungarian Democratic Republic 
Code, the Romanian Code and the preamble to the 
Constitution of the International Labour 
Organization, besides article 39(d) of the Indian 
Constitution. On September 26, 1975 during the 
International Women's Year, the President of India 
promulgated an ordinance which was replaced by 
the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976. The Act 
provides for the payment of equal remunerat ion to 
men and women workers and for the prevention of 
discrimination on the ground of sex against women 
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in the m a t t e r of employment and o ther connec ted 
and inc iden ta l m a t t e r s . 
In V i s h a k h a & Ors. V. Sta te of Ra j a s than & 
Ors5, the Supreme Court uphe ld the r igh t s of 
working women aga ins t sexual h a r a s s m e n t in 
working p laces relying on the provis ions of the 
Convent ion on the El iminat ion of All Forms of 
Disc r imina t ion AGAINST Women (CEDAW) and the 
fundamen ta l r igh t s conferred by a r t i c l e s 14 ,15 , 
19(1) (g) a n d 21 of the Cons t i tu t ion of India . The 
cour t dec la red : 
In the a b s e n c e of domest ic law occupying the 
field, to formula te effective m e a s u r e s to check the 
evil of sexua l h a r a s s m e n t of working women a t all 
workp laces , the c o n t e n t s of i n t e rna t i ona l c o v e n a n t s 
and n o r m s are significant for the p u r p o s e of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the g u a r a n t e e of gender equal i ty , 
r ight to work with h u m a n dignity in Art icles 14 ,15 , 
19(l)(g) and 21 of the Cons t i tu t ion and the 
sa fegua rds a g a i n s t sexual h a r a s s m e n t implici t 
t he reon . Any in t e rna t iona l convent ion not 
i n c o n s i s t e n t with the fundamen ta l r i gh t s and in 
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harmony with its spirit must be read into these 
provisions to enlarge the meaning and content 
thereof, to promote the object of the consti tut ional 
guarantee. 
Thus, in Vir Bhan Singh Vs State of U.P.6 the 
Supreme Court observed" It is an unfortunate and 
disturbing phenomenon that has recently arisen in 
many par ts of the country that ins tances of bride 
burnings are alarmingly on increase. If the society 
is to be ridden off this growing evil, it is imperative 
that whenever dastardly crimes of this na ture arc 
detected and the offence brought home to the 
accused, the court must deal with such offenders 
ruthlessly and impose deterrent punishments . 
It was in State (Delhi Administration) Vs. 
Lakshman Kumar^ that the Supreme Court had 
opined tha t even death sentence may not be 
improper in the cases of gruesome bride burnings 
in the country. In Smt. Paniben Vs. State of 
Gujarat,* the Apex Court opined as follows: 
"It would be a travesty of just ice if 
sympathy is shown when such cruel act is 
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committed. It is rather strange that a 
mother-in-law who herself is a woman 
should indulge in the killing of another 
woman. It is hard to fathom as to why 
even the mother in her, did not make her 
feel so. Undue sympathy would be 
harmful to the cause of just ice. It may 
even undermine the confidence in the 
efficacy of law. Merely because the 
accused had spent more than ten years in 
jail could not convince the court to show 
any leniency". 
9 Similarly, in Kailash Kaur Vs. St. of Punjab 
the Supreme Court opined that where a case of 
gruesome murder of a young wife by the barbaric 
process of pouring kerosene oil on the body and 
then setting her on fire after subjecting her to a 
long physical and mental harassment for the 
extraction of dowry comes before the court and the 
offence is brought home to the accused beyond 
reasonable doubt, it is the duty of the court to deal 
strictly and award maximum penalty prescribed by 
law in order that it may operate as a deterrent to 
the other persons from committing such antisocial 
acts. Thus, the accused were convicted under Sec. 
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498 A I.P.C. and Sec. 306 I.P.C Like wise in Smt. 
Shanti Vs. State of Haryana,io while confirming the 
conviction of the appellants under Sec. 304-B 
I .P.C, the Supreme Court observed that the 
prosecution has established beyond reasonable 
doubt that the appellants had treated the deceased 
cruelly which comes within the meaning of 'Cruelty' 
for dowry demand and hence their proper 
conviction under the said section of the penal code. 
In dowry death cases the courts have to 
consider those instances, which took place for a 
long period of seven years after marriage and the 
totality of the circumstances. Thus in Chajju and 
others Vs St. of Haryana,ii where the cause of 
death of the deceased was asphyxia due to the 
extensive burns and where the PSGH High Court 
found that the deceased father had spent about Rs. 
40000 / - on the marriage of his daughter . But the 
appellants (the greedy husband and the mother in-
law) were not satisfied with the same and they were 
pestering the deceased for bringing inadequate 
dowry. Before her death, the deceased had 
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complained to her parents of the i l l-treatments 
meted out to her at the hands of the appellants and 
had also told them that her life in her matrimonial 
home had become unbearable. The appellants 
denied these allegations and claimed that the 
deceased was over burdened with work. She was 
sensitive and hence committed suicide on her own 
along with her infant son. The Punjab and Haryana 
High Court upheld the conviction of the accused 
under Sec. 304 B of the Penal Code. Similarly in 
State of Punjab Vs. Iqbal Singh,^2 the Supreme 
Court convicted the accused husband under Sec. 
306 1. P. C. and sentenced him to rigorous 
imprisonment for seven years and imposed a fine of 
Rs. 5000 / -
In Sudam Vs. State of Maharashtra^^ where 
the dying declaration of the wife showed that 
because of continuous ill t reatments and tor tures 
at the hands of the cruel husband, she had no 
alternative but to end her own life, the Bombay 
High Court held that the maximum punishment 
permissible under Sec. 498A I.P.C. on the husband 
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by the Trial court is justified since this case fulfills 
all the ingredients of cruelty. 
In Inder Raj Malik Vs. Sunita Malik,i^^ it was 
contended that Sec. 498-A I.P.C. was violative of 
Art. 14 of the Constitution of India in as much as it 
gave an arbitrary power to the police and the court; 
moreover, the words 'cruelty' and 'harassment ' 
under Sec. 498-A are equally vague. It was further 
contended that Sec. 498-A I.P.C. offended against 
double jeopardy under Art. 20 of the Consti tution, 
in as much as a person can be convicted both 
under Sec. 4 of the dowry Prohibition (Amendment) 
Act, 1984 as well as under Sec. 498A.It was held 
that Sec. 498-A I.P.C. inter alia punishes such 
demands of property or valuable security from the 
wife or her relatives which are coupled with cruelty 
to her. Hence a person can be prosecuted in 
respect of both the offences under Sec. 4 of the Act 
of 1984 and Sec. 498-A I.P.C. There is no question 
of giving arbitrary powers to the police as well as to 
the courts . The word 'cruelty' is well defined and 
its import is well known. The meaning of 
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harassment is also well known and there cannot be 
any arbitrary exercise of powers in interpreting it. 
In P. Bikshapathi Vs. State of A.P.^5^ Just ice 
Radhaishan Rao held that in all dowry cases- the 
appreciation of evidence has to be made in the light 
of Sec. 113 A of the Indian Evidence Act, which 
raises a presumption as to the abetment of suicide 
in case of unna tu ra l death, by the husband or any 
of his relative. The court rightly convicted the 
accused under Sec. 498A and 306 of the Penal 
Code. In State of Punjab Vs. Amarjit Singh,^^ the 
husband who was accused of regular torturing, 
beating and abusing his wife, on earlier occasions 
for the inadequate dowry, one day throttled the 
neck of his wife, when she pleaded her helplessness 
to bring more dowries. Frustrated in his plans, one 
day he set ablaze his young wife. Before dying, the 
wife categorically accused the husband for setting 
her on fire. In view of the gravity of the offence, the 
court sentenced the- husband to life imprisonment 
under Sec. 304 B 1. P.C. Stating the efficacy of Sec. 
304 B 1. P. C In Premvati Vs. State of M.P.i^ (the 
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court opined that if the occurrence of death of a 
new) married woman is preceded by cruelt}', tor ture 
or harassment by the husband or the in-laws for or 
in connection with dowry demand and if that 
collection is established, mere occurrence of death 
is enough to at t ract Sec. 304-B I.P.C. These cases 
came with in the definition of Domestic Violence. 
In Gurbachan Singh Vs. Satpal Singh and 
others, 18 regular torture, bickering, humiliations, 
by the husband and the in-laws finally led to the 
death of the newly wedded wife by burn injuries. 
She had earlier written to her parents about the ill 
t reatment meted out to her in her marital home. 
The Supreme Court, keeping in view all the 
circumstances of the case took a very serious note 
and concluded that the deceased committed suicide 
only at the instigation of her husband and the in-
laws and therefore, a presumption under Sec. 113A 
of Indian. Evidence Act was raised by the court and 
affirmed the conviction of the accused under Sec. 
306 I.P.C. In Mulakh Raj Vs. Satish Kumar,^9 where 
the death of a newly wedded bride took place within 
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one and half years of marriage due to strangulation 
and it was established beyond reasonable doubt by 
the prosecution that the husband had been very 
cruel to her right from the very beginning and the 
death took place in his bedroom. Moreover, the 
evidence of the doctors conducting autopsy were 
consistent with medical jur isprudence. Therefore, 
the Supreme Court convicted the accused husband 
under Sec. 302 and Sec. 498-A of the Indian Penal 
Code. In State of H.P. Vs. Nikku Ram and others,^o 
where the mother-in-law who was incidentally 
eighty years old, used to torture and ha rass her 
newly wedded daughter-in law both physically as 
well as mentally for bringing insufficient dowry. 
Her mother-in-law often mercilessly beat her. She 
was alleged to have given a fatal blow with a sickle, 
which caused an incised, would on her head and 
unable to bear the wound, the ill fated bride died 
within a few days. In this case, the court after 
considering the circumstances of the case and 
keeping in view the old age of that accused lady 
convicted her under Sec. 324 l.P.C. and imposed a 
fine of Rs. 3000. 
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In Krishna Murthy Vs. State of A.P.21 as well 
as In Chandra Bhushan Bhimraj and others Vs. 
State of Maharashtra, the court convicted the 
accused ones under Sec. 498A of the Indian Penal 
Code. Again the prosecution was successful in 
establishing the acts of cruelty of the accused 
husband in Chandra Lakshmi Narayan Vs. State of 
A.P.,22 the court on the basis of the materials on 
record convicted the accused husband under Sec. 
498A I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo rigorous 
imprisonment for three years and also to pay fine of 
Rs. 5000 / - and in default, simple imprisonment for 
six months . 
The Allahabad High Court in Smt. Gopal alias 
Bhagat Vs. State of U.P.23 convicted the accused 
husband under Sec. 302 IPC on the basis of the 
dying declaration made by deceased in her full 
consciousness narrat ing the ill conduct of her 
cunning husband . The court opined that it was a 
forced suicide and hence convicted the accused. In 
Abdul Barrack Vs. State of Bengal,24 the accused 
husband was alleged to have assaul ted his wife. 
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Vigorously with his harsh hands and sticks right 
from the beginning, which ultimately resulted in 
the death of the deceased jus t after two years of 
her marriage. The evidence of the eyewitnesses 
regarding the regular torture and assaul t of the 
wife also corroborated the prosecution's 
allegations. Thus the court convicted the accused 
under Sec. 498A of the Indian Penal Code. In 
Harbans Lai and others Vs. State of Haryana-^s 
wherein the trial court had acquitted both the 
husband and the mother-in-law of the deceased 
under Sec. 302 read with Sec. 34 I.P.C. for causing 
the death of the victim and her baby child of nine 
years by sprinkling kerosene oil and setting them 
ablaze. In appeal, the Punjab and Haryana High 
Court convicted both of them to undergo life 
imprisonment. Even the Supreme Court, on appeal, 
did not find any ground for disagreeing with the 
findings of the High Court. It was held tha t the 
accused persons have alone caused the death of the 
bride and her daughter and hence rightly 
convicted. 
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In Venu Gopal Vs. State of Karnataka26 the 
newly wedded wife was mercilessly tortured, 
humiliated and beaten frequently for more dowries 
by her husband. Within two years of her marriage, 
she died an unnatura l death. The prosecution 
successfully established the guilt of the cruel 
husband by way of relevant evidences. The 
Supreme Court held that the accused be convicted 
under Sec. 304-B and Sec. 498 A of the Indian 
Penal Code. In Arun Vyas and others Vs Anita 
Vyas27. The newly wedded wife, after being 
subjected to gross cruelty was turned out of her 
matrimonial home by the husband. The Supreme 
Court observed that even if the complaint of 
allegation is time barred it could still be 
entertained if it gives an unfair advantage to the 
accused husband and results in the miscarriage of 
just ice. Cruelty is a continuing offence and the 
interest of the justice demands that the courts 
should protect the oppressed and punish the 
oppressor. Thus, the court rightly convicted the 
accused under Sec. 498-A I.P.C. 
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In Siddesha and others Vs. State,28 the 
accused husband was alleged to have forcibly 
dragged the deceased wife to the bathroom, poured 
kerosene oil on her clothes and set her on fire. It 
was also established that the mother-in-law of the 
newly married wife and her husband inflicted high 
level of atrocities on her for not bringing sufficient 
dowry items and jewellery. She was ultimately 
forced to commit suicide by the accused ones. The 
court convicted both the husband and his mother 
under Sec. 498A of the Penal Code and under Sec. 
3,4 & 5 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 
Moreover, the husband was also convicted under 
Sec. 304B of the Indian Penal Code. The Supreme 
Court suggested the social ostracism of the boy 
afterwards in the matter of marriage in Ashoka 
Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan29. it observed that 
the social reformist and the legal ju r i s t s may evolve 
a machinery for debarring such a boy from 
remarriage, irrespective of the member of the family 
who committed the crime and in violation penalize 
the whole family including those who participated 
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in it. That social ostracism is needed to curtail 
increased malady of bride burning. 
The Supreme Court has held in Soni 
Devrajbhai Babubhaiv. State^o that in view of the 
protection granted by Article 20(1) of the 
Constitution an act committed before section 304-
B.The Andhra Pradesh High Court is of the view-
that where a plot to engineer the death of a woman 
is hatched by her in laws, It is not necessary for 
their conviction under this section that they must 
actually participate in it. On the facts of the case 
however, the husband who had led his wife to her 
parental home to press for outstanding as well as 
fresh dowry demands but the wife's parents had 
shown their inability to meet the demands, and on 
their re turn when the wife had slipped away from a 
bus stop, he and the wife's parents had joint 
operation to find her, and later on her floating body 
was recovered, was held not guilty under this 
section.31 In Bhoora singh v. Staters there was 
harassment , ill-treatment and threat to the life of 
the deceased by her in-laws for non-satisfaction of 
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dowry demands. This was duly, established by the 
letter written by the deceased was in hospital in a 
semiconscious condition and was responding only 
to deep stimulation. The unwritten oral dying 
declaration of the deceased made to Circumstances 
of the case the accused was convicted under section 
498-B. But not under section 304-B because the 
incident of burning of the deceased took place 
before the offence under section 304-B came into 
existence and this being a substantive offence and 
not a procedural one retrospective operation could 
not be given to it. 
The burden of proof continues to lie on the 
prosecution all the time like any other criminal 
case. Where, a young wife had voluntarily 
committed suicide by consuming insecticide, this 
by itself does not prove a case against the husband 
under this section^s. Similarly, where there was 
evidence of only a slight harassment of the 
deceased by her in-laws as a result of which she 
burnt herself to death, this by itself is not enough 
to convict the husband or the in-laws.3-* Where the 
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body of the deceased married woman had cremated 
in undue haste without informing even her parents 
and there was no material whatsoever on record to 
show a na tura l death, a presumption against the 
accused under section 113-B. Evidence Act, 1872 
can be drawn.35 Similarly, where the post mortem 
report indicated kerosene smell from the body and 
hair of the deceased married woman the plea of 
accidental burning while preparing tea deserved to 
be negatived.36 
The Supreme Court has observed in V.N Pawar 
V. State37 that wife-burning tragedies are becoming 
too frequent for the country to be complacent. 
Police sensitization mechanism which will prevent 
the commission of such crimes must be set up if 
these heinous crimes are to be avoided Likewise, 
special provisions facilitating easier proof of such 
special class of murders on establishing certain 
basic facts must be provided for by appropriate 
legislation. 
In Prakash Chander v. State of Delhi38 a wife 
die within seven years of her marriage .Her body 
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was found burnt in the house of her husband at 
midnight. Her parents ' and sister 's deposition that 
there was demand of dowry and the deceased was 
subjected to cruelty and harassment by her 
husband and in-laws were reliable. It was held that 
the husband ' s conviction under Section 304-B was 
proper. The trial Court has convicted her mother-
in-law under Section 498-A which impliedly meant 
her acquittal for the more serious offence under 
Section 304-B. The State did not appeal against her 
implied acquittal . It was held, the High Court in her 
appeal against conviction had no power to convict 
her under Section 304-B of the code. 
In Pawan Kumar v. state of Haryana^Q the 
Supreme Court held that agreement for dowry is not 
always necessary and that persistent demands for 
television and scooter from the bride after marriage 
would be held to be in connection with marriage 
and the accused is guilty under section 304-B of 
the Code and section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition 
Act, 1961. 
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In Surinder Kumar v. State,'^o wife was 
deserted by her husband. The defence pleaded that 
the desertion was because of the fact that the wife 
was suffering from epilepsy and not for demand of 
dowry. However, in her dying declaration and the 
suicide note the deceased had specifically named 
the accused making demand of colour television 
and scooter and that she was being abused and 
harassed for bringing insufficient dowry. Though 
she was staying with her parents when she 
committed suicide, there were meetings between the 
parties and at tempts made to rehabili tate her. It 
was held tha t it was sufficient incitement and 
continuous harassment when she was not accepted 
unless dowry demands were met at t ract ing rigour of 
section 304-B and thus the conviction was 
sustained. 
In D.S Shishodia v. K.C Samdariya,^! a 
married woman died within seven years of her 
marriage. The Rajasthan High Court held tha t the 
date of marriage should be reckoned from the date 
of solemnization and not from the date of Muklava 
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ceremony which took place subsequently, more so 
when 'Muklava' is not a necessary ingredient of 
marriage and it is not established that by custom 
'Muklava' is the marriage. 
In Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab,^- the 
Supreme Court observed that there should be 
perceptible nexus between the death of the 
deceased and harassment or cruelty on her. In this 
case there was insufficient evidence to show tha t 
the wife was subjected to cruelty soon before 
attempting to commit suicide. It was held that the 
accused could not be convicted under section 116 
was set aside and that under section 498-A was 
confirmed. The fine under section 498-A was 
modified to Rs. One lac each for all the three 
accused. 
In State of Karnataka v. M.V 
Manjunathegowda43, a wife died within six months 
of her marriage. There was demand and payment of 
dowry. Harassment and cruelty was caused to her. 
The testimony of the brother and father of the 
deceased proved that soon before her death the 
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deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment 
in connection with demand of dowry by the accused 
husband. The Supreme Court held that the accused 
guilty of committing dowry death under section 
304-B but since the prosecution failed to establish 
complete and conclusive chain of c i rcumstances to 
bring guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, 
his acquittal for murder could not be interfered 
with. 
In Hira Lai v. State (Government of NCT) of 
Delhi,"^4 the Supreme Court observed tha t the 
expression 'soon before' in section 304-B of the 
Indian Penal Code and in section 113-B of the 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not indicate any 
fixed period but the proximity test is applicable. 
The existence of proximate and live link between 
the effect of cruelty and the death is necessary. An 
acquittal under section 304-B does not necessarily 
mean acquittal under section 498-A and also under 
section 306 of the Code though no charge to tha t 
effect is framed. 
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In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raj Gopal 
Aswawaj'^s the Supreme Court ruled that no 
definite period is indicated in the expression 'soon 
before' used in section 304-B. There must be 
existence of proximate and live link between the 
effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the 
concerned death. Reema Agarwal v. Anupam'*^, is a 
very important case where the relevance of sections 
304-B and 498-A. 
During the recent past, Indian Courts have 
been overwhelmingly burdened with innumerable 
cases relating to conjugal violence including the 
extreme cases of dowry deaths or bride burnings . 
Therefore, keeping in view the alarming increase of 
violence cases in the hands of her husband or the 
in-laws, in her matrimonial home, the Indian 
Courts have played positive roles in tackling the 
incidences of violence in the marital homes. The 
courts have adopted very stringent posture towards 
such cases, by pronouncing tough and firm 
judgments against the perpetrators of such heinous 
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crimes and dispensing with appropriate jus t ice to 
the aggrieved spouse or her relatives. 
Therefore, it can be said that the role of the 
Indian courts have been quite appreciative in 
expounding the law and clarifying the legal norms 
so that the culprits do not escape the punishment 
on account of the technical ties and inadequacies of 
law. The courts have been in fact sensitive to the 
issues regarding the protection of women's r ights 
keeping in mind the changing concept of the 
present day society towards the place and s ta tus of 
married women in their matrimonial homes. Some 
of the representative cases and the cour ts a t t i tude 
towards them while pronouncing their judgments 
are briefly being discussed here in order to 
highlight the gravity of the cases and the efficacy of 
judicial response. Thus responding very seriously 
against the prevailing social menace of dowry 
demands and the consequent violence resul t ing in 
the form of tor ture , humiliation and even extreme 
cases of dowry deaths and bride burnings , the 
Supreme Court has off and on advocated for 
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stringent and deterrent punishments to those who 
are involved in the commission of such heinous 
crimes. 
402 
References : 
1. 1978 2 SCR 621 
2. 1979 1 SCR 192 
3 . 1979 3 SCR 169 
4. 1992 1 SCR 225 
5. 1997; 6 SCR 24 
6. AIR 1983 SC 1902 
7. AIR 1986 SC 266 
8. AIR 1992 SC 1897 
9. AIR 1987 SC 1368 
10. 1990 3 SCJ 567 
11 . 1490 1 HCR 509 P 86 H 
12. 1991 1 SCA LE 923 
13. 1990 1 HLR 79 Bom 
14. 1986 Cri LJ 1510 Del 
15. 1989 Cri LJ 1186 
404 
16. 1988 2 SC ALE 733 
17. 1991 Cri L. J. 268 
18. AIR 1990 Sc 209 
19. AIR 1992 SC 1175 
20. AIR 1996 SC 671 
21. 1994 CR. LJ 506 
22. 1996 Cr. LJ 2670 
23. 1996 Cr. L. J. 1837 
24. 1993 SC 819 
25. AIR 1993 SC 819 
26. AIR 1999 SC 146 
27. AIR 1999 SC 2071 
28. AIR 2001 Cr. LJ 38 
29. 1990 SC 2134 
30. 1991 Cr. LJ 3135 (SC) 
31. 1990 Cr. LJI 666 (All) 
405 
32. 1993 Cr. LJ 2636 
3 3 . GJURDITTA SINGH v. S t a t e , 1992 Cr. LJ 
309 (Raj) 
34. Mohan Lai v. S ta te , 1984 1 C h a n d LR 647 
35 . Aqula Ravinder v. s ta te AIR 1991 SC 142 
36. Ashok Kumar v. Sta te AIR 1990 SC 2134 
37 . AIR 1980 SC 1271 
38 . 1995 Cr. LJ 368 Del 
39 . AIR 1998 Sc. 958 . 
40 . 1997 Cr. LJ 1737 
4 1 . 2001 Cr. LJ C156 (Raj) 
42 . 2001 Cr. LJ 4625 (SC) 
4 3 . 2 0 0 3 Cr. LJ 900(SC) 
44 . 2003 Cr. LJ 3711 (SC) 
4 5 . 2004 Cr. LJ 1791 (SC) 
46 . 2004 Cr. LJ 892 (SC) 
406 
1 
CHAPTER - 6 
Comparative study 
between USA and 
India 
m 
Comparative Study between American and Indian 
Domestic Violence Act 
American Position: Definition of Domestic 
Violence 
There are four types of abuse typically 
associated with these definitions, physical, 
emotional, economic, and sexual abuse. 
1. Physical abuse is the type with which most 
people are familiar and which the law can 
address most easily. Physical abuse 
includes kicking, pinching, punching, 
slapping biting and other behaviors by the 
perpetrator designed to cause the victim 
physical pain or discomfort. 
2. Emotional abuse includes insult ing, 
nagging, humiliating the victim to front of 
others, and isolation of the victim. Isolation 
refers to the systematic separation of the 
victim from friends, family and society. This 
type of abuse is common and in some cases 
can be quite extreme. The law is less adopt 
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at addressing this type of abuse, because it 
is more difficult to define although vigorous 
prosecution could yield convictions for 
assault , false imprisonment and stalking. 
3. Sexual assaul t includes rape, sodomy and 
object penetration. The law has great 
difficulty in addressing these issues 
because of problems with evidentiary proof. 
The American Criminal Just ice System has 
additional difficulty in addressing forced 
sexual behaviors between married or 
cohabiting individuals, particularly in those 
s tates in which marital rape and marital 
sexual assaul t are not considered criminal. 
4. Economic abuse is manifested complete 
control of the family finances by the abuser . 
The victim may be given an allowance, but 
h e / s h e is typically not permitted to keep 
h i s / he r own paycheck (when permitted to 
work at all), and in some cases, may not be 
given enough money to survive. There is 
little, if anything, that the current laws can 
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do to protect against this type of abuse, 
unless theft or conversion can adequately 
be proven. 
Studies and lengthy observations of victims and 
abuser 's have revealed a pattern which domestic 
abuse typically follows, commonly referred to as the 
cycle of violence. The cycle begins with the 
honeymoon phase . In the first cycle, this phase is 
the courtship. The abuser brings the victim gifts. 
Treats the victim with affection and makes 
promises to the victim about their future. This 
phase is followed by the "tension building" phase 
during which the abuser will insult the victim, will 
make accusat ions about the victim's fidelity and 
will begin to systematically erode the victim's sense 
of self respect and self worth. Isolation, economic 
abuse, and torturing of children and pets may 
occur during this phase. This phase culminates in 
the "explosion". During the explosion phase , the 
batterer will engage in verbal, physical a n d / o r 
sexual abuse of the victim. 
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Once the explosion phase is completed, the 
relationship will return to the honeymoon phase . 
This phase will now be marked by the apology, tear, 
gifts and promises that the batterer will change 
and that h e / s h e will never again use the victim. In 
most relationships, it will happen again. Over time, 
the cycle becomes more violent, the honeymoon 
phase becomes shorter and eventually nonexistent: 
the tension phase becomes shorter and more 
intense; and the explosions become longer and 
more violent. Visually, the cycle may be more 
accurately described as a downward spiral^. 
Definition of Domestic Violence (Act 2005) 
Sec. 3: For the purpose of this Act may act 
omission or commission or conduct of the 
respondent shall constitute domestic violence in 
case it-
(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, 
safety, life, limb or well-being, whether 
mental or physical, of the aggrieved person 
or tends to do so and includes causing 
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phys ica l a b u s e , sexual a b u s e , verbal and 
emot ional a b u s e and economic a b u s e ; or 
(b) h a r a s s e s , h a r m s , in jures or e n d a n g e r s the 
aggrieved person with a view to coerce he r 
or any o ther person re la ted to he r to meet 
any unlawful demand for any dowry or o ther 
p roper ty or valuable secur i ty ; or 
(c) h a s the effect of t h r e a t e n i n g the aggrieved 
pe r son or any person re la ted to he r by any 
c o n d u c t ment ioned in c l ause (a) or c l ause 
(b);or 
(d) o therwise in jures or c a u s e s h a r m , w h e t h e r 
phys ica l or men ta l to the aggrieved pe r son . 
CASE LAW: Case at Work place 
To da t e , plaintiffs seeking to ob ta in d a m a g e s 
from employers for domest ic violence re la ted 
in jur ies s u s t a i n e d in the workplace have sough t to 
do so pr imar i ly t h rough s t a t e worker ' s 
c o m p e n s a t i o n laws. General ly, t h e s e s t a t u t e s hold 
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employers liable for those accidents, which occur. 
"In the course of the victim's employment" and 
"arise out of the victim's employment". 
The requirement that the accident occur in the 
"course of employment is met easily whenever the 
victim is at work or engaged in activities for the 
employer's benefit. The "arising out of employment" 
requirement typically requires there is a casual 
connection between the victim's employment and 
the accident. Domestic violence related injuries 
tend to occur, therefore, in the course of 
employment while the victim is working bu t do not 
typically arise out of the employment (the injury is 
not casually related to employment. Thus these 
injuries are typically not compensable. 
Some jurisdict ions have carved out an 
excepting to this rule for those cases in which the 
victims employment facilitated or exacerbated the 
incident. The cases that follow represent a 
chronological sample of the cases decided to date . 
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California Compensation and Fire v. 
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board^ was a 
1968 case before the Supreme Court of California 
one of the earliest cases of this type. The victim 
Lillian Schick was employed by a table pad 
company to go to customer's home and measure 
tables to be fitted for pads. Upon learning that she 
was planning to remarry, her ex-husband rented an 
apartment using an alias called a department store 
to order a table paid and requested that someone 
be sent to measure the table. When Mrs. Schick 
arrived at the apartment, Mr. Schick short her and 
then himself. 
The Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board 
awarded compensation to Mrs. Schick's daughter . 
The employer's insurance company appealed. The 
California Supreme Court affirmed the board's 
decision. 
The insurance company argued that because 
of the reasons for the assault were purely personal 
to Mrs. Schick and not related to her employment 
her death was not compensable (it did not arise out 
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of her employment). The court rejected this 
argument, finding that Mrs. Schick's death was 
facilitated by her employment. Her employment 
required that she go to an isolated apar tment 
alone, allowing Mr. Schick the opportunity to kill 
her without interference. 
In Epperson v. Industrial Commission^, the 
victim, Mrs. Emperson stayed in a hotel one night 
to avoid her abusive husband. 
Upon reporting to work the following morning, 
she informed the security guard that she did not 
want to see Mr. Empperson if he came to the 
building. Mr. Epperson arrived at the building as 
Mrs. Epperson was passing through the lobby. They 
spoke quietly for several minutes. When she 
insisted that she must return to work. Mr. 
Epperson disarmed the guard and shot her with a 
gun he had been hiding under his shirt . 
In Raybol v, Louisiana State University^ was a 
1988 Louisiana Supreme Court case, Ms. Raybol 
the defendant 's motion. The appellate court 
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affirmed and the Supreme Court reversed. The 
Supreme Court essentially collapsed the distinction 
between the arising out of and the course of 
employment requirements and field that because 
Raybol was working at the time of the assaul t , she 
qualified for worker's compensation benefits. They 
reversed the finding of summary judgment for the 
defendant, but did not grant the plaintiff's motion, 
and remanded the case to the trial court. 
Two just ices dissented from the majority 
opinion. The dissenting opinion clarified the 
distinction between the "course of" and "arising out 
of "employment requirements and suggested that 
the impetus of the attack on Ms. Raybol was purely 
personal and thus not compensable. 
In Monahan v. United States Check Book was 
a 1995 case of first impression in Nebraska. Mr. 
Robertson and Ms. Radtke both worked at the 
United States Check Book Company. She worked 
during the day and he was the night maintenance 
man. Robertson abused Radtke throughout their 
marriage. 
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After being hospital Luized on one occasion, 
Radtke left Robertson. He threatened to kill her if 
she did not move back in with him and even 
arranged for a truck to move her things without her 
consent. She did not want to move back and 
indicated to a third party that she was afraid of 
Robertson. The night before she was scheduled to 
return to Robertson's home, she went to the United 
States Check Book Company and shot Mr. 
Robertson. 
The Court of Appeals held that "the general 
rule is that where an assault is committed by a 
person intending to injure the employee because of 
reasons personal to him, and not for reasons 
directed against him as an employee or because of 
his employment, the injury does not arise out of 
the employment". The court made reference to the 
exception for assaul t s exacerbated or facilitated by 
the victim's employment, but rejected Monahan's 
argument that Robertson's position as the only 
night employee facilitated the attack. Roberison's 
estate was denied benefit. 
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In Ross V. Mark's^ was a 1995 case decided by 
a North Carolina Court of Appeals. Ms. Brock and 
Mr. Godwin had been divorced for several years 
when they resumed their relationship in 1990. 
Brock, an ass is tant manager at a local Hardee's 
continued to date other men until Godwin asked 
her to move out of their home. 
Encouraged by a room-mate, Godwin 
developed a plan to "embarrass" Brock. Godwin and 
the roommate waited for Brock to leave the store 
with the night deposit. He convinced her to let him 
into her car. The two began to fight and Godwin 
shot her twice. The roommate, who was following in 
another car, shot her one more time and left her 
body in a secluded area. 
Weiss V. Milwaukee^ was decided in March 
1996. It is the most recent in this line of cases . The 
facts present an archetypal case of the effects of 
domestic violence on the victim's work 
environment. After leaving her abusive husband 
(Mr. Abuhanim) and filing a res t ra ining order 
against him. Ms. Weiss received so many 
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threatening phone calls from him that she was fired 
from her job. 
Two months later, she obtained a position with 
the City of Milwaukee, where she worked as an 
engineering technician. As a city employee, she was 
required to live in Milwaukee and t hus found an 
apar tment within the city limits. She informed the 
payroll office of her ex-husband's behavior and 
requested that her new address remain 
confidential. They assured her that it would be 
indicating that the City had a policy prohibiting the 
disclosure of such employee information to private 
individuals. Abughanim later called the City and 
claiming to be a bank officer confirming Weiss 
address for credit purposes requested her address . 
They gave it to him and he resumed his campaign 
of calling Weiss to threaten her life and the lives of 
their two children. 
Weiss inst i tuted an action against the City for 
negligent infliction of emotional dis t ress . The City 
moved for summary judgment claiming (1) that 
Weiss claim was barred by the exclusive remedy 
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provision of the state's worker's compensation 
clause and (2) that they were permitted to disclose 
the information under Wisconsin's open records 
law. 
The trial court found for the City, accepting 
the open records argument and further finding tha t 
damages were too difficult to determine. The 
appellate court affirmed, finding tha t Weiss did 
have an action against the City, but that it was 
barred by the worker's compensation exclusive 
remedy provision. The Supreme Court agreed, 
finding that Weiss injuries were facilitated by her 
employment and thus adequately addressed by 
worker's compensation. 
American Indian and Alaska Native women are 
battered, raped and stalked at far greater ra tes 
than any other group of women in the United 
States. The U.S. Department of Jus t ice est imates 
that 1 of 3 Native women will be raped; that 6 of 10 
will be physically assaulted; that approximately 9 
in 10 rapes or assaul ts against American Indians 
are committed by non-Indian assa i lants and that 
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Native women are stalked at a rate at least twice 
that of any other population. 
While many issues need to be addressed to 
confront this crisis, it is clear the jurisdict ional 
limitations placed on Indian nations are key factors 
in creating this disproportionate violence. The U.S. 
Department of Just ice has general jurisdict ion over 
felony crimes by or against Indians, including 
homicide, rape and aggravated assaul t , but 
perpetrators of such crimes against Indian women 
are rarely, if at all, prosecuted given the broad 
caseload faced by U.S. Attorneys. 
If the Federal government declines to 
prosecute, non-Indian rapists , ba t terers and 
stalkers walk free knowing that they can re turn to 
commit future crimes in the same or different 
Indian nation. Indian nations also face the obstacle 
that Congress has limited the sentencing authori ty 
of tribal courts to "in no event impose for 
conviction of any offense any penalty or 
punishment greater than imprisonment for one 
year". As a result , Indian perpetrators not 
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prosecuted by the federal government may not 
receive a sentence appropriate to the crimes of rape 
and battery under current law. 
In 1994, recognizing the importance of 
addressing the safety of women in this country, the 
United States passed into law the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA). The legislation contained 
specific sections referencing Indian tribes that , 
while important, did not adequately address the 
complicated issues surrounding any strategic 
resolution of the endemic violence Indian women 
endure on a daily basis . 
The purposes of the Tribal Title are to: 
• Decrease the incidents of violent crimes 
against Indian women. 
• Strengthen the capacity of Indian nat ions to 
exercise their sovereign authority to respond 
to violent crimes committed against Indian 
women. 
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• Ensure that perpetrators of violent crimes 
committed against Indian women are held 
accountable for their criminal behavior. 
Provisions in the reauthorization of VAWA would. 
• Restore the authority of Indian tr ibes to 
appropriately respond to domestic violence 
and rape by sentencing perpetra tors of such 
crimes beyond one year and $5,000 fine. 
• Increase the analysis and research on violence 
against Indian women. 
• Permit Indian law enforcement agencies to 
enter and obtain criminal information from 
Federal criminal information da tabases . 
• Establish a national tribal sex offender and 
tribal protection order registry. 
• Increase support for essential tr ibal services 
for Indian women. 
• Ensure the proper government-to-government 
relationship between Indian na t ions and the 
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Department of Just ice by requiring an annual 
consultation with Indian nations and creating 
a Tribal Division within the Office on Violence 
Against Women. 
The Violence against Women Act, 2005 
The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) 
expires in 2005 and the remarkable gains have 
made in ending domestic violence, sexual assaul t , 
dating violence and stalking could come to a halt if 
Congress does not act now. As we look to the 
reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, 
Congress has a unique opportunity not only to 
continue successful and vital programs, but also to 
expand on 10 years of progress to further the safety 
and stability of the lives of survivors of dom.estic 
violence, dating violence, sexual assaul t and 
stalking. 
• A broad group of law enforcement, victim 
service providers, community leaders, and 
survivors of domestic and sexual violence and 
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stalking have evaluated VAWA and 
recommended the changes necessary for VAWA 
2005 tha t would effectively and thoroughly 
respond to the epidemic of violence against 
women in our nation. 
• VAWA 2005 enhances core programs and 
policies in the criminal just ice and legal 
systems and reaffirms the commitment to 
reform systems that affect adult and youth 
victims of domestic violence, dating violence, 
sexual assaul t , and stalking. 
• VAWA 2005 also makes bold new strides in 
ending domestic and sexual violence and 
stalking by addressing currently unmet needs. 
• VAWA 2005 provides practical solutions to 
improving the response of the criminal just ice 
and legal systems by expanding funding for 
local groups working with underserved 
communities, strengthening the criminal 
just ice response to sexual assaul t , developing 
s tandards for protecting the confidentiality of 
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victims served by VAWA programs, enhancing 
collaboration between victim service 
organizations and civil legal assis tance 
providers, and enhancing provisions to fully 
enforce protective orders across state lines. 
VAWA 2005 includes the reauthorization of 
critical programs and the development of new 
services that respond to evolving community 
needs. Solution-based remedies address the 
concerns of victims generally, as well as the 
unique needs of disabled, elderly, Native, legal 
immigrant, and ethnic minority victims, and 
victims living in rural communities. 
Domestic violence is one of the primary causes 
of homelessness. Survivors and advocates 
consistently rate housing as a top priority, 
and 92% of homeless women have been 
physically or sexually assaulted. In order to 
address the housing problem, VAWA 2005 
provides a comprehensive yet pragmatic 
approach that includes expanding transit ional 
housing options, protecting the safety and 
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confidentiality of homeless victims receiving 
services, ensuring that victims can access the 
criminal justice system without jeopardizing 
their current or future housing, and creating 
permanent housing solutions that help develop 
communities and build collaborations between 
service providers, government agencies and 
housing developers. 
• While it is imperative to continue VAWA's 
focus on responding to the violence, 
reauthorization should also address 
prevention. By intervening early with children 
who have witnessed domestic violence, 
supporting young families at risk for violence, 
and changing social norms through targeted 
interventions with children and teens, VAWA 
2005 takes the next step toward truly ending 
the violence. 
• Domest ic violence, da t ing violence, sexua l 
a s s a u l t , and s ta lk ing adversely affect our 
n a t i o n ' s you t h and p e r p e t u a t e a society of 
violence. VAWA 2005 provides a 
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comprehensive approaches for assisting 
children, teens and young adults who have 
violence in their lives. VAWA 2005 includes 
initiatives such as bringing communities 
together and providing cross training and 
collaboration to address the co-occurrence of 
domestic violence and child abuse, assist ing 
colleges and universities with creating services 
and policies to address violence on campus, 
providing teens and young adults with 
appropriate services, ensuring access to court 
systems, and preventing abuse during child 
visitation. 
VAWA dramatically improves the response to 
violence against American Indian and Alaska 
Native women at all levels. It is estimated that 
1 in 3 Native women will be raped and that 6 
in 10 will be physically assaulted during their 
lifetimes. VAWA 2005 seriously addresses 
violence against Native women by 
strengthening the capacity of Indian nat ions to 
provide tribal-based services to women: 
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providing solutions to current gaps in their 
ability to track perpetrators of violence against 
Indian women, and creating an administrative 
vehicle for addressing barriers preventing 
Indian nations from accessing life-saving 
funds. 
Domestic violence, sexual assault , dating 
violence and stalking are health care problems 
of epidemic proportions. Domestic violence, 
sexual assaul t and stalking contribute to a 
host of chronic health problems, even after 
immediate signs of t rauma have healed. A 
critical gap remains in the delivery of health 
care to domestic violence and sexual assaul t 
survivors. In order to improve the health care 
system's response to violence against women 
and thus ensure proper treatment and help, 
VAWA 2005 provides for the training and 
education of health care providers and funds 
federal health programs to improve their 
services to victims. 
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• Survivors identify economic independence as 
one of the most important factors in 
determining whether they will be able to 
escape a violent relationship or address the 
aftermath of a sexual assaul t . But all too 
often, victims risk losing their jobs when they 
take needed time off from work to go to court, 
heal from injuries, or take other steps to 
increase their safety. Provisions in VAWA 2005 
give victims reasonable unpaid leave from 
work to take steps to address the violence. 
• VAWA 1994 and 2000 recognized the special 
circumstances that can apply to non-citizen 
survivors of domestic violence and provided 
avenues for battered spouses and children to 
leave their abusive families without 
jeopardizing their immigration s t a tus . VAWA 
2005 makes technical corrections to existing 
immigration law, resolving inconsistencies in 
the eligibility for immigrant victims. 
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Violence Against Women Act 2005 
The Violence Against Women Act of 2005 was 
signed into law in January 2006. The bill 
authorizes $3.9 billion to support the program, 
including major enhancements, for the next five 
years. However, this bill does not actually provide 
the funding it is jus t the first step, setting an 
upper spending limit. For each of the 5 years of the 
bill. Congress will need to pass legislation 
appropriating the specific amount of funds that the 
government will provide for each of the VAWA 
programs. There is no guarantee that Congress will 
appropriate the $3.9 billion that was authorized, or 
even the minimum amount that is needed. 
The war in Iraq, budget cuts and other major 
expenses have resulted in less money for human 
services programs such as VAWA. President Bush 's 
2007 budget for VAWA does not include enough 
money for many of the previously established VAWA 
programs and services, so that it is unlikely that 
Congress will include adequate funding for the new 
programs that VAWA 2005 intended for 2006-2010. 
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Despite the overwhelming Congressional votes for 
VAWA, that does not mean that the same Congress 
will vote for adequate funding to support the 
programs. Very strong public support of VAWA will 
be necessary to convince Congress to provide 
adequate funding through the appropriations bill 
for the financial year 2007 (which s tar ts on October 
1, 2006). 
Now is a key time in the appropriations 
process. If you support programs to help victims of 
violence and to prevent violence, it is important to 
email your U.S. Senators and member of Congress 
asking for full funding of VAWA and protection of 
the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA). 
Created in 1984, VOCA protects the rights of 
violent crimes victims and provides financial 
compensation, assistance, and services to those 
victims as well. VOCA covers victims of violent 
crimes such as sexual assault , rape, abuse , dating 
violence, and terrorism. Through the Office for 
Victims of Crime (OVC) and the Crime Victims 
Fund, both established by VOCA, federal funding is 
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allotted to national, state, and local organizations 
to directly aid violent crimes victims. The Crime 
Victims Fund collects fines, penalties, bond money, 
and funds from crime offenders to support these 
grants, so no taxpayer money is used. However, 
each year Congress puts a "cap" on the Crime 
Victims Fund, which means they limit how much of 
the collected fines and other money will be given to 
the victims. Congress decides on the amount 
during the appropriate process, so it is important 
that you let your representatives know tha t VOCA 
needs full funding. 
Legislative Background 
In J u n e 2005, Congress introduced the 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 2005, 
bipart isan legislation to reauthorize the VAWA 
legislation originally passed in 1994. Since VAWA 
first became law in 1994, more than 660 s ta te laws 
protecting victims of domestic violence and sexual 
assaul t have been passed, and VAWA 2005 has an 
even more comprehensive approach to the problem 
of violence. The legislation is called a re-
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authorization because it provides new authority for 
an existing law. The House passed VAWA with an 
overwhelming vote for approval on September 8, 
followed by unanimous Senate approval on October 
4. President Bush signed the bill into law on 
January 5, 2006, continuing it for five more years . 
VAWA could provide nearly $3.9 billion dollars of 
funding over the next five years to combat and 
prevent violence against women. However, it is up 
to the Congress to pass the needed funding every 
year^. 
Rather than keep the law exactly as it had 
been. Congress expanded the scope of the bill in 
several ways. Specifically, VAWA now helps protect 
child victims of violence, immigrant and minority 
populations, and men and boys. The law focuses on 
education and prevention, creating training 
programs for law enforcement officials, heal th care 
providers, housing providers, and men and boys to 
help stop the generational cycle of abuse and 
sexual assaul t . Further, VAWA extends services 
and legal protection for women in housing and 
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employment, and revamps the legal system to make 
if more accessible and beneficial for the victims. 
Additionally, the law establishes crisis services for 
victims of rape and sexual assault . 
The new law focuses on four areas of crime, 
domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assaul t , 
and stalking. However, these programs will only be 
reality if Congress provides adequate funding every 
year. 
Highlights of the recently approved VAWA: 
• Creating four new programs directed 
specifically at youth and child victims of violence. 
It also funds grants to combat violent crime on 
college campuses , and has juvenile justice 
provisions to better help the many girls in jail who 
have been victims of domestic violence and sexual 
abuse. 
• Introducing the National Resource Center on 
Workplace Responses to assist employers and labor 
organizations in developing and utilizing workplace 
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responses for victims of domestic violence, sexual 
assault , and stalking, and dating violence. 
• Focusing legal and financial aid on housing 
issues for victims of violence. This title mandates 
long term housing grants for victims at risk of 
homelessness, programs to help victims keep their 
housing and funds to educate and train public 
housing providers in the areas of domestic violence 
and sexual assaul t . Additionally, the law expands 
grants for transitional, housing, and protects 
victims from being unfairly evicted or denied 
housing because they were or are victims of 
domestic violence or sexual assault . 
• Providing grants to help encourage state and 
local cooperation of advocates, public health 
departments , and health care providers to create a 
more efficient healthcare response to domestic 
violence and sexual assault . Also, the law forms 
programs teaching medical and health profession 
s tudents about identifying and treating victims of 
violence and allocate funds for a study on effective 
interventions in healthcare settings. 
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• Developing prevention programs aimed at 
children exposed to violence, families at risk of 
violence and men and boys, to stop the 
perpetuation of violence against women VAWA calls 
for a public awareness campaign to educate the 
American population about the problems with 
domestic violence, sexual assault , staking, and 
dating violence in the United States. 
• Increasing protection of immigrant victims of 
domestic violence, sexual assault and trafficking. 
The bill allows immigrant victims to file a petition 
through VAWA, extends access to work 
authorization and the legal system, helps extend or 
change the type of visas an immigrant is granted, 
and makes receiving permanent residency easier. 
VAWA also improves legal right of child and young 
adult immigrant victims^. 
• Directing funds toward Indian tribal 
governments to prevent violence against women in 
this group, educate the leaders and population and 
increase the resources available to Indian victims 
of domestic violence, sexual assault , stalking, and 
436 
dating violence. Additionally, the law calls for 
research on violence against Indian women, and the 
establishment of a Deputy Director for Tribal 
Affairs. 
• Dramatically increasing funding for the STOP 
training program to promote collaboration of law 
enforcement and legal officials to better serve 
victims. Examples include victim access to trained 
legal and advocacy personnel, court training and 
education programs, double penalties for repeat 
violence or abuse offenders, and prosecution 
counselors to help guide the victim through the 
legal process. The law protects confidentiality of 
victims, and creates public awareness campaigns 
for underserved and minority communities. 
• Finally, developing the Sexual Assault Services 
Program (SASP) to fund direct services for sexual 
assaul t victims and broadening the rural program 
to include sexual assault , child sexual assaul t , and 
stalking. VAWA also expands eligibility to rural 
communities who do not receive funding because 
they are in an urban state. Additionally, there are 
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provisions for services and programs for elder and 
disabled women who are victims of domestic 
violence and sexual assault , and for upgrading the 
capabilities of the National Domestic Violence 
Hotline. 
ACTS 
U.S. Supreme Court Hears Cases with 
Important Ramifications for vict ims of 
Domestic Violence 
Recently on March 20, 2006, the U.S. Supreme 
Court heard oral arguments of two cases involving 
victims of domestic violence the outcomes of which 
will significantly impact the prosecution of 
domestic violence and sexual assault perpetrators . 
In Washington v. Davis^, a woman called 911 
and hung up before speaking to anyone. When the 
911 operator called her back, the woman said that 
someone was jumping on her and stated that 
Adrian Davis was attacking her. She also stated 
that he had beaten her with his fists and that he 
had left. At trial, the victim did not testify as the 
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prosecution was unable to locate her, and the court 
permitted the admission of the 911 call over 
objections from Davis. The jury found Davis guilty 
of a felony violation of the victim's protective order 
against him. Davis appealed the trial court decision 
and the Court of Appeals upheld the conviction 
rejecting his argument that the 911 call should not 
have been admitted. State v, Davis^, Davis appealed 
this decision to the Washington State Supreme 
Court which affirmed the lower courts ' decisions 
that the admission of a 911 call did not violate the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation 
under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 
Crawford v. Washington^o 
In Hammon v. Indiana, two police officers 
arrived at the Hammons home in response to a 
report of a domestic disturbance. When they 
arrived, they found Mrs. Hammon on the front 
porch and reported that she looked "somewhat 
frightened^i." After surveying the scene, one of the 
officers went back outside to the porch and asked 
Mrs. Hammon for the second time what had 
H j y 
happened. In court, this officer testified that Mrs. 
Hammon told him that she and her husband had 
been in a physical fight in which he threw her 
down, pushed her onto the ground and had 
punched her in the chest^s. The State charged and 
convicted Mr. Hammon of domestic battery. 
Although she was subpoenaed, Mrs. Hammon was 
not present at trial to testify, and the court agreed 
to admit the officer's testimony over Mr. Hammon's 
objection. Id. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial 
court 's admissions of Mrs. Hammon's s ta tements to 
the officer under the hearsay exception for excited 
ut terances . Hammon v. Slate'^^,. Upon petition to 
transfer, the Supreme Court of Indiana upheld the 
lower courts^ decision regarding admission of Mrs. 
Hammon's s ta tements to the police officer, holding 
that her s tatement was not testimonial and was 
admissible under the Confrontation Clause even 
without an opportunity to cross examine her. 
On October 31 , 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court 
agreed to hear both Hammon and Davis in tandem 
to clarify the appropriate application of its previous 
decision in Crawford v. Washington^''. In Crawford, 
the Court ruled that a crime witness "sworn 
statement at a police station could not be admitted 
against the defendant when the witness was not 
present in court and was not cross-examined. The 
Crawford Court interpreted the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution to require that testimonial s ta tements 
may only be admitted against defendants if the 
declarant is available in court for cross-
examination. 
During oral arguments in Davis and Hammon 
the Jus t ices questioned counsel regarding how far 
the Crawford rule should be extended. While most 
of the Jus t ices seemed skeptical about using 
victims un-sworn statements against defendants. 
Just ice Ruth Bader Ginsburg showed part icular 
concern for domestic violence victims who told the 
police about the abuse but they were reluctant to 
appear in court. "The practical reality" is that 
many women in these si tuations are "scared to 
death" to testify against the person who abused 
441 
them. Jus t ice Ginsburg said. She suggested that 
s tatements made to authorit ies during 
"emergencies" should be admissible as an exception 
to otherwise inadmissible testimonial s ta tements 
made by witnesses who were not present in court. 
Monteroso v, Moran Case 
Holding: Upon Ms. Monterroso's appeal, the 
California Court of Appeal reversed the mutual 
restraining order that the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County entered against Ms. Monterroso and 
her husband Mr. Moran, ruling tha t to enter a 
mutual restraining order under Family Code section 
6305 a trial court must make detailed factual 
findings that both parties acted primarily as 
aggressors and neither party acted primarily in 
self-defense. The case was remanded to rule upon 
the merits of the restraining order application 
against Mr. Moran. 
The basic facts of the case where Ms. 
Monterroso and Mr. Moran were married formerly 
lived together and have minor children together. 
442 
They separated in August 2004. At the trial court 
proceeding, Ms. Monterroso had sought a temporary 
restraining order against her husband. On her 
apphcation, she detailed three separate incidents of 
severe domestic violence which included verbal 
death threats and emotional/verbal abuse, 
at tempts to choke and smother Ms. Monterroso, 
hits, slaps, scratches to Ms. Monterroso's body and 
face, and threats of self-mutilation by Mr. Moran. 
At the third incident on January 1, 2005, Ms. 
Monterroso was able to call the police and Mr. 
Moran was arrested. Ms. Monterroso obtained an 
emergency protective order that day. 
The Court decided that the principles of 
estoppel did not bar a direct appeal in this case 
because it found that Ms, Monterroso did not 
consent to the mutual order. In its reasoning, the 
Court stated that because Ms. Monterroso was not 
represented, did not display any legal 
sophistication, needed an interpreter and was not 
told about the requirements or ramifications of a 
mutual restraining order by the lower court, she 
443 
could not have consented. Therefore, since she did 
not agree to the mutual restraining order, the Court 
stated that she was not stopped from seeking 
redress on appeal. 
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punishment of guilty to a great extent and create 
terror in minds which are criminally inclined. Yet 
they can not be called as foolproof. The law may be 
adequate but its enforcement is below expectations 
with a marginal impact in society. A custom 
consistently followed and increasingly glamourised 
cannot be whisked away by criminal sanct ions and 
legislative contrivances. Law can be ahead of public 
opinion but, if the gulf is too wide, there is 
likelihood of its non-observance and violation. 
As rightly pointed by the Supreme Court. 
"Young women of education, intelligence and 
character do not set fire to themselves to welcome 
the embrace of death unless provoked and 
compelled to that desperate step by the intolerance 
of their misery". 
In 1961 Dowry Prohibition Act was passed. 
Despite the Act and its subsequent amendments in 
1983 and 1986 brides are still harassed , tortured 
and even burned to extract more dowry. According 
to the records of Crimes (Women) Cell, from 1983 to 
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Our submission is that though the Domestic 
Act 2005 made lots of provisions to define and 
execute the law for the protection against domestic 
violence but VAWA 2005 have certain provisions, 
which help remains women to fight against 
Domestic Violence, hey are: 
Firstly, VAWA could provide nearly $3.9 billion 
dollars of funding over the next five years to combat 
and prevent violence against women. 
Secondly, focusing legal and financial aid on 
housing issues for victims of violence. Additionally, 
the law expands grants for transitional, housing, 
and protects victims from being unfairly evicted or 
denied housing because they were / are victims of 
domestic violence or sexual assault . 
Thirdly, providing grants to help encourage 
state and local cooperation of advocates, public 
health departments and health care providers to 
create a more efficient healthcare response to 
domestic violence and sexual assault . 
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So we should make such provisions in future 
and that is possible only by creating legal 
awareness and cooperation among the three organs 
of the s tate . NGO's should also come forward to 
help women who are victims and are not aware of 
provisions of the act. It is submitted that the 
Government should provide financial aid for the 
rehabilitation of the victims because of the aim of 
the act is to provide assistance to those women who 
are victims and are not financially capable to fight 
for their r ights. 
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CONCLUSION: 
After reviewing the material it can be 
concluded that s ta tus of woman had gone through 
ups and down in the Indian history. At some time 
in Vedic and Post-Vedic period, woman enjoyed 
almost equalities with the man in all sphere of life 
like social, political, and economic cul tural and 
even religious. During Medieval period and Islamic 
period shows that a deterioration in the position of 
woman and the time when British came to India, 
many barbaric practices developed and woman were 
confined to subordinate s ta tus . Woman known as 
abla, a weak, helpless person. A wife was treated as 
a property of her husband. Thus, gradually the 
women were pushed to the subordinate position. 
The 19th and 20th century shows efforts and 
at tempts of the social reformers for the bet terment 
of woman. In this present social system woman are 
facing various miseries, exploitation and 
oppression. Women are exploited in their family and 
in married life by their husbands and relatives. 
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The existence of this social malaise has been 
acknowledged in the Vienna Accord of 1994 and the 
Beijing Platform, 1995. The intervention of the 
state to protect women against violence of any kind, 
especially tha t which occurs within the family, has 
been strongly recommended by the UN Committee 
on Convention on Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)." In the 
word of Jus t ice Anand "We are still unable to boast 
of a society where there is total gender equality or 
gender equity". Movement from the First U.N. World 
Conference on Women held in Mexico in 1975 to the 
Fourth World conference on Women held at Beijing 
in 1985, has been a journey in search of equality, 
development and grant so encouraging but the tide 
must continue. 
In our country, the Constitution makers , while 
drafting the Constitution, were sensitive to the 
problems fated by women and made specific 
provisions relating to them. The suprema lex, in its 
various articles, not only mandates equality of the 
sexes but also authorises benign discrimination in 
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favour of women and chi ldren to m a k e up for the 
b a c k w a r d n e s s , which h a s been the i r age-old 
des t iny . 
In t u n e with var ious provis ion of the 
Cons t i tu t ion , the Sta te h a s enac ted many women 
specific leg is la t ions to pro tec t women social evils 
like chi ld m a r r i a g e s , dowry, r ape , p rac t i ce of Sa t i , 
e tc . the prob lem, however, is not only t he non-
imp lemen ta t i on of such laws b u t a lso m a k i n g 
women folk, pa r t i cu la r ly the i l l i tera te ones aware of 
the ex is tence of s u c h legislat ion a n d r i gh t s t h a t 
flow from s u c h legis la t ions . 
Apar t from the a m e n d m e n t s , the NCW h a s 
p roposed the in i t ia t ion of new b i l l s / l a w s for t he 
be t te r p ro tec t ion of the r ights of women. In the field 
of c r imina l law, a new Bill, the Cr imina l Laws 
(Amendment) Bill, h a s been r e c o m m e n d e d , s eek ing 
s ignif icant s t r e n g t h e n i n g for pena l t i e s u n d e r t he 
Ind ian Pena l Code in cases of ou t r ag ing modes ty of 
minor s a n d in cases of child r a p e and inces t 
p rovis ions of s a fegua rds to be bui l t into t he Cr PC 
a n d the Ind ian Evidence Act in the con tex t of r a p e 
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cases was also proposed. It also recommended 
provisions for examination of rape victims by 
women officers, investigation by women police 
officers, trials by women magistrates, provisions for 
presumptions regarding the commission of the final 
sexual act." 
For prevention of barbarous and beastly 
cruelty, NCW proposed a Bill to provide for death 
penalty in cases of commission of barbarous and 
beastly acts . Trial of such case was proposed to be 
by special Courts to be set up in consultation with 
the Chief Jus t ice of India or Chief Jus t ices of High 
Courts. 
A large chunk of crimes against women like 
wife beating, cruelty by husbands or the in laws 
adultery, bigamy, etc. are committed due to 
adjustment problem between the husband and the 
wife. These problems should be sorted out in the 
initial s tages. 
Although, the laws, both substant ive and 
procedural, appears great or facilitates the 
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1991, 43 cases of bride burning, inst i tuted by the 
Cell, were tried by the courts; there were jus t 3 
convictions, rest of the cases ended up in acquit tals 
in the Sessions Court itself. 
No doubt India has women-specified 
legislations both constitutional and legal. 
Particularly section 304B and 498B of IPC, and 
provisions of Cr. P.C. and Indian Evidence Act 
along with Articles 14, 21 and 39 (a) to protect the 
women from different violence. The Domestic 
Violence Act of 2005 specifically its Preamble s ta tes 
that this Act, is to provide for more effective 
protection of the rights of women guaranteed under 
the Constitution of India, who are victims of 
violence of any kind occurring within the family. 
The Act seeks to address emergency s i tuat ions 
and stop violence. It is designed to help the woman 
during the most intense phase of abuse . It will not 
only provide a support mechanism but will also be 
a tool for women to negotiate for their r ights from a 
position of equality. 
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On the objectives of the legislation, Human 
Resource Development Minister Murli Manohar 
Joshi said that . 
"Domestic violence is undoubtedly a human 
rights issue and serious deterrent to development. 
The phenomenon is widely prevalent but has 
remained largely invisible in public domain. While 
cruel behavior against a woman by her husband or 
his relatives is recognized as an offence under 
Section 498-A of the India Penal Code, 1860, the 
civil laws does not address this phenomenon in its 
entirely. 
In cases of cruelty and wife beating the role of 
the police is very crucial but there is a complete 
lack of interest in the police force to follow up these 
cases seriously. Often valuable information is lost 
at the initial stages and conviction becomes very 
difficult. The beatings are in the husband ' s house 
and mostly occur in the night. It is very difficult for 
the wife to report the matter immediately. Unless 
there are sensitive and specially trained officials to 
deal with the investigation, it will be impossible to 
465 
prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt as is 
necessary in criminal jur isprudence. Very often 
writ petit ions have to be filed to direct the police to 
investigate the matter or demonstrat ions are held 
to force the police to register a case. 
Efforts should be made to decentralize just ice 
and take it to the doorsteps of the l i t igants. The 
concept of mobile courts should be reintroduced to 
achieved this aim. Mobile courts will help in getting 
just ice faster. It will also help in tackling the issue 
at the grassroot level before they become 
complicated and loaded with falsehood. 
The number of judges should be increased and 
more courts and tr ibunals should be established 
to cater for the increase in the number of cases 
that are filed every year. 
Judges should try to give pragmatic judgments 
within the framework of law. Such judicial activism 
is the essence of judicial development. Law should 
change with society. Judges can play a crucial role 
to make law pulsate with life and to respond 
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positively to the challenges of change. In 
contemporary society such activism is essential and 
indispensable. 
A suitable infrastructure has to be created to 
cope up with the increased demand of quick 
remedial action for the crimes committed on 
women. The long delays in processing cases and 
obtaining convictions have resulted in loss of faith 
in the enforcement agencies. 
The existing courts are not enough to cope up 
with the heavy backlog and the new cases that are 
being filed every day. Since the disposal rate is 
slow, cases pending are bound to multiply. There is 
an imperative requirement to increase the number 
of courts substantial ly. 
After going through the laws of US and India it 
is clear tha t the socio-economic condition in both of 
the countries are different so the violence against 
women do vary from circumstances of each 
countries. In USA laws are much more effective 
then in India. Indian women are much more 
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dependent on their husband, they are not 
financially independent. If some of them are literate 
they are not bold enough to come out of the four 
walls and fight for their rights and approach to the 
court for the protection for their right. There are 
also legal complications and they shall not get 
just ice within time and after taking legal action 
they can not lead a normal life in the society, all 
these reasons Indian women suffer violence silently 
within home, Whereas American Women are being 
financially independent have various facilities and 
they are quite aware of their rights. 
In order to deal with the problem more 
effectively the following measures are suggested: 
Suggestions: 
1. Government should provide the law 
enforcement agencies with adequate resource 
and instruction to investigate and prosecute 
domestic violence victims. 
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2. Government should provide a civil remedy for 
domestic violence survivors in the form of a 
legally enforceable protection order. 
3. There should be an establishment of special 
courts to deal cases of crime against women. 
4. There must be time limit for the disposal of 
cases against women. Protracted crim.inal 
trials are an impediment in securing jus t ice . 
5. A new evidence code put together by the 
United Nations, which says that prior sexual 
conduct of the victim shall not be admitted as 
evidence, should be strictly followed in India 
also. 
6. According to law, to give dowry as well as to 
demand dowry is an offence. So there should 
be more stringent punishment for the dowry 
givers? Such unreasonable distinction should 
be done away with. 
7. In the light of increasing menace of dowry, 
crime (women) cell should function in every 
police station and powers to give DGP (women 
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officer) to take suo motu cases for 
investigation. There is need and scope for 
active and direct involvement of women police 
in investigation specially trained to deal with 
the offence relating to the women. 
8. The police should avoid asking conciliation 
between assai lants and victims and prevent 
delay in investigations of crime dowry, death, 
rape etc. 
9. Capital punishment should be awarded to 
person committing the offence of dowry-death, 
rape; Martial rape should also be recognized. 
10. Demand of dowry should be ground for 
obtaining divorce. A person convicted of an 
offence under Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 
should face dismissal of service. To curb the 
practice of dowry deaths, there is an urgent 
need to reinforce the punitive and preventive 
measures . 
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11 . Compensa to ry board shou ld be 
e s t ab l i shed on the line sugges ted by the 
S u p r e m e Cour t for the vict ims of r ape c a s e s . 
12. Nat ional commiss ion for women be given 
more powers t h a n j u s t be a r e c o m m e n d a t o r y 
body. I ts b r a n c h e s should be e s t ab l i shed at 
every d is t r ic t so t h a t violation of h u m a n r ight 
of women can be repor ted . 
13. NGOs should be involved in all dec i s ions 
t a k e n those affecting women. 
14. As is evidence there h a s been P le thora of 
l eg i s la t ions to protec t her h u m a n r i gh t s and 
digni ty. What is needed is t h a t i n s t e a d of 
a m e n d m e n t s . The exist ing laws shou ld be 
enforced in coordina t ion with sociologist , 
p h i l o s o p h e r s , a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , j u r i s t s and 
police t h a t domest ic violence a g a i n s t women 
can be control led . 
15. Tra in ing cou r se s at all levels shou ld 
inc lude a capsu l e on i s sue re la ted to women 
e.g. the impac t of dowry, c o r r u p t i o n and 
471 
broken homes of family life, consequences of 
bigamy and adultery on martial bliss etc. The 
course should be designed to include 
significant area of relevance to women 
including legislation relating to crimes against 
women and its applications. Modern training 
methodology such as case study method, 
special audio visual effect etc. must be 
introduced. 
16. There are many cases where poor or 
helpless women are forced to stay at home 
which is responsible for atrocities on them as 
they have no other option and other places to 
go for shelter. The procedural laws are quite 
weak and obsolete and further indiscriminately 
giving anticipatory bails and adjournment of 
cases to the offenders, taking ten to fifteen 
years to decide even simple cases. So they 
need to be updated. 
17. Settlement of martial dispute by mutual 
give and take and counseling services would be 
beneficial. Once the parties take the issue to 
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the court, the att i tudes of both parties become 
hard and it is very difficult to arrive at a 
mutually accepted solution. 
18. Books dealing comprehensively with 
relevant law related to crime against women 
should be published in various regional 
languages. They should deal with the 
important laws related to women and should 
deal with important laws related to women 
should also contain the procedure to be 
followed when a particular crime is committed. 
The police stations and libraries of the courts , 
social welfare organizations and general 
interest libraries should have sufficient 
number of the copies of books containing 
protective law to spread legal literacy among 
the masses . 
19. The media should give publicity to the 
laws tha t are enacted to protect women. The 
efforts should be directed at the grass root 
level and entrusted to people who inspire 
confidence and are held in respected by the 
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people. These messengers of progress should 
have full faith in the messages that they are 
spreading. 
20. Education is necessary to eradicate this 
evil. If we wish to eradicate this evil from root 
we must teach our girl because it has been 
rightly said " If you teach a boy, you teach a 
person but if you teach a girl you will teach a 
family". 
21 . Economic dependence is quite necessary. 
It helps in two ways firstly independent girl 
can fulfill the need of family and if still 
violence occurs she can take a bold decision to 
separate herself from the atmosphere where 
atrocities have committed. 
22. Eradication of social evils like Dowry, 
child marriages should be done. In fact various 
laws had been passed on prohibition of dowry 
but still violations of these laws are 
increasing. Women have a right in succession 
law but how many women fight for their 
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property rights, she has a Stridhan (property in 
which she has an exclusive right under Hindu 
succession law) but how many women are 
aware of this right? Answer lies in the fact 
either women are not aware about this right or 
they are not bold enough to come out of home 
and fight for their rights. So mere protecting 
women through laws are not enough. What is 
necessary is to fight for the sake of her right 
provided by the international conventions, 
Constitutional law or personal laws of our 
country. She must be bold enough to reject the 
proposal who asks for dowry. But in India it is 
quite impossible, the question arises why? The 
answer lies in fact if she takes such decision it 
becomes a risk for her and nobody would like 
to marry a girl who knows law and raises voice 
against them especially in village and under 
developed areas. So what is needed is wider 
social movement where right should not be 
given on papers but in reality. 
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23. Incidence of crime against women are 
increasing but women are tolerating because 
she is not aware of her rights secondly she is 
not literate thirdly she is not bold enough to 
come out of four walls, But what to say about 
women who are aware, educated and bold to 
approach to the police station for availing the 
protection of her rights provided by various 
laws but she faces lots of obstacles like delay 
in disposal of cases, non registration of FIR 
etc. Most of the cases get acquitted because of 
lack of proper proof or other party is 
financially strong. In such circumstances what 
she will do? Society will condemn her, family 
will condemn here and from where she will 
fulfill her basic requirement of life. So 
cooperation of other agency is essential to 
curb these crimes. So the laws cannot be the 
solution of problem unless and unti l there is 
strict enforcement of law. 
24. Approach of male should be changed. 
They should treat the women as their par tner 
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friend and above all human being. I have 
interviewed several women and most of them 
are suffering because their husband are 
controlled by mother or other female member 
of the family, their mother in law harass ing 
their daughter in law jus t because she was 
harassed by her in-laws. She forgets now there 
is vast change of social values and educational 
values husband usually do not raise his voice 
because either he is after money or he is not 
bold enough to criticize his respected and 
loving members of the family. In the words of 
Just ice Anand "Fight for just ice is a fight 
against tradit ions that have chained them- a 
fight against at t i tude that are ingrained in the 
society - it is a fight against proverbial 
lakshman rekha which is different for man and 
different for women. Men must rise to the 
occasion. They must recognize and accept the 
fact that women are equal par tners in life. 
They are individuals who have their own 
identity". 
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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE; A SOCIO LEGAL STUDY : 
(QUESTIONNAIRRE) 
A- BACKGROUND 
1. Domestic Violence is a problem frequently taking 
place in 
(a) Urban area (b) Rural area 
(c) Metro area (d) All the above 
I 
2. Which among the following are bold enough to come 
out of the four walls & report the case? 
(a) Urban Literate women (b) Urban Illiterate women 
(c) Rural Literate women (d) Rural Illiterate women 
3. Which among the following are aware of legal 
provisions relating to women 
(a) Urban based Women (b) Rural based Women 
(c) Semi Urban based Women (d) Metropolitan based 
Women I 
4. Which among the following violence is usually 
prevalent 
(a) Emotional Violence (b) Physical Violence 
(c) Financial Violence (d) Mental Violence (e) All 
5. How many Women are aware of their rights 
(a) 0% (b) 10% (c) 20% 
(d) 40% (e) 50% (f) 75% (g) 100% 
6. Is the role of NGO in this direction is satisfactory 
(a) Yes . (b) No 
7. Males who commits crime are 
(a) Urban based (b) Rural based 
(c) Metro area (d) All above 
B CAUSES OF THE CRIME 
8- Men who commit crime are having frustration/ 
inferiority complex/ mentally ill 
(a) Abnormal personality trait (b) Drunkard 
(c) Criminal background (d) Financially weak 
9. Is it a problem arising out of 
(a) Change of Values (b) lack of moral values 
(c) Financial constraints (d) Poor law enforcement 
10. Is it a problem more frequently taking place in 
(a) Arranged marriage (b) Love marriage 
C- SOLUTION OR REMEDY 
11- Which one of the following is the solution of the 
problem 
(a) Literacy (b) Finical Independence 
(c) Boldness (d) More Stringent Legal provisions 
(e) Legal Awareness (f) Social change 
(g) All of above 
12. How many cases in a year are settled by the 
interference of police officer/ Judiciary 
(a) 10% (b) 20% (c) 40% (d) 50% 
(e) 75% (f) 100% (g) None 
13. After coming to police station/ court problem 
become -
(a) Aggravated (b) Solved 
14. Whether women after coming to Police station / 
court leads 
(a) Normal Married Life (b) Abnormal Married Life 
15. Will Domestic Violence Act. Solve the problem 
(a) yes (b) No 
16. Do you think-FIR should be registered in these case 
(a) Yes (b) No (c) No comments 
17. Any Suggestions: 
m 
Annexure 
m-
UNITED NATIONS WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, 1 9 9 3 (Relevant Provisions) 
VIENNA DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION 
The World Conference on Human Rights, 
Considering that the promotion and protection of human 
rights is a matter of priority for the international 
community, and t h a t the Conference affords a unique 
opportunity to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the; 
international human rights system and of the machinery 
for the protection of human rights, in order to enhance 
and thus promote a fuller observance of those rights, in a 
just and balanced manner. 
Recalling the Preamble to the Charter of the United 
Nations, in particular the determination to reaffirm faith 
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, and in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small, 
Deeply concerned by various forms of discrimination and 
violence, to which women continue to be exposed all over 
the world, 
18. The human rights of women and of the girl-child 
are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of 
universal human rights. The full and equal participation 
of women in political, civil, economic, social and cu l tu ra l 
life, at the national, regional and international levels, and 
the eradication of all forms of discrimination on grounds 
of sex are priority objectives of the international 
community. 
Gender-based violence and all forms of sexual 
harassment and exploitation, including those resulting 
from cultural prejudice and international trafficking, are 
incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human 
person, and must be eliminated. This can be achieved by 
legal measures and through national action and 
international cooperation in such fields as economic and 
social development, education, safe maternity and heal th 
care, and social support. 
The human rights of women should form an integral part 
of the United Nations human rights activities, including 
the promotion of all human rights instruments relating to 
women. 
The World Conference on H u m a n Rights urges 
Governments , inst i tut ions, in tergovernmental a n d non-
governmental organisat ions to intensify their e f for ts for 
the protection and promotion of h u m a n r ights of women 
and the girl-child. 
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
WARNS OF THREATS TO GAINS ON WOMEN'S HUMAN 
RIGHTS, 2004 
As Commission Continues Consideration of Women's Human 
Rights, Speakers Raise Issues on Human Trafficking, HIV/AIDS 
Infection, Domestic Violence 
(Delayed in transmission.) 
GENEVA, 5 April (UN Information Service) — The Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women this morning addressed 
the Commission on Human Rights, warning against alarming 
trends toward political conservatism and backlash which 
threatened the gains made thus far in the global women's human 
rights agenda. 
Yakin Erturk, Special Rapporteur on violence against women, 
said she had emphasized the universality of violence against 
women, the multiplicity of its forms and the intersectionality of 
diverse kinds of discrimination against women rooted in other 
systems of subordination and inequality in her report to the 
Commission. Thus, while recognizing positive developments, it 
must also be noted that great divisions among humankind were 
increasingly articulated along cultural lines and that the 
management of conflict based on cultural and religious 
specificities often resulted in the justification of violence against 
women both within and between conflicting groups. 
On the subject of official visits undertaken in 2004, Ms. Erturk 
said she had been to both El Salvador and Guatemala in 
February. While both countries had the necessary legal 
framework in international human rights law, the challenges 
faced were grave as violence against women and girls continued 
to be widespread inside and outside the home. The official 
response to brutal murders of women had illustrated that 
violence against women was not seen as a serious crime. 
Moreover, women in both countries shared problems related to 
the armed conflicts and, more recently, related to the violence 
and exploitation linked with domestic and transnational criminal 
networks. 
El Salvador, speaking as a concerned country, affirmed that the 
protection of women was a priority at both the national and 
international levels and that efforts had been made to implement 
important projects for the modernization of organizations 
entrusted with oversight of violence against women. 
Guatemala, also speaking as a concerned country, highlighted 
the priority accorded to combating the causes and consequences 
of violence against women. Among ongoing efforts, a new unit 
had bean established within the national civil police lo 
investigate crimes against women. 
Switzerland, Canada, Cuba, Ireland (on behalf of the European 
Union) and Pakistan participated in the inter-active dialogue that 
followed the Special Rapporteur's presentation. 
As the Commission continued with its general debate on the 
integration of women's human rights and the gender perspective, 
it heard from national delegations who emphasized the need to 
ensure effective implementation - into national legislation and 
practice - of international agreements, the rising threat of 
trafficking in women and children and the interconnectedness of 
HIV/AIDS infection and the vulnerability of 
women due to traditional cultural and sexual roles. 
Participating in the general debate were Representatives of the 
Dominican Republic, New Zealand (on behalf of Canada and 
Australia), Ireland (on behalf of the European Union), Lithuania 
(on behalf of the Baltic and Nordic States), Sri Lanka, Republic of 
Korea, South Africa, Cuba, China, India, Paraguay, Pakistan, 
Bahrain, Croatia, United States, Sudan, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Bhutan and Chile. 
Speaking in exercise of the right of reply were the 
Representatives of Japan, the United States and the Republic of 
Korea. 
The Commission will resume its consideration of the integration 
'if the human rights of women and the gender perspective at 3 
p.m. this afternoon. 
DOCUMENTS ON WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS 
Under this agenda item the Commission has before it the report 
(E/CN.472004/66 and Add.l) of Yakin Erturk, Special 
Rapporteur on violence against Women, its Causes and 
Consequences, which concludes that violence against women is 
a continuum of acts that violate women's basic human rights, 
resulting in devastating consequences for women who experience 
it, traumatic impact on those who witness it, de-legitimization of 
States that fail to prevent it and the impoverishment of entire 
societies that tolerate it. Over the past decade, the problem has 
gained recognition as a human rights violation that can be 
eliminated through political will and legal and civil action. On 
the other hand, increased trends towards militarization, armed 
conflict and global terrorism have naturally focused on violence 
in emergency situations, while the proximity of people of 
different cultures has drawn attention to the "other": both often 
result in a normalization of violence against women and have 
caused a depoliticization of public discourse on violence against 
women in certain areas. 
The report cites among the critical issues requiring further 
attention promoting a constructive dialogue among civilizations 
and diffusing the adverse impact of religious extremism on 
women's human rights; the impact of transnational ism on 
women in terms of types of violence encountered, the multiplicity 
of normative systems at work and the multiplicity of State and 
non-State actors involved; strengthening the capacity of States to 
comply effectively with their obligations under international law; 
the intersection of violence against women and the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic; and "gender budgeting as a mechanism for 
monitoring State compliance with international law to eliminate 
violence against women. 
The Addendum contains summaries of general individual 
allegations, as well as urgent appeals transmitted to 
Governments, and their replies. Such communications were 
carried out with Angola, Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab 
Emirates and Uruguay. 
There is also a report of the Secretary-General on the joint work 
plan of the Division for the Advancement of Women and the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(E/CN.4/2004/65-E/CN.6/2004/7), which contains an 
assessment of the implementation of the current work plan and 
sets forth the joint work plan for 2004, including aspects for 
support for human rights bodies; support for intergovernmental 
bodies and special procedures; technical cooperation, advisory 
services and meetings; awareness raising and outreach; and 
inter-agency coordination. 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
YAKIN ERTURK, Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, 
stressed that her report emphasized the universality of violence 
against women, the multiplicity of its forms and the 
intersectionality of diverse kinds of discrimination against 
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women rooted in other systems of subordination and inequality. 
She had also expanded upon the concept of violence again 
women to capture that wide spectrum of acts manifested "from 
the domicile to the transnational arena". New issues and 
concerns were continually emerging and transnational actors, 
including intergovernmental organizations, corporations and 
other business enterprises, among others, were implicated in the 
need for further standard setting and implementation. 
Official missions had been undertaken to El Salvador and 
Guatemala in February 2004, she said, while noting that the 
final mission reports would be presented during the 
Commission's 2005 session- While both countries had the 
necessary legal framework in international human rights law, 
the challenges were grave as violence against women and girls 
continued to be widespread inside and outside of the home. The 
official response to the brutal murders of women who had been 
kidnapped and later found dead with signs of rape and torture 
illustrated that violence against women - whether domestic 
violence, rape or sexual harassment — was not seen as a serious 
crime. Women in both countries also shared problems related to 
the long years of armed conflict and to more recent problems of 
violence and exploitation linked to domestic and transnational 
criminal networks. Most crimes remained uninvestigated, 
resulting in impunity, reinforcing patterns of gender 
discrimination and constituting a source of perpetual terror in 
the everyday lives of women. However, among positive 
developments, legal reforms had been undertaken in El 
Salvador, while Guatemala and the United Nations had recently 
agreed to establish a Commission for the Investigation of Illegal 
Groups and Clandestine Security Organizations. 
While violence against women persisted in all countries, the 
international women's movement and human rights advocates 
worldwide had made the issue a priority on the international 
agenda, the Special Rapporteur noted. The Declaration by 
women Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other dignitaries made at 
the beginning of the Commission's present session, and the 
high-level segment's focus on violence against women, were 
encouraging However, concern must also be expressed over 
alarming trends toward political conservatism and backlash, 
which threatened the gains made thus far in the global women's 
human rights agenda. Noting that great divisions among 
humankind were increasingly being articulated along cultural 
lines, she warned that the management of conflict based on 
cultural and religious specificities often resulted in the 
justification of violence against women both within and between 
conflicting groups. 
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Stressing that HIV/AIDS had emerged as the single most 
devastating epidemic experienced in modern history, she noted 
that its interconnection with and impact on women's human 
rights had become a major area of concern as women and girls 
were particularly vulnerable to HIV/AIDS, owing not only to their 
biological conditions, but also to economic and social 
inequalities and culturally accepted gender roles that placed 
them in subordinate positions vis-a-vis men regarding decisions 
on sexual relations. The development of guidelines for the 
practical implementation of international law on the human 
rights of women, and enhancing understanding and developing 
strategies to respond to violence against women at the 
transnational, national, community and individual levels and 
security were among the priorities she envisaged addressing. 
MARIO ERNESTO CASTRO GRANDE (El Salvador), speaking as 
a concerned country, said the visit of the Special Rapporteur 
showed the commitment of El Salvador to the special 
mechanisms of the Commission. The protection of women was a 
priority for the Government of El Salvador, both at the national 
and international levels. The report of the Special Rapporteur, 
which contained her preliminary conclusions and 
recommendations, was appreciated, but El Salvador regretted 
that conclusions were mixed with general observations about 
countries, without specificity. It was hoped (hat the final report 
would make a clear demarcation, including the specific realities 
of El Salvador. There was also concern for the Special 
Rapporteur's affirmation that the Government was not 
complying with its international obligations to investigate, 
prosecute and punish acts of violence a gains I women, since 
this was incorrect. 
The Government of El Salvador had passed laws on this subject. 
In 2003, decrees had been adopted to increase the penalties for 
offences against sexual liberty and regarding sexual exploitation, 
in particular trafficking of women and children. EI Salvador had 
been making efforts to implement important projects for the 
modernization of organizations entrusted with the oversight of 
violence against women; had created a hotline for the victims of 
violence; and had set up an institute against violence with a 
wide-based nature and mandate, including oversight. The trend 
of brutal killings in the region was not a systematic trend in El 
Salvador, or a wide-scale one. This violence was being committed 
mainly by gangs. The Government was greatly concerned about 
these acts and was working to combat them. El Salvador 
appreciated that the Special Rapporteur had noted that much 
had been done to combat domestic violence, and it was 
recognized that much remained to be done. It was to be hoped 
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that the final recommendations of the Special Rapporteur would 
help in this respect. 
LARS PIRA PEREZ (Guatemala), speaking as a concerned 
country, said that combating the causes and consequences of 
violence against women was a priority for his Government. 
Although the final report of the Special Rapporteur on her visit 
to Guatemala would only be submitted next year, the 
preliminary note had broadly explained the Issues of importance 
for the Government. It was hoped that the problems described 
could be corrected, but above all, the aim was to eliminate the 
sources of the problems faced by women. There had been 
progress in that regard since the signing of the peace agreement 
in Guatemala, however, obstacles still remained to be overcome. 
The priority was to identify reasons why women were targeted. 
Among the Government's ongoing efforts, a new unit had been 
established within the national civil police to investigate crimes 
against women. Guatemala also recognized the need for regional 
and international cooperation to combat issues of violence 
against women. Both the preliminary conclusions and the 
recommendations of the Special Rapporteur were being giver, 
serious attention. 
INTERACTIVE DIALOGUE 
JEAN-DANIEL VIGNY (Switzerland) said that he supported the 
work of the Special Rapporteur, and Switzerland's policy on this 
issue was clear: it was against any form of violence against 
women. The Special Rapporteur should continue to develop the 
concept of violence against women. 
ADRIAN NORFOLK (Canada) said as all were aware, violence 
against women was as multi-faceted as it was pervasive, and it 
needed to be attacked from many levels. This had been 
highlighted in previous reports. The impact of HIV/AIDS on 
women and girls was a grave concern, and the commitment of 
the Special Rapporteur was welcomed. How would research be 
undertaken to broaden understanding and how would a 
thematic approach help this? 
MARIA DEL CARMEN HERRERA CASEIRO (Cuba) said in the 
conclusion of the report, the Special Rapporteur referred to and 
raised the need for global governance, indicating that the United 
Nations should carry out a constructive role to deal with the 
deficiencies of this. Did the Special Rapporteur have a specific 
idea as to what actions should be undertaken by the United 
Nations in this optic, bearing in mind that there were some 
organizations that lay outside the scope of the United Nations 
which dealt with this issue. 
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MARY WHLLAN (Ireland) said the emphasis placed on the 
cooperation between actors both between and within as well as 
outside of the United Nations was welcomed. How would the 
Special Rapporteur describe the cooperation between the special 
mechanisms and other branches of treaty bodies; what 
mandates did she see as most closely linked to her own, and 
how did she plan to coordinate with them. 
TEHMINA JANJUA (Pakistan) said the ideas in the report were 
very interesting and created a thematic perspective on the 
mandate, which was strongly supported- The assessment that 
violence against women was a continuum of violence, and 
impoverished whole societies that tolerated it, was a message 
that needed to be taken seriously. The future work of the Special 
Rapporteur would take a thematic analysis of the full range of 
women's access to justice, and a question was asked as lo how 
she intended to elaborate this. Violence against women under 
occupation required further elaboration. 
YAKIN ERTURK, Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, 
said in reaction to the comments that she appreciated the 
concerns expressed by El Salvador and Guatemala in relation to 
her report after her mission lo both countries. She looked 
forward to contributing to their efforts in fighting violence 
against women. With regard to the question by Switzerland, she 
said that she was developing an index to show the efforts of 
States, and the index would indicate the level of compliance by 
each State. She would consolidate her expertise to develop the 
index that would be vital in measuring States' efforts in 
implementing the provisions of the Convention on women, for 
example. The collaboration between treaty bodies and Special 
Rapporteurs was also essential to advance the cause of women. 
STATEMENTS ON WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS 
YSSET ROMAN MALDONADO (Dominican Republic) said the 
integration of women's rights and the gender perspective 
continued to be a priority in the Dominican Republic. Work 
plans and institutions had been set up, and at the same time, 
policies had been strengthened for women and their families. 
However, certain problems affecting the rights of women 
continued to prevail, for example in the increase of intra-familial 
violence and the trafficking of Dominican women. Ministers had 
made it clear that this first problem of intra-familial violence 
was, one that corroded families, and the principal victims of this 
violence were women. Statistical projections showed that if the 
escalation continued, there would be a 21 per cent increase 
compared to last year, and thus specific actions had been taken 
to promote policies that reduced this violence. 
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The Government was using training, the media and a 
documentation centre in the fight against this scourge in order 
to create greater awareness of thy problem. Legal and 
psychological clinics had been set up to give treatment to the 
victims of this violence, and a pilot project had been set up for 
women and their surviving children. Policies had been set up 
from a multi-sexual viewpoint, and the implementation of 
organized social action based on consensus was one of the main 
goals. Efforts had also been made to limit smuggling of women. 
However, the decisive support of the international community 
was required to combat these scourges. 
TIM CAUGHLEY (New Zealand), speaking also on behalf of 
Australia and Canada, noted that it had been more than 20 
years since the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women had entered into force and nearly ten years 
since the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action. Underscoring the need for universal adherence to and 
implementation of those documents, he also noted that at a 
time when the international community should be moving 
forward with programmes to fulfill its commitments, some 
States had begun to question the common standards to which 
all had agreed. Furthermore, while the adoption by the General 
Assembly's Third Committee of resolutions on domestic violence 
against women and the preparation of an in-depth study on 
violence against women were welcomed, its inability to reach 
agreement on the omnibus resolution had been disappointing. 
Increasing rates of trafficking and alarming increases in 
HIV/AIDS infection in women and children, fuelled by gender 
inequalities, stigmatization, violence and discriminatory 
attitudes, as well as the widespread use of sexual violence as a 
weapon of intimidation and war, amply demonstrated the 
continued relevance of international commitments to eliminate 
violence against women and the urgent need for concerted 
international action, he added. However, there had been some 
progress including, among others, the appointment of the 
Special Rapporteur on violence against women and the 
agreement of a set of conclusions on the role of men and boys in 
promoting gender equality. While the greatest achievements of 
the past decade in the struggle against violence had been 
awareness raising and standard setting, those of the second 
decade must focus on implementation of effective programmes 
and strategies to ensure that the prohibition .against violence 
became a tangible reality. 
MARY WHELAN (Ireland), speaking on behalf of the European 
Union, said that to ensure the full and equal enjoyment of 
human rights by women, it was essential that women and girls 
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participated fully and equally in all activities in society and in all 
decisions affecting them. Action to promote gender equality 
required a consistent and systematic approach, which 
presupposed the recognition of the differences between men and 
women and the willingness to establish a balanced distribution 
of responsibilities and obligations between women and men. 
Many countries had put in place the necessary policy framework 
to promote the rights of women and to ensure that those rights 
were not only recognized but were respected in practice. But one 
had also to acknowledge that in far too many cases, application 
was sketchy, and women were not able to enjoy full and equal 
human rights. States should incorporate provisions concerning 
non-discrimination of women into their national legislations and 
provide effective mechanisms to ensure the implementation of 
those standards. While the European Union acknowledged that 
there had been progress in many areas, many States continued 
to deny women the full and equal exercise and enjoyment of the 
rights to which all persons were entitled. 
The provisions of the International Bill of Human Rights applied 
in full to women. That was the fundamental principle 
underpinning the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, which focused on the 
measures needed to make that principle a reality. The Union 
welcomed the resolve of the international community, confirmed 
at the highest level in the UN millennium Declaration, to 
strengthen efforts to implement that instrument. The optional 
protocol to the Convention was a further important step in that 
direction, because it provided a more effective monitoring 
mechanism of States' implementation of their commitments. The 
Union urged all States to sign, ratify and implement fully the 
Convention and its optional protocol. Nevertheless, the Union 
continued to be concerned at the very significant number and 
content of reservations, some of them regarding fundamental 
provisions of the Convention. 
Harmful traditional or customary practices, including female 
genital mutilation and crimes committed in the name of honour, 
were forms of violence that prevented the full enjoyment of 
human rights. Social, cultural or religious factors could never be 
invoked as a justification for such violence. Domestic violence, 
which encompassed marital rape as well as other forms of 
physical, psychological and sexual violence, was one of the most 
common, least visible forms of violence against women and girls. 
States had an obligation to eradicate all forms of violence against 
women and the girl child in the family and to ensure the effective 
protection of women and girls. 
ALGIMANTAS RIMKUNAS (Lithuania), speaking on behalf of the 
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Baltic and Nordic States, said that trafficking in women and 
children was a major human rights concern and that combating 
that phenomenon must figure high on the international agenda. 
No country or region was immune to the problem and failure of 
States to investigate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators 
prevented the victims of such trafficking from enjoying the 
human rights to which they were entitled. The absence of equal 
rights, gender-based discrimination and the denial of economic 
opportunities to women were factors that could lead to women's 
increased vulnerability to trafficking, which constituted the 
denial of the rights to liberty, freedom of movement and freedom 
from violence, torture and cruel and degrading treatment. 
Human trafficking had reached such unprecedented levels that 
it should truly be called a new form of slavery. 
Well-coordinated national, regional and global action was 
imperative to prevent and combat trafficking in human beings, 
he continued. The global ratification and implementation of the 
United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime 
and its Protocol on trafficking would constitute a significant 
achievement. Regionally, a new European Convention aimed to 
establish a comprehensive legal framework for protecting victims' 
human rights and providing assistance to victims and witness 
protection. Moreover, a common understanding of the scope and 
nature of the problem had led to common efforts by Baltic 
Governments, law enforcement personnel, educational 
institutions and non-governmental organizations. Among other 
initiatives, the Task Force on Organized Crime in the Baltic Sea 
Region and its operative committee constituted a core group for 
gathering, analysing and exchanging relevant data. There had 
also been efforts to increase public awareness about trafficking 
in its various forms, including holding seminars and meetings in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to provide information on 
recognizing victims and traffickers and to make available 
resources for assistance. 
MANORI MALLIKARATCHY (Sri Lanka) said that among the most 
striking social, political and economic phenomena of the past 
century had been the emergence and integration of the discourse 
on women's rights at all levels. Women comprised more than half 
the world's population. Women represented 70 per cent of the 
world's poor, and two thirds of them had not been taught to read 
and write. Efforts to bring a gender perspective into the human 
rights debate as well as to address the most urgent issues facing 
women around the world were not only relevant to the 
Commission but also for global economic and social progress. 
The Government of Sri Lanka recognized the importance of 
gender perspective and the major role that women could play in 
peace building and post-conflict rehabilitation and 
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reconstruction. At the second round of peace talks held between 
the Government and the LITE in Oslo, a sub-committee was 
established to ensure the effective inclusion of gender issues in 
the peace process and its first meeting was held in March 2003. 
The priority issue identified by the sub-committee included the 
gender perspective on resettlement, personal security and safety, 
infrastructure and service, livelihood and employment, political 
representation, decision-making and reconciliation. As a result 
of two decades of armed conflict, surveys had shown the 
noticeable increase in women-headed households, which had 
been identified as an area requiring special attention. 
During the past two decades, mainly as a result of economic 
liberalization, the influence of Sri Lankan women in social and 
economic spheres had grown significantly. Approximately half of 
the labour force in professional, semi-professional and middle-
income level employment was composed of women. They also 
dominated the migrant labour force, and employment in the free 
trade zone and the tea plantation sector, which accounted for Sri 
Lanka's foreign exchange earnings. 
HYUCK CHOI (Republic of Korea) said the human rights of 
women and girls were an inalienable, integral and indivisible 
part of universal human rights. In this regard, the promotion 
and protection of the full enjoyment of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms by women was rightly a key concern of 
the Commission, and efforts to advance human rights as a 
universal goal should integrate the human rights of women and 
the gender perspective. Furthermore, equality between men and 
women, boys and girls was fundamental to a society where 
democracy' and human rights were upheld for all. Domestically, 
the current focus was on fighting the sex trade and trafficking in 
persons, the predominant victims of which were women and 
girls. The issue of violence against women should be high on the 
global human rights agenda. As poverty and HIV/AIDS became 
increasingly feminised, their interplay with gender-based 
violence had plunged the most vulnerable of women and girls 
around the world into a state of marginal existence where their 
very survival and dignity as human beings were effectively 
denied. Under these circumstances, there was a pressing need to 
revisit and reframe the goal of ending violence against women, 
making it not just a goal in itself but also a vital part of 
strategies in fighting poverty and HIV/AIDS. 
J. NDLOVU (South Africa) said President Mbeki had reiterated 
the importance of promoting human rights in general and in 
particular the rights of women, children and the disabled, if it 
were truly desired to sustain democratic values worldwide. This 
would also add impetus to ongoing efforts to enhance the 
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integration of gender equality and women's rights into the United 
Nations system. In the first decade of its democracy, South 
Africa had created an enabling legislative framework and 
awareness programmes to ensure transformation, and this was 
done due to acute awareness of how race, class and gender 
conspired to locate women, especially rural African women, at 
the very bottom of the rights hierarchy. Mindful of the important 
role that peace and security played in the promotion and 
protection of human rights. South Africa was involved in several 
initiatives aimed at a peaceful continent and a peaceful world, 
and in this context its engagement in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Burundi and other places was in line with the values 
espoused in the Millennium Declaration. South Africa looked 
forward to a fruitful sharing of ideas in order to find sustainable 
solutions to problems impeding successful promotion and 
implementation of gender equality and women's rights. 
MARIA DEL CARMEN HERRERA (Cuba) said that poverty had 
many faces and most of them were female. Women accounted for 
70 per cent of the nearly two billion poor worldwide; two-thirds 
of the world's illiterate were women; and more than half of the 40 
million HIV/AIDS patients worldwide were women, 95 per cent of 
whom lived in the Third World. Poor countries could not be 
blamed for this tragedy - they were not the ones who had 
conquered and plundered entire continents for centuries, neither 
had they established colonialism, slavery or imperialism. The 
national efforts of Third World States must be supplemented 
with a new climate of international cooperation to overcome the 
underdevelopment imposed upon them. Cuba proffered the 
example of a country where, within a framework of justice and 
the fight for equality, the situation of women could be radically 
transformed and their rights fully realized. In Cuba, women 
accounted for 44.9 per cent of labour in the state-run civilian 
sector. They represented 66.4 per cent of all mid- and high-level 
technicians and professionals, 72 per cent of the educational 
sector, 67 per cent of the health sector and 44.6 per cent of the 
scientific sector. Cuba today figured among the top ten countries 
worldwide with regard to the representation of women in 
Parliament, with 35.4 per cent. Such results were the outcome of 
the Cuban people's firmness and the Government's political will 
to carry out its social projects for the benefit of the whole 
population. 
LIU ZHONGXIN (China) said women were movers of history, 
creators of wealth and participators in progress. However, their 
equal rights with men remained to be guaranteed. First, this was 
due to the out-dated gender stereotypes that should be 
discarded, as they prevented women from being aware of their 
own rights, and with them it was impossible to reshape their 
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lives. These stereotypes were frequently sources of violence and 
sexual aggression against women, and all Governments should 
take steps to gradually overcome them. Second, women's 
participation at the national level in policy formulation would 
improve the situation, forming proof of better democracy and the 
protection of women's rights. Training should be provided so as 
to help women acquire the skills and confidence vital for their 
full participation in political life. 
The Government of China continued to formulate and implement 
policies that enhanced the situation of women at many levels, 
systematically promoting their rights. The year 2005 marked the 
tenth anniversary of the Beijing Conference, and this would be 
celebrated by reports on the implementation of its Plan of Action 
and other events. China was concerned about the situation of 
human rights of women in the United States, where they did not 
enjoy equal rights either in political life, income or daily life. 
Domestic violence and sexual harassment were serious problems 
and rampant in that country. China called upon the Government 
of the United States to take a hard look at the situation of 
women in the country, and called on the Special Rapporteur to 
visit that country. 
MUKTA TOMAR (India) said the progress of any society was 
dependent on its ability' to protect and promote the rights of its 
women. The guaranteeing of equal rights and privileges for 
women by the Constitution had marked the first step towards 
the transformation of the status of women in India. As a result of 
concerted efforts and a comprehensive policy framework over the 
last five decades, there had been significant advances in the 
socio-economic indicators for women. Empowerment for women 
was critical for the socio-economic progress of any country. The 
Government of India was convinced that education was the key 
for the advancement of women. The spread of liberal education 
and values had unleashed forces for social reform and created 
awareness about the need for increased participation of women 
in the educational, social, economic and political life of India. In 
addition to the role of the State and the Constitutional provisions 
that existed, the judiciary had also played a key role in the 
advancement of gender justice in India. The Supreme Court of 
India had delivered landmark pronouncements on matters such 
as the need for equal property rights for women, and grass roots 
groups organizing women had become agents of social change, 
enabling access to financial and material resources. 
LORENA PATINO (Paraguay) said that her country had ratified 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women and would this year be submitting its fifth 
periodic report to the related Committee. It was also a State 
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party to Inter-American Conventions guarantee ing women's 
rights. Among national efforts to integrate the issue of women's 
h u m a n rights, a national secretariat had been established to 
oversee the implementation of women's rights and the legal 
progress made in the international field had been accompanied 
by developments in national legislation. Among other 
a s su rances , the equality of women in all fields had been 
guaranteed in the Constitution. Moreover, legal i n s t rumen t s and 
actions unde r t aken by both governmental and non-governmental 
organizations had placed the serious problem of domestic 
violence front stage and there were efforts to make people 
increasingly aware tha t violations of women's r ights were 
violations of h u m a n rights. Among the successes witnessed in 
this field, it could be seen tha t women were gradually acceding 
to key positions of political power. For example,, among others , 
six women currently held 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE D . l . TAKE INTEGRATED 
MEASURES TO PREVENT AND ELIMINATE VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 
Actions to be taken By Governments: 
a. Condemn violence against women and refrain from invoking 
any cus tom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid their 
obligations with respect to its elimination a s set out in the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence agains t Women; 
b. Refrain from engaging in violence against women and exercise 
due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with 
national legislation, pun ish acts of violence agains t women, 
whether those ac ts are perpetrated by the State or by private 
persons; 
c. Enact a n d / o r reinforce penal, civil, labour and administrat ive 
sanct ions in domestic legislation to pun i sh and redress the 
wrongs done to women and girls who are subjected to any form 
of violence, whether in the home, the workplace, the community 
or society; 
d. Adopt a n d / o r implement and periodically review and analyse 
legislation to ensure its effectiveness in eliminating violence 
against women, emphasizing the prevention of violence and the 
prosecution of offenders; take measures to ensu re the protection 
of women subjected to violence, access to j u s t and effective 
remedies, including compensat ion and indemnification and 
healing of victims, and rehabilitation of perpetra tors ; 
e. Work actively to ratify a n d / o r implement internat ional h u m a n 
rights no rms and ins t ruments as they relate to violence against 
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women, including those contained in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, [21] the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, [13] the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, [13] and the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment; [22] 
f. Implement the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, taking into account general 
recommendation 19, adopted by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women at its eleventh 
session; [23] 
g. Promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a 
gender perspective in all policies and programmes related to 
violence against women; actively encourage, support and 
implement measures and programmes aimed at increasing the 
knowledge and understanding of the causes, consequences and 
mechanisms of violence against women among those responsible 
for implementing these policies, such as law enforcement 
officers, police personnel and judicial, medical and social 
workers, as well as those who deal with minority, migration and 
refugee issues, and develop strategies to ensure that the 
revictimization of women victims of violence does not occur 
because of gender-insensitive laws or judicial or enforcement 
practices; 
h. Provide women who are subjected to violence with access to 
the mechanisms of justice and, as provided for by national 
legislation, to just and effective remedies for the harm they have 
suffered and inform women of their rights in seeking redress 
through such mechanisms; 
i. Enact and enforce legislation against the perpetrators of 
practices and acts of violence against women, such as female 
genital mutilation, female infanticide, prenatal sex selection and 
dowry- related violence, and give vigorous support to the efforts 
of non-governmental and community organizations to eliminate 
such practices; 
j . Formulate and implement, at all appropriate levels, plans of 
action to eliminate violence against women; 
k. Adopt all appropriate measures, especially in the field of 
education, to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct 
of men and women, and to eliminate prejudices, customary 
practices and all other practices based on the idea of the 
inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes and on stereotyped 
roles for men and women; 
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1. Create or strengthen institutional mechanisms so that women 
and girls can report acts of violence against them in a safe and 
confidential environment, free from the fear of penalties or 
retaliation, and file charges; 
m. Ensure that women with disabilities have access to 
information and services in the field of violence against women; 
n. Create, improve or develop as appropriate, and fund the 
training programmes for judicial, legal, medical, social, 
educational and police and immigrant personnel, in order to 
avoid the abuse of power leading to violence against women and 
sensitize such personnel to the nature of gender-based acts and 
threats of violence so that fair treatment of female victims can be 
assured; 
o. Adopt laws, where necessary, and reinforce existing laws that 
punish police, security forces or any other agents of the State 
who engage in acts of violence against women in the course of 
the performance of their duties; review existing legislation and 
take effective measures against the perpetrators of such violence; 
p. Allocate adequate resources within the government budget 
and mobilize community resources for activities related to the 
elimination of violence against women, including resources for 
the implementation of plans of action at all appropriate levels; 
q. Include in reports submitted in accordance with the 
provisions of relevant United Nations human rights instruments, 
information pertaining to violence against women and measures 
taken to implement the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence against Women; 
r. Cooperate with and assist the Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights on violence against women in the 
performance of her mandate and furnish all information 
requested; cooperate also with other competent mechanisms, 
such as the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights on torture and the Special Rapporteur of the Commission 
on Human Rights on summary, extrajudiciaiy and arbitrary 
executions, in relation to violence against women; 
s. Recommend that the Commission on Human Rights renew 
the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on violence against 
women when her term ends in 1997 and, if warranted, to update 
and strengthen it. 
By Governments, including local governments, community 
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, educational 
institutions, the public and private sectors, particularly 
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enterprises, and the mass media, as appropriate: 
a. Provide well-funded shelters and relief support for girls and 
women subjected to violence, as well as medical, psychological 
and other counselling services and free or low-cost legal aid, 
where it is needed, as well as appropriate assistance to enable 
them to find a means of subsistence; 
b. Establish linguistically and culturally accessible services for 
migrant women and girls, including women migrant workers, 
who are victims of gender-based violence; 
c. Recognize the vulnerability to violence and other forms of 
abuse of women migrants, including women migrant workers, 
whose legal status in the host country depends on employers 
who may exploit their situation; 
d. Support initiatives of women's organizations and 
non-governmental organizations all over the world to raise 
awareness on the issue of violence against women and to 
contribute to its elimination; 
e. Organize, support and fund community-based 
education and training campaigns to raise awareness about 
violence against women as a violation of women's enjoyment of 
their human rights and mobilize local communities to use 
appropriate gender-sensitive traditional and innovative methods 
of conflict resolution; 
f. Recognize, support and promote the fundamental role of 
intermediate institutions, such as primary health-care centres, 
family-planning centres, existing school health services, mother 
and baby protection services, centres for migrant families and so 
forth in the field of information and education related to abuse; 
g. Organize and fund information campaigns and educational 
and training programmes in order to sensitize girls and boys and 
women and men to the personal and social detrimental effects of 
violence in the family, community and society; teach them how 
to communicate without violence and promote training for 
victims and potential victims so that they can protect themselves 
and others against such violence; 
h. Disseminate information on the assistance available to 
women and families who are victims of violence; 
i. Provide, fund and encourage counselling and rehabilitation 
programmes for the perpetrators of violence and promote 
research to further efforts concerning such counselling and 
rehabilitation so as to prevent the recurrence of such violence; 
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j . Raise awareness of the responsibility of the media in 
promoting non-stereotyped images of women and men, as well as 
in eliminating patterns of media presentation that generate 
violence, and encourage those responsible for media content to 
establish professional guidelines and codes of conduct; also raise 
awareness of the important role of the media in informing and 
educating people about the causes and effects of violence against 
women and in stimulating public debate on the topic. 
By Governments, employers, trade unions, community and 
youth organizations and non-governmental organizations, as 
appropriate: 
a. Develop programmes and procedures to eliminate sexual 
harassment and other forms of violence against women in all 
educational institutions, workplaces and elsewhere; 
b. Develop programmes and procedures to educate and raise 
awareness of acts of violence against women that constitute a 
crime and a violation of the human rights of women; 
c. Develop counselling, healing and support programmes for 
girls, adolescents and young women who have been or are 
involved in abusive relationships, particularly those who live in 
homes or institutions where abuse occurs; d. Take special 
measures to eliminate violence against women, particularly 
those in vulnerable situations, such as young women, refugee, 
displaced and internally displaced women, women with 
disabilities and women migrant workers, including enforcing 
any existing legislation and developing, as appropriate, new 
legislation for women migrant workers in both sending and 
receiving countries. By the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations: 
Provide the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights on violence against women with all necessary assistance, 
in particular the staff and resources required to perform all 
mandated functions, especially in carrying out and following up 
on missions undertaken either separately or jointly with other 
special rapporteurs and working groups, and adequate 
assistance for periodic consultations with the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women and all treaty 
bodies. 
By Governments, international organizations and non-
governmental organizations: 
Encourage the dissemination and implementation of the UNHCR 
Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women and the UNHCR 
Guidelines on the Prevention of and Response to Sexual Violence 
against Refugees. 
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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE D.2. STUDY THE CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF PREVENTIVE MEASURES 
Actions to be taken 
By Governments, regional organizations, the United Nations, 
other international organizations, research institutions, women's 
and youth organizations and nongovernmental organizations, as 
appropriate: 
a. Promote research, collect data and compile statistics, 
especially concerning domestic violence relating to the 
prevalence of different forms of violence against women, and 
encourage research into the causes, nature, seriousness and 
consequences of violence against women and the effectiveness of 
measures implemented to prevent and redress violence against 
women; 
b. Disseminate findings of research and studies widely; 
c. Support and initiate research on the impact of violence, such 
as rape, on women and girl children, and make the resulting 
information and statistics available to the public; 
d. Encourage the media to examine the impact of gender role 
stereotypes, including those perpetuated by commercial 
advertisements which foster gender-based violence and 
inequalities, and how they are transmitted during the life cycle, 
and take measures to eliminate these negative images with a 
view to promoting a violence-free society. 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE D.3. ELIMINATE TRAFFICKING IN 
WOMEN AND ASSIST VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE DUE TO 
PROSTITUTION AND TRAFFICKING 
Actions to be taken 
By Governments of countries of origin, transit and destination, 
regional and international organizations, as appropriate: 
a. Consider the ratification and enforcement of international 
conventions on trafficking in persons and on slavery; 
b. Take appropriate measures to address the root factors, 
including external factors, that encourage trafficking in women 
and girls for prostitution and other forms of commercialized sex, 
forced marriages and forced labour in order to eliminate 
trafficking in women, including by strengthening existing 
legislation with a view to providing better protection of the rights 
of women and girls and to punishing the perpetrators, through 
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both criminal and civil measures; 
c. Step up cooperation and concerted action by all relevant law 
enforcement authorities and institutions with a view to 
dismantling national, regional and international networks in 
trafficking; 
d. Allocate resources to provide comprehensive programmes 
designed to heal and rehabilitate into society victims of 
trafficking, including through job training, legal assistance and 
confidential health care, and take measures to cooperate with 
non-governmental organizations to provide for the social, 
medical and psychological care of the victims of trafficking; 
d. Develop educational and training programmes and policies 
and consider enacting legislation aimed at preventing sex 
tourism and trafficking, giving special emphasis to the protection 
of young women and children. 
F. WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY 
There are considerable differences in women's and men's access 
to and opportunities to exert power over economic structures in 
their societies. In most parts of the world, women are virtually 
absent from or are poorly represented in economic decision-
making, including the formulation of financial, monetary, 
commercial and other economic policies, as well as tax systems 
and rules governing pay. Since it is often within the framework 
of such policies that individual men and women make their 
decisions, inter alia, on how to divide their time between 
remunerated and unremunerated work, the actual development 
of these economic structures and policies has a direct impact on 
women's and men's access to economic resources, their 
economic power and consequently the extent of equality between 
them at the individual and family levels as well as in society as a 
whole. 
In many regions, women's participation in remunerated work in 
the formal and non-formal labour market has increased 
significantly and has changed during the past decade. While 
women continue to work in agriculture and fisheries, they have 
also become increasingly involved in micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises and, in some cases, have become more 
dominant in the expanding informal sector. Due to, inter alia, 
difficult economic situations and a lack of bargaining power 
resulting from gender inequality, many women have been forced 
to accept low pay and poor working conditions and thus have 
often become preferred workers. On the other hand, women have 
entered the workforce increasingly by choice when they have 
become aware of and demanded their rights. Some have 
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succeeded in entering and advancing in the workplace and 
improving their pay and working conditions. However, women 
have been particularly affected by the economic situation and 
restructuring processes, which have changed the nature of 
employment and, in some cases, have led to a loss of jobs, even 
for professional and skilled women. In addition, many women 
have entered the informal sector owing to the lack of other 
opportunities. Women's participation and gender concerns are 
still largely absent from and should be integrated in the policy 
formulation process of the multilateral institutions that define 
the terms and, in cooperation with Governments, set the goals of 
structural adjustment programmes, loans and grants. 
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, 1 9 7 9 
The States Parties to the present Convention, 
Noting that the Charter of the United Nations reaffirms faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person and in the equal rights of man and women, 
Noting that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms 
the principle of the inadmissibility of discrimination and 
proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to all the rights 
and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, 
including distinction based on sex, 
Noting that the States Parties to the International Covenants on 
Human Rights have the obligation to ensure the equal right of 
men and women to enjoy all economic, social, cultural, civil and 
political rights. 
Considering the international conventions concluded under the 
auspices of the United Nations and the specialized agencies 
promoting equality of rights of men and women, 
Noting also the resolutions, declarations and recommendations 
adopted by the United Nations and the specialized agencies 
promoting equality of rights of men and women. 
Concerned, however, that despite these various instruments 
extensive discrimination against women continues to exist. 
Recalling that discrimination against women violates the 
principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity, is 
an obstacle to the participation of women, on equal terms with 
men, in the political, social, economic and cultural life of their 
countries, hampers the growth of the prosperity of society and 
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the family and makes more difficult the full development of the 
potentialities of women in the service of their countries and of 
humanity, 
Concerned that in situations of poverty women have the least 
access to food, health, education, training and opportunities for 
employment and other needs. 
Convinced that the establishment of the new international 
economic order based on equity and justice will contribute 
significantly towards the promotion of equality between men and 
women. 
Emphasizing that the eradication of apartheid, of all forms of 
racism, racial discrimination, colonialism, neo-colonialism, 
aggression, foreign occupation and domination and interference 
in the internal affairs of States is essential to the full enjoyment 
of the rights of men and women, 
Affirming that the strengthening of international peace and 
security, relaxation of international tension, mutual co-operation 
among all States irrespective of their social and economic 
systems, general and complete disarmament, and in particular 
nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international 
control, the affirmation of the principles of justice, equality and 
mutual benefit in relations among countries and the realization 
of the right of peoples under alien and colonial domination and 
foreign occupation to self-determination and independence, as 
well as respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
will promote social progress and development and as a 
consequence will contribute to the attainment of full equality 
between men and women. 
Convinced that the full and complete development of a country, 
the welfare of the world and the cause of peace require the 
maximum participation of women on equal terms with men in all 
fields. 
Bearing in mind the great contribution of women to the welfare 
of the family and to the development of society, so far not fully 
recognized, the social significance of maternity and the role of 
both parents in the family and in the upbringing of children, and 
aware that the role of women in procreation should not be a 
basis for discrimination but that the upbringing of children 
requires a sharing of responsibility between men and women and 
society as a whole. 
Aware that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the 
role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve 
full equality between men and women, 
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Determined to implement the principles set forth in the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
and, for that purpose, to adopt the measures required for the 
elimination of such discrimination in all its forms and 
manifestations. 
Have agreed on the following: 
PARTI 
Article 1 
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term 
"discrimination against women" shall mean any distinction, 
exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the 
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital 
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural, civil or any other field. 
Article 2 
States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its 
forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without 
delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, 
to this end, undertake: 
(a) to embody the principle of the equality of men and women in 
their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not 
yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other 
appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle; 
(b) to adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, 
including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all 
discrimination against women; 
(c) to establish legal protection of the rights of women on an 
equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national 
tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of 
women against any act of discrimination; 
(d) to refrain from engaging in any act or practice of 
discrimination against women and to ensure that public 
authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this 
obligation; 
(e) to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women by any person, organization or enterprise; 
(f) to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to 
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modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and 
practices which constitute discrimination against women; 
(g) to repeal all national penal provisions which constitute 
discrimination against women. 
Article 3 
States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, 
social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, 
including legislation, to ensure the full development and 
advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them 
the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms on a basis of equality with men. 
Article 4 
1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures 
aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women 
shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the present 
Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the 
maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures 
shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of 
opportunity and treatment have been achieved. 
2. Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including 
those measures contained in the present Convention, aimed at 
protecting maternity shall not be considered discriminatory. 
Article 5 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: 
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men 
and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of 
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are 
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of 
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women; 
(b) To ensure that family education includes a proper 
understanding of maternity as a social function and the 
recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in 
the upbringing and development of their children, it being 
understood that the interest of the children is the primordial 
consideration in all cases. 
Article 6 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including 
legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and 
exploitation of prostitution of women. 
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PART II 
Article 7 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the political and public life of 
the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal 
terms with men, the right: 
(a) to vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible 
for election to all publicly elected bodies; 
(b) to participate in the formulation of government policy and 
the implementation thereof and to hold public office and 
perform all public functions at all levels of government; 
(c) To participate in non-governmental organizations and 
associations concerned with the public and political life of the 
country. 
Article 8 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to 
women, on equal terms with men and without any 
discrimination, the opportunity to represent their Governments 
at the international level and to participate in the work of 
international organizations. 
Article 9 
1. States Parries shall grant women equal rights with men to 
acquire, change or retain their nationality. They shall ensure in 
particular that neither marriage to an alien nor change of 
nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically 
change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force 
upon her the nationality of the husband. 
2. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with 
respect to the nationality of their children. 
PART III 
Article 10 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in order to ensure to them equal 
rights with men in the field of education and in particular to 
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: 
(a) the same conditions for career and vocational guidance, for 
access to studies and for the achievement of diplomas in 
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educational establishments of all categories in rural as well as in 
urban areas; this equality shall be ensured in preschool, general, 
technical, professional and higher technical education, as well as 
in all types of vocational training; 
(b) access to the same curricula, the same examinations, 
teaching staff with qualifications of the same standard and 
school premises and equipment of the same quality; 
(c) the elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men 
and women at all levels and in all forms of education by 
encouraging coeducation and other types of education which will 
help to achieve this aim and, in particular, by the revision of 
textbooks and school programmes and the adaptation of 
teaching methods; 
(d) the same opportunities to benefit from scholarships and other 
study grants; 
(e) the same opportunities for access to programmes of 
continuing education including adult and functional literacy 
programmes, particularly those aimed at reducing, at the earliest 
possible time, any gap in education existing between men and 
women; 
(f) the reduction of female student drop-out rates and the 
organization of programmes for girls and women who have left 
school prematurely; 
(g) the same opportunities to participate actively in sports and 
physical education; 
(h) access to specific educational information to help to ensure 
the health and well-being of families, including information and 
advice on family planning. 
Article 11 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of employment in 
order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the 
same rights, in particular: 
(a) the right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings; 
(b) the right to the same employment opportunities, including 
the application of the same criteria for selection in matters of 
employment; 
(c) he right to free choice of profession and employment, the right 
to promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of 
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service and the right to receive vocational training and 
retraining, including apprenticeships, advanced vocational 
training and recurrent training; 
(d) he right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to 
equal treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as 
equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work; 
(e) the right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement, 
unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other 
incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave; 
(f) the right to protection of health and to safety in working 
conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of 
reproduction. 
2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the 
grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure their effective 
right to work. States Parties shall take appropriate measures: 
(a) to prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal 
on the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and 
discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital status; 
(b) to introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable 
social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or 
social allowances; 
(c) to encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social 
services to enable parents to combine family obligations with 
work responsibilities and participation in public life, in 
particular through promoting the establishment and 
development of a network of child-care facilities; 
(d) to provide special protection to women during pregnancy in 
types of work proved to be harmful to them. 
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this Article 
shall be reviewed periodically in the light of scientific and 
technological knowledge and shall be revised, repealed or 
extended as necessary. 
Article 12 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of health care in order 
to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to 
health care services, including those related to family planning. 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, 
States Parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in 
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connexion with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal 
period, granting free services where necessary, as well as 
adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation. 
Article 13 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in other areas of economic and 
social life in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, the same rights, in particular: 
(a) the right to family benefits; 
(b) the right to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of 
financial credit; 
(c) the right to participate in recreational activities, sports and 
all aspects of cultural life. 
Article 14 
1. States Parties shall take into account the particular problems 
faced by rural women and the significant roles which rural 
women play in the economic survival of their families, including 
their work in the non-monetized sectors of the economy, and 
shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the application of 
the provisions of this Convention to women in rural areas. 
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, 
on a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate in 
and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall 
ensure to such women the right: 
(a) to participate in the elaboration and implementation of 
development planning at all levels; 
(b) to have access to adequate health care facilities, including 
information, counselling and services in family planning; 
(c) to benefit directly from social security programmes; 
(d) to obtain all types of training and education, formal and non-
formal, including that relating to functional literacy, as well as, 
inter alia, the benefit of all community and extension services, in 
order to increase their technical proficiency; 
(e) to organize self-help groups and co-operatives in order to 
obtain equal access to economic opportunities through 
employment or self-employment; 
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(f) to participate in all community activities; 
(g) to have access to agricultural credit and loans, market ing 
facilities, appropriate technology and equal t rea tment in land 
and agrar ian reform as well as in land reset t lement schemes; 
(h) to enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to 
housing, sanitat ion, electricity and water supply, t ranspor t and 
communicat ions . 
PART IV 
Article 15 
1. States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before 
the law. 
2. States Parties shall accord to women, in civil mat te r s , a legal 
capacity identical to tha t of men and the same opportuni t ies to 
exercise tha t capacity. In particular, they shall give women equal 
rights to conclude contracts and to adminis ter property and 
shall t reat them equally in all s tages of procedure in cour ts and 
t r ibunals . 
3. States Parties agree tha t all contracts and all other private 
ins t ruments of any kind with a legal effect which is directed at 
restricting the legal capacity of women shall be deemed null and 
void. 
4. States Parties shall accord to men and women the same rights 
with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and 
the freedom to choose their residence and domicile. 
Article 16 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measu re s to eliminate 
discrimination against women in all mat te r s relating to marriage 
and family relations and in part icular shall ensure , on a basis of 
equality of men and women: 
(a) the same right to enter into marriage; 
(b) the same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into 
marriage only with their free and full consent; 
(c) the same rights and responsibilities dur ing marriage and at 
its dissolution; 
(d) the same rights and responsibilities a s pa ren t s , irrespective of 
their marital s t a tus , in mat te rs relating to their children; in all 
cases the interests of the children shall be pa ramoun t ; 
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(e) the same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the 
number and spacing of their children and to have access to the 
information, education and means to enable them to exercise 
these rights; 
(f) the same rights and responsibilities with regard to 
guardianship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, or 
similar institutions where these concepts exist in national 
legislation; in .all cases the interests of the children shall be 
paramount; 
(g) the same personal rights as husband and wife, including the 
right to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation; 
(h) the same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, 
acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and 
disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a valuable 
consideration. 
2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal 
effect, and all necessary action, including legislation, shall be 
taken to specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the 
registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory. 
PARTY 
Article 17 
1. For the purpose of considering the progress made in the 
implementation of the present Convention, there shall be 
established a Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) 
consisting, at the time of entry into force of the Convention, of 
eighteen and, after ratification of or accession to the Convention 
by the thirty-fifth State Party, of twenty-three experts of high 
moral standing and competence in the field covered by the 
Convention. The experts shall be elected by States Parties from 
among their nationals and shall serve in their personal capacity, 
consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution 
and to the representation of the different forms of civilization as 
well as the principal legal systems. 
2. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret 
ballot from a list of persons nominated by States Parties. Each 
State Party may nominate one person from among its own 
nationals. 
3. The initial election shall be held six months after the date of 
the entry into force of the present Convention. At least three 
months before the date of each election the Secretary-General of 
XXXI 
the United Nations shall address a letter to the States Parties 
inviting them to submit their nominations within two months. 
The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in alphabetical order 
of all persons thus nominated, indicating the States Parties 
which have nominated them, and shall submit it to the States 
Parties. 
4. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at a 
meeting of States Parties convened by the Secretary-General at 
United Nations Headquarters. At that meeting, for which two 
thirds of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum, the 
persons elected to the Committee shall be those nominees who 
obtain the largest number of votes and an absolute majority of 
the votes of the representatives of States Parties present and 
voting. 
5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of 
four years. However, the terms of nine of the members elected at 
the first election shall expire at the end of two years; immediately 
after the first election the names of these nine members shall be 
chosen by lot by the Chairman of the Committee. 
6. The election of the five additional members of the Committee 
shall be held in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 2, 
3 and 4 of this Article, following the thirty-fifth ratification or 
accession. The terms of two of the additional members elected on 
this occasion shall expire at the end of two years, the names of 
these two members having been chosen by lot by the Chairman 
of the Committee. 
7. For the filling of casual vacancies, the State Party whose 
expert has ceased to function as a member of the Committee 
shall appoint another expert from among its nationals, subject to 
the approval of the Committee. 
8. The members of the Committee shall, with the approval of the 
General Assembly, receive emoluments from United Nations 
resources on such terms and conditions as the Assembly may 
decide, having regard to the importance of the Committee's 
responsibilities. 
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the 
necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of the 
functions of the Committee under the present Convention. 
Article 18 
1. States Parties undertake to submit to the Secretary-Genera! of 
the United Nations, for consideration by the Committee, a report 
on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures 
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which they have adopted to give effect to he provisions of the 
present Convention and on the progress made in this respect: 
(a) within one year after the entry into force for the State 
concerned; and 
(b) thereafter a t least every four years and further whenever the 
Committee so requests . 
2. Reports may indicate factors and difficulties affecting the 
degree of fulfillment of obligations unde r the present Convention. 
Article 19 
1. The Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure . 
2. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years . 
Article 20 
1. The Committee shall normally meet for a period of not more 
than two weeks annual ly in order to consider the reports 
submit ted in accordance with Article 18 of the present 
Convention. 
2. The meetings of the Committee shall normally be held at 
United Nations Headquar ters or at any other convenient place as 
determined by the Committee. 
Article 21 
1. The Committee shall, through the Economic and Social 
Council, report annual ly to the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on its activities and may make suggest ions and general 
recommendat ions based on the examination of reports and 
information received from the States Parties. Such suggestions 
and general recommendat ions shall be included in the report of 
the Committee together with comments , if any, from States 
Parties. 
2. The Secretary-General shall t ransmi t the reports of the 
Committee to the Commission on the S ta tus of Women for its 
information. 
Article 22 
The specialized agencies shall be entitled to be represented at 
the consideration of the implementation of such provisions of the 
present Convention as fall within the scope of their activities. 
The Committee may invite the specialized agencies to submit 
reports on the implementation of the Convention in a reas falling 
XXXIII 
within the scope of their activities. 
PART VI 
Article 23 
Nothing in this Convention shall affect any provisions that are 
more conducive to the achievement of equality between men and 
women which may be contained: 
(a) in the legislation of a State Party; or 
(b) in any other international convention, treaty or agreement in 
force for that State. 
Article 24 
States Parries undertake to adopt ail necessary measures at the 
national level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Convention. 
Article 25 
1. The present Convention shall be open for signature by all 
States. 
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is designated as 
the depositary of the present Convention. 
3. The present Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments 
of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations. 
4. The present Convention shall be open to accession by all 
States. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an 
instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
Article 26 
1. A request for the revision of the present Convention may by 
made at any time by any State Party by means of a notification 
in writing addressed to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon 
the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such a request. 
Article 27 
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth 
day after the date of deposit with the Secretary-General of the 
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United Nations of the twentieth instrument of ratification or 
accession. 
2. For each State ratifying the present Convention or acceding to 
it after the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or 
accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth 
day after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of 
ratification or accession. 
Article 28 
1. The Secretary-Genera] of the United Nations shall receive and 
circulate to all States the text of reservations made by States at 
the time of ratification or accession. 
2. A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
present Convention shall not be permitted. 
3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification to 
this effect addressed to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, who shall then inform all States thereof. Such 
notification shall take effect on the date on which it is received. 
Article 29 
1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning 
the interpretation or application of the present Convention which 
is not settled by negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, 
be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of 
the request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the 
organization of the arbitration, any one of those parties may 
refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request 
in conformity with the Statute of the Court. 
2. Each State Party may at the time of signature or ratification of 
this Convention or accession thereto declare that it does not 
consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of this Article. The other 
States Parties shall not be bound by that paragraph with respect 
to any State Party which has made such a reservation. 
3. Any State Party which has made a reservation in accordance 
with paragraph 2 of this Article may at any time withdraw that 
reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
Article 30 
The present Convention, the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, 
Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall 
be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
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THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
ACT, 2 0 0 5 (43 of 2005) 
[13th September, 2005] 
An Act to provide for more effective protection of the rights of 
women guaranteed under the Constitution who ore victims of 
violence of any kind occurring within the family and for matters 
connected therewith or incidental thereto. 
BE it enacted by Parliament in the Fifty-sixth Year of the 
Republic of India a s follows:— 
CHAPTER 1 
PRELIMINARY 
1. Short title, extent and commencement.—(1) This Act may be 
called the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 
2005. 
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of J a m m u 
and Kashmir. 
(3) It shall come into force on such date a s the Central 
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint. 
COMMENTS 
This section provides for the short title, extent and 
commencement of Act. The Act extends to the whole of India 
except to the State of J a m m u and Kashmir in the area of 
protection of women who are victims of violence of any kind 
occurring within the family. As adequate s teps have to be taken 
for administer ing the provisions of this Act, provision h a s been 
made empowering the Central Government to appoint the date of 
commencement of the Act, by notification in the Official Gazette. 
[Notes on Clauses] 
2. Definitions—In this Act, un less the context otherwise 
requires,— 
(a) "aggrieved person" m e a n s any woman who is, or h a s been, 
in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges 
to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the 
respondent ; 
(b) "child" m e a n s any person below the age of eighteen years 
and includes any adopted, step or foster child; 
(c) "compensation order" means an order granted in te rms of 
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section 22; 
(d) "custody order" means an order granted in t e rms of section 
2 1 ; 
(e) "domestic incident report" means a report made in the 
prescribed form on receipt of a complaint of domestic violence 
from an aggrieved person; 
(f) "domestic relationship" means a relat ionship between two 
persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a 
shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, 
marriage, or through a relationship in the n a t u r e of marriage, 
adoption or are family members living together a s a joint family; 
(g) "domestic violence" h a s the same meaning a s assigned to it 
in section 3; 
(h) "dowry" shall have the same meaning a s assigned to it in 
section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961); 
(i) "Magistrate" means the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, 
or as the case may be, the Metropolitan Magistrate, exercising 
jurisdiction unde r the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 
1974) in the area where the aggrieved person resides temporarily 
or otherwise or the respondent resides or the domest ic violence 
is alleged to have taken place; 
(j) "medical facility" means such facility a s may be notified by 
the State Government to be a medical facility for the purposes of 
this Act; 
(k) "monetary relief means the compensat ion which the 
Magistrate may order the respondent to pay to the aggrieved 
person, a t any stage during the hearing of an application seeking 
any relief u n d e r this Act, to meet the expenses incurred and the 
losses suffered by the aggrieved person a s a resul t of the 
domestic violence; (1) "notification" m e a n s a notification 
published in the Official Gazette and the expression "notified" 
shall be cons t rued accordingly; 
(m) "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made u n d e r this 
Act; 
(n) "Protection Officer" means an officer appointed by the State 
Government unde r sub-section (1) of section 8; 
(o) "protection order" means an order made in te rms of section 
18; 
(p) "residence order" means an order granted in te rms of sub-
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section (1) of section 19; 
(q) "respondent" means any adult male person who is, or has 
iDeen, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and 
against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under 
this Act: 
Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship 
in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a 
relative of the husband or the male partner. 
(r) "service provider" means an entity registered under sub-
section (1) of section 10; 
(s) "shared household" means a household where the person 
aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic 
relationship either singly or along with the respondent and 
includes such a household whether owned c. tenanted either 
jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or 
tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the 
aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have 
any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household 
which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is 
a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the 
aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared 
household. 
(t) "shelter home" means any shelter home as may be notified 
by the State Government to be a shelter home for the purposes 
of this Act. 
COMMENTS 
This section defines the various expressions occurring in the Act. 
The definitions of "aggrieved person", "domestic relationship", 
"domestic violence", "monetary relief, "Protection Officer", 
"protection order", "residence order", "respondent", "service 
provider" and "shared household" are some of them. As per the 
Act, any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship 
with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to 
act of domestic violence by the respondent is an aggrieved 
person. The expression "domestic relationship" means a 
relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point 
of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are 
related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in 
the nature of marriage, adoption or are members of a family 
living together as a joint family. The word "respondent" means 
any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic 
relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the 
aggrieved person has sought any relief under the Act provided 
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that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the 
nature of marriage may also file a complaint under the Act 
against a relative of the husband or male partner. [Notes on 
Clauses] 
CHAPTER II 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
3. Definition of domestic violence.—For the purposes of this Act, 
any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent 
shall constitute domestic violence in case it— 
(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb 
or vi^ell-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved 
person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, 
sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; 
or 
(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person 
with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to 
meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or 
valuable security; or 
(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any 
person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or 
clause (b); or 
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or 
mental, to the aggrieved person. 
Explanation I.—^For the purposes of this section,— 
(i) "physical abuse" means any act or conduct which is of such 
a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or 
health or impair the health or development of the aggrieved 
person and includes assault, criminal intimidation and criminal 
force; 
(ii) "sexual abuse" includes any conduct of a sexual nature that 
abuses, humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates the dignity of 
woman; 
(iii) "verbal and emotional abuse" includes— 
(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or 
ridicule specially with regard to not having a child or a male 
child; and 
(b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in 
whom the aggrieved person is interested. 
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(iv) "economic abuse" includes— 
(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to 
which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom 
whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which 
the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not 
limited to, household necessities for the aggrieved person and 
her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately 
owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the 
shared household and maintenance; 
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets 
whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, 
bonds and the like or other property in which the aggrieved 
person has an interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the 
domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required by 
the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any other 
property jointly or separately held by the aggrieved person; and 
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or 
facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by 
virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the 
shared household. 
Explanation II.—^For the purpose of determining whether any 
act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent 
constitutes "domestic violence" under this section, the overall 
facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into 
consideration. 
COMMENTS 
This section defines the expression "domestic violence". Any act, 
omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall 
amount to domestic violence in certain circumstances. It 
includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and 
emotional or economic abuse which are also explained in the 
section. In determining whether any act, omission, commission 
or conduct of the respondent constitutes "domestic violence", the 
overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be a guiding 
factor. [Notes on Clauses] 
CHAPTER III 
POWERS AND DUTIES OF PROTECTION OFFICERS, SERVICE 
PROVIDERS, ETC. 
4. Information to Protection Officer and exclusion of liability of 
informant.—(1) Any person who has reason to believe that an act 
of domestic violence has been, or is being, or is likely to be 
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committed, may give information about it to the concerned 
Protection Officer. 
(2) No liability, civil or criminal, shall be incurred by any person 
for giving in good faith of information for the purpose of sub-
section (1). 
COMMENTS 
This section seeks to provide that any person who has reason to 
believe that an act of domestic violence has been or is being 
committed, such person may inform the Protection Officer. It 
also lays down that the person who is providing the information 
in good faith shall be exempt from any civil or criminal liability 
for giving such information. [Notes on Clauses] 
5. Duties of police officers, service providers and Magistrate.—A 
police officer. Protection Officer, service provider or Magistrate 
who has received a complaint of domestic violence or is 
otherwise present at the place of an incident of domestic violence 
or when the incident of domestic violence is reported to him, 
shall inform the aggrieved person— 
(a) of her right to make an application for obtaining a relief by 
way of a protection order, an order for monetary relief, a custody 
order, a residence order, a compensation order or more than one 
such order under this Act; 
(b) of the availability of services of service providers; 
(c) of the availability of services of the Protection Officers; 
(d) of her right to free legal services under the Legal Services 
Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987); 
(e) of her right to file a complaint under section 498A of the 
Indian Penal 
Code (45 of 1860), wherever relevant: 
Provided that nothing in this Act shall be construed in any 
manner as to relieve a police officer from his duty to proceed in 
accordance with law upon receipt of information as to the 
commission of a cognizable offence. 
COMMENTS 
This section lays down the duties of a police officer. Protection 
Officer, service provider and the Magistrate to inform the 
aggrieved person of her right to make an application for one or 
more reliefs under the Act, the availability of services of service 
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providers and Protection Officers, her right to avail free legal 
services under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 and her 
right to file a complaint under section 498A of the Indian Penal 
Code, wherever relevant. It is also envisaged that this section 
shall not relieve any police officer from his duty to proceed in 
accordance vv^ ith law on receipt of information as to commission 
of a cognizable offence. [Notes on Clauses] 
6. Duties of shelter homes—If an aggrieved person or on her 
behalf a Protection Officer or a service provider requests the 
person in charge of a shelter home to provide shelter to her, 
such person in charge of the shelter home shall provide shelter 
to the aggrieved person in the shelter home. 
COMMENTS 
This section seeks to provide that the person in charge of a 
shelter home shall be bound to provide shelter to the aggrieved 
person on being requested by the aggrieved person or, on her 
behalf by a Protection Officer or a service provider. [Notes on 
Clauses] 
7. Duties of medical facilities.—If an aggrieved person or, on her 
behalf a Protection Officer or a service provider requests the 
person in charge of a medical facility to provide any medical aid 
to her, such person in charge of the medical facility shall provide 
medical aid to the aggrieved person in the medical facility. 
COMMENTS 
This section seeks to provide that the person in charge of the 
medical facility shall be bound to provide medical aid to the 
aggrieved person if requested by her or on her behalf by a 
Protection Officer or a service provider. [Notes on Clauses] 
8. Appointment of Protection Officers.—(1) The State 
Government shall, by notification, appoint such number of 
Protection Officers in each district as it may consider necessary 
and shall also notify the area or areas within which a Protection 
Officer shall exercise the powers and perform the duties 
conferred on him by or under this Act. 
(2) The Protection Officers shall as far as possible be women and 
shall possess such qualifications and experience as may be 
prescribed. 
(3) The terms and conditions of service of the Protection Officer 
and the other officers subordinate to him shall be such as may 
be prescribed. 
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COMMENTS 
This section empowers the State Government to appoint, by 
notification in the Official Gazette, such number of Protection 
Officers in each District as it considers necessary and also to 
notify the area in which such Protection Officer shall exercise the 
powers conferred and discharge the duties imposed under the 
Act. It also provides that the Protection Officers shall, as far as 
possible, be women and shall possess such qualifications and 
experience as may be laid down by the Central Government, by 
rules. The terms and conditions of service of the Protection 
Officer and the other officers subordinate to him may also be 
regulated by rules. [Notes on Clauses] 
9. Duties and functions of Protection Officers.—(1) It shall be the 
duty of the Protection Officer— 
(a) to assist the Magistrate in the discharge of his functions 
under this Act; 
(b) to make a domestic incident report to the Magistrate, in 
such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, upon 
receipt of a complaint of domestic violence and forward copies 
thereof to the police officer in charge of the police station within 
the local limits of whose jurisdiction domestic violence is alleged 
to have been committed and to the service providers in that area; 
(c) to make an application in such form and in such manner as 
may be prescribed to the Magistrate, if the aggrieved person so 
desires, claiming relief for issuance of a protection order; 
(d) to ensure that the aggrieved person is provided legal aid 
under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987) and 
make available free of cost the prescribed form in which a 
complaint is to be made; 
(e) to maintain a list of all service providers providing legal aid 
or counselling, shelter homes and medical facilities in a local 
area within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate; 
(f) to make available a safe shelter home, if the aggrieved person 
so requires and forward a copy of his report of having lodged the 
aggrieved person in a shelter home to the police station and the 
Magistrate having jurisdiction in the area where the shelter 
home is situated; 
(g) to get the aggrieved person medically examined, if she has 
sustained bodily injuries and forward a copy of the medical 
report to the police station and the Magistrate having 
jurisdiction in the area where the domestic violence is alleged to 
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have been taken place; 
(h) to ensure that the order for monetary relief under section 20 
is complied with and executed, in accordance with the procedure 
prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 
1974); (i) to perform such other duties as may be prescribed. (2) 
The Protection Officer shall be under the control and supervision 
of the Magistrate, and shall perform the duties imposed on him 
by the Magistrate and the Government by, or under, this Act. 
COMMENTS 
This section lays down the duties and functions of the Protection 
Officers. The Protection Officer may assist the Magistrate in the 
discharge of his functions under the Act, make a domestic 
incident report to the Magistrate, make an application to the 
Magistrate if the aggrieved person so desires praying for 
issuance of a protection order, ensure legal aid to the aggrieved 
person under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, maintain 
a list of service providers, make available a safe shelter home if 
the aggrieved person so requires, get the aggrieved person 
medically examined if she has sustained bodily injuries, ensure 
that the order for monetary relief under section 20 of the Act is 
complied with and executed in accordance with the provisions of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and perform such other 
duties as may be laid down by the Central Government, by rules. 
It also stipulates that the Protection Officer shall be under the 
control and supervision of the Magistrate and perform the duties 
assigned to him by the Magistrate and the Government by or 
under the Act. [Notes on Clauses] 
10. Service providers—(1) Subject to such rules as may be 
made in this behalf, any voluntary association registered under 
the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860) or a company 
registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or any 
other law for the time being in force with the objective of 
protecting the rights and interests of women by any lawful 
means including providing of legal aid, medical, financial or 
other assistance shall register itself with the State Government 
as a service provider for the purposes of this Act. 
(2) A service provider registered under sub-section (1) shall have 
the power to— 
(a) record the domestic incident report in the prescribed form if 
the aggrieved person so desires and forward a copy thereof to the 
Magistrate and the Protection Officer having jurisdiction in the 
area where the domestic violence took place; 
(b) get the aggrieved person medically examined and forward a 
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copy of the medical report to the Protection Officer and the police 
station within the local limits of which the domestic violence 
took place; 
(c) ensure that the aggrieved person is provided shelter in a 
shelter home, if she so requires and forward a report of the 
lodging of the aggrieved person in the shelter home to the police 
station within the local limits of which the domestic violence 
took place. 
(3) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against 
any service provider or any member of the service provider who 
is, or who is deemed to be, acting or purporting to act under this 
Act, for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be 
done in the exercise of powers or discharge of functions under 
this Act towards the prevention of the commission of domestic 
violence. 
COMMENTS 
This section provides for the registration of certain entities with 
the State Government as a service provider for the purposes of 
the Act. Any voluntary association registered under the Societies 
Registration Act, 1860 or a company registered under the 
Companies Act, 1956 or under any other law, having the 
objective of protecting the rights and interests of women by 
lawful means including providing legal aid, medical, financial or 
other assistance shall be eligible to be registered under the Act 
as per the procedure bid down by rules. This section also 
enumerates the powers of a service provider. Such powers 
include the power to record the domestic incident report, to get 
the aggrieved person medically examined and to ensure that the 
aggrieved person is provided shelter in a shelter home, if she so 
requires. This section further provides immunity to the service 
provider or any member of the service provider for anything done 
or intended to be done in good faith under the Act, from any 
suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding. [Notes on Clauses] 
11. Duties of Government.—The Central Government and every 
State Government, shall take all measures to ensure that— 
(a) the provisions of this Act are given wide publicity through 
public media including the television, radio and the print media 
at regular intervals; 
(b) the Central Government and State Government officers 
including the police officers and the members of the judicial 
services are given periodic sensitization and awareness training 
on the issues addressed by this Act; 
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(c) effective co-ordination between the services provided by 
concerned Ministries and Departments dealing with law, home 
affairs including law and order, health and human resources to 
address issues of domestic violence is established and periodical 
review of the same is conducted; 
(d) protocols for the various Ministries concerned with the 
delivery of services to women under this Act including the courts 
are prepared and put in place. 
COMMENTS 
This section stipulates the duties of the Central Government 
and the State Governments. These duties are to give wide 
publicity to the provisions of the Act, to give sensitization and 
awareness training on the issues addressed by the Act to 
Government officers including police officers and members of 
judicial service, to ensure effective coordination between 
Ministries and Departments dealing with law, home affairs, law 
and order, health and human resources in the services provided 
by them on the issues of domestic violence and (o put in place 
protocols for the Ministries and courts concerned with the 
delivery of services to women under the provisions of the Act. 
[Notes on Clauses] 
CHAPTER IV 
PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING ORDERS OF RELIEFS 
12. Application to Magistrate.—(1) An aggrieved person or a 
Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved 
person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one 
or more reliefs under this Act: 
Provided that before passing any order on such application, the 
Magistrate shall take into consideration any domestic incident 
report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service 
provider. 
(2) The relief sought for under sub-section (1) may include a 
relief for issuance of an order for payment of compensation or 
damages without prejudice to the right of such person to 
institute a suit for compensation or damages for the injuries 
caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by the 
respondent: 
Provided that where a decree for any amount as compensation or 
damages has been passed by any court in favour of the aggrieved 
person, the amount, if any, paid or payable in pursuance of the 
order made by the Magistrate under this Act shall be set off 
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against the a m o u n t payable under such decree and the decree 
shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the time being 
in force, be executable for the balance amoun t , if any, left after 
such set off. 
(3) Every application unde r sub-section (1) shall be in such form 
and contain such part iculars as may be prescribed or a s nearly 
as possible thereto. 
(4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which shall 
not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of receipt of 
the application by the court. 
(5) The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every 
application made unde r sub-section (1) within a period of sixty 
days from the date of its first hearing. 
COMMENTS 
This section lays down tha t the aggrieved person or Protection 
Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person 
may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or 
more reliefs unde r the Act including order for payment of 
compensat ion or damages without prejudice to the r ights of such 
person to inst i tute a suit for compensat ion or damages for the 
injuries sus ta ined in the act of domestic violence committed by 
the respondent . While disposing of an application u n d e r sub-
section (1), the Magistrate shall take into consideration any 
domestic incident report received by him from the Protection 
Officer or the service provider. The a m o u n t paid or payable to 
the aggrieved person by an order made by the Magistrate unde r 
the Act shall be set off against the a m o u n t of decree of 
compensat ion or damages passed by any court in favour of the 
aggrieved person. Sub-section (3) provides tha t the format and 
part iculars of the application unde r this section shall be as 
nearly a s possible to the format laid down by the Central 
Government by rules. Sub-sections (4) and (5) provide tha t the 
Magistrate shall fix the first date of hear ing of the application 
ordinarily withifi three days of its receipt and shall endeavour to 
dispose of every application within sixty days of the first hearing. 
[Notes on Clauses] 
13. Service of notice.—(1) A notice of the date of hear ing fixed 
unde r section 12 shall be given by the Magistrate to the 
Protection Officer, who shall get it served by such m e a n s as may 
be prescribed on the respondent , and on any other person, as 
directed by the Magistrate within a max imum period of two days 
or such further reasonable time as may be allowed by the 
Magistrate from the date of its receipt. 
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(2) A declaration of service of notice made by the Protection 
Officer in such form as may be prescribed shall be the proof that 
such notice was served upon the respondent and on any other 
person as directed by the Magistrate unless the contrary is 
proved. 
COMMENTS 
This section provides that a notice of the date of hearing of an 
application for relief shall be given by the Magistrate to the 
Protection Officer who shall get it served by such means as may 
be prescribed by the Central Government on the respondent and 
on any other person within a maximum period of two days or 
such further reasonable time as may be allowed by the 
Magistrate. A declaration of service of notice made by the 
Protection Officer in the form set out by the Central Government 
by rules shall be a proof of service of notice. [Notes on Clauses] 
14. Counselling.—(1) The Magistrate may, at any stage of the 
proceedings under this Act, direct the respondent or the 
aggrieved person, either singly or jointly, to undergo counselling 
with any member of a service provider who possess such 
qualifications and experience in counselling as may be 
prescribed. 
(2) Where the Magistrate has issued any direction under sub-
section (1), he shall fix the next date of hearing of the case within 
a period not exceeding two months. 
COMMENTS 
This section empowers the Magistrate to direct at any stage of 
the proceedings, the respondent or the aggrieved person either 
singly or jointly to undergo counselling with any member of a 
service provider. The member of the service provider providing 
the counselling shall possess such qualifications and experience 
as may be laid down by the Central Government, by rules. 
Where any counselling has been ordered under this section, the 
Magistrate shall fix the next date of hearing of the case within a 
period not exceeding two months. [Notes on Clauses] 
15. Assistance of welfare expert—In any proceeding under this 
Act, the Magistrate may secure the services of such person, 
preferably a woman, whether related to the aggrieved person or 
not, including a person engaged in promoting family welfare as 
he thinks fit, for the purpose of assisting him in discharging his 
functions. 
COMMENTS 
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This section stipulates that the Magistrate may secure the 
services of a suitable person preferably a woman whether related 
to the aggrieved person or not, including a person engaged in 
promoting family welfare for the purposes of assisting the court 
in the discharge of its functions. [Notes on Clauses] 
16. Proceedings to be held in camera.—^If the Magistrate 
considers that the circumstances of the case so warrant, and if 
either party to the proceedings so desires, he may conduct the 
proceedings under this Act in camera. 
COMMENTS 
This section provides for proceedings to be held in camera at the 
discretion of the Magistrate or if either party to the proceedings 
so desires. [Notes on Clauses] 
17. Right to reside in a shared household.—(1) Notwithstanding 
anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, 
every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to 
reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any 
right, title or beneficial interest in the same. 
(2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from 
the shared household or any part of it by the respondent save in 
accordance with the procedure established by law. 
COMMENTS 
This section lays down that irrespective of any contrary provision 
in any other law, every woman in a domestic relationship shall 
have the right to reside in the shared household and the 
aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the 
shared household by the respondent except in accordance with 
the procedure established by law. [Notes on Clauses] 
18. Protection orders.—The Magistrate may, after giving the 
aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of being 
heard and on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence 
has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a protection order 
in favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent 
from— 
(a) committing any act of domestic violence; 
(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic 
violence; 
(c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person or, if 
the person aggrieved is a child, its school or any other place 
frequented by the aggrieved person; 
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(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, with 
the aggrieved person, including personal, oral or written or 
electronic or telephonic contact; 
(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank 
accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the parties, jointly by 
the aggrieved person and the respondent or singly by the 
respondent, including her stridhan or any other property held 
either jointly by the parties or separately by them without the 
leave of the Magistrate; 
(f) causing violence to the dependants, other relatives or any 
person who give the aggrieved person assistance from domestic 
violence; 
(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection 
order. 
COMMENTS 
This section provides that the Magistrate may, after giving the 
aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of being 
heard and on being prima face satisfied that domestic violence 
has taken place or is likely to take place, may pass a protection 
order in favour of the aggrieved person. A protection order may 
contain an order prohibiting the respondent from committing 
any act of domestic violence or aiding or abetting therein, 
entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person or if 
the person aggrieved is a child its school, or any other place 
frequented by the aggrieved person or attempting to 
communicate in any form whatsoever with the aggrieved person 
without the leave of the Magistrate, alienating any assets, 
operating bank lockers or bank accounts belonging to both the 
parties jointly or to the respondent singly, including her stridhan 
or any other property held jointly or separately by them, causing 
violence to the dependents, other relatives or any person giving 
the aggrieved person assistance from domestic violence or 
committing any other act as specified in the protection order. 
[Notes on Clauses] 
19. Residence orders.—(1) While disposing of an application 
under sub-section (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may, on being 
satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a 
residence order— 
(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any 
other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person 
from the shared household, whether or not the respondent has a 
legal or equitable interest in the shared household; 
(b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared 
household; 
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from 
entering any portion of the shared household in which the 
aggrieved person resides; 
(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off 
the shared household or encumbering the same; 
(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the 
shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate; or 
(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate 
accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the 
shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the 
circumstances so require: 
Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against 
any person who is a woman. 
(2) The Magistrate may impose any additional conditions or pass 
any other direction which he may deem reasonably necessary to 
protect or to provide for the safety of the aggrieved person or any 
child of such aggrieved person. 
(3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent to execute a 
bond, with or without sureties, for preventing the commission of 
domestic violence. 
(4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be an 
order under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1973 (2 of 1974) and shall be dealt with accordingly. 
(5) While passing an order under sub-section (1), sub-section (2) 
or subsection (3), the court may also pass an order directing the 
officer-in-charge of the nearest police station to give protection to 
the aggrieved person or to assist her or the person making an 
application on her behalf in the implementation of the order. 
(6) While making an order under sub-section (1), the Magistrate 
may impose on the respondent obligations relating to the 
discharge of rent and other payments, having regard to the 
financial needs and resources of the parties. 
(7) The Magistrate may direct the officer-in-charge of the police 
station in whose jurisdiction the Magistrate has been 
approached to assist in the implementation of the protection 
order. 
(8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to return to the 
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possession of the aggrieved person her stridhan or any other 
property or valuable security to which she is entitled to. 
COMMENTS 
This section provides that the Magistrate may on being satisfied 
that domestic violence has taken place pass a residence order 
restraining the respondent from dispossessing or disturbing the 
possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, 
directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared 
household, restraining the respondent or his relatives from 
entering the shared household, restraining the respondent from 
alienating or disposing of or encumbering the shared household, 
restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the 
shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate, or 
directing the respondent to secure alternate accommodation for 
the aggrieved person of the same level as enjoyed by her in the 
shared household or to pay rent for the same. It is also provided 
in this section that no order shall be passed against any person 
who is a woman directing her to remove herself from the shared 
household. Sub-section (2) empowers the Magistrate to impose 
additional conditions and pass any other direction in order to 
protect the safety of the aggrieved person or her child. Sub-
section (3) provides for execution of a bond by the respondent for 
prevention of the domestic violence. Sub-section (5) empowers 
the Magistrate to pass an order directing the officer-in-charge of 
the concerned police station to give protection to the aggrieved 
person or to assist in implementation of the residence order. It is 
also provided in this section that the Magistrate may impose on 
the respondent an obligation to discharge rent and other 
payments and to direct the respondent to return to the aggrieved 
person her stridhan or any other property or valuable security to 
which she is entitled. [Notes on Clauses] 
20. Monetary reliefs.—(1) While disposing of an application 
under subsection (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may direct the 
respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred 
and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the 
aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence and such 
relief may include, but is not limited to,— 
(a) the loss of earnings; 
(b) the medical expenses; 
(c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or removal of 
any property from the control of the aggrieved person; and 
(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her 
children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an 
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order of maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being 
in force. 
(2) The monetary relief granted under this section shall be 
adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard 
of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed. 
(3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order an appropriate 
lump sum payment or monthly payments of maintenance, as the 
nature and circumstances of the case may require. 
(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order for monetary 
relief made under sub-section (1) to the parties to the application 
and to the in-charge of the police station within the local limits 
of whose jurisdiction the respondent resides. 
(5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted to the 
aggrieved person within the period specified in the order under 
sub-section (1). 
(6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make 
payment in terms of the order under sub-section (1), the 
Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the 
respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to deposit 
with the court a portion of the wages or salaries or debt due to or 
accrued to the credit of the respondent, which amount may be 
adjusted towards the monetary relief payable by the respondent. 
COMMENTS 
This section empowers the Magistrate to pass orders for grant of 
monetary relief to the aggrieved person from the respondent to 
meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered including loss of 
earnings, medical expenses, loss to property and maintenance of 
the aggrieved person and her children including maintenance 
under, or in addition, to section 125 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force. 
Sub-section (2) provides that the monetary relief shall be 
adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard 
of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed. This 
section also empowers ^he Magistrate to order lump sum or 
monthly payments for maintenance. Sub-section (6) provides 
that on the failure of the respondent to make payments of the 
monetary relief, the Magistrate may direct the employer or a 
debtor of the respondent to directly pay to the aggrieved person 
or to deposit with the court a portion of the wages or salaries or 
debt due to or accrued to the respondent. [Notes on Clauses] 
21. Custody orders.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any 
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other law for the time being in force, the Magistrate may, at any 
stage of hearing of the application for protection order or for any 
other relief under this Act grant temporary custody of any child 
or children to the aggrieved person or the person making an 
application on her behalf and specify, if necessary, the 
arrangements for visit of such child or children by the 
respondent: 
Provided that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that any visit of 
the respondent may be harmful to the interests of the child or 
children, the Magistrate shall refuse to allow such visit. 
COMMENTS 
This section lays down that notwithstanding anything contained 
in any other law for the time being in force the Magistrate may, 
at any stage of hearing of the application for grant of any relief, 
grant temporary custody of any child to the aggrieved person or 
to the person making an application on her behalf and specify 
the arrangements for visit of such child by the respondent. 
However, the Magistrate may refuse to allow such visits if in his 
opinion such visits may be harmful to the interests of the child. 
[Notes on Clauses] 
22. Compensation orders.—In addition to other reliefs as may be 
granted under this Act, the Magistrate may on an application 
being made by the aggrieved person, pass an order directing the 
respondent to pay compensation and damages for the injuries, 
including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the 
acts of domestic violence committed by that respondent. 
COMMENTS 
This section lays down that in addition to other reliefs which 
may be granted under the Act, the Magistrate may, on an 
application by the aggrieved person, pass an order directing the 
respondent to pay compensation or damages or both to the 
aggrieved person for the injuries including for the mental torture 
and emotional distress caused to her by domestic violence by the 
respondent. [Notes on Clauses] 
23. Power to grant interim and ex parte orders.—(1) In any 
proceeding before him under this Act, the Magistrate may pass 
such interim order as he deems just and proper. 
(2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie 
discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed 
an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the 
respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may 
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grant an ex parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, 
as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person under section 18, 
section 19, section 20, section 21 or, as the case may be, section 
22 against the respondent. 
COMMENTS 
This section provides for grant of interim orders by the 
Magistrate. He may also pass ex parte orders on the basis of 
affidavits given by the aggrieved person. [Notes on Clauses] 
24. Court to give copies of order free of cost.—The Magistrate 
shall, in all cases where he has passed any order under this Act, 
order that a copy of such order, shall be given free of cost, to the 
parties to the application, the police officer-in-charge of the 
police station in the jurisdiction of which the Magistrate has 
been approached, and any service provider located within the 
local limits of the jurisdiction of the court and if any service 
provider has registered a domestic incident report, to that service 
provider. 
COMMENTS 
This section provides for supply of copies of orders passed by the 
Magistrate free of charge to the parties to the application, the 
concerned police officer and the service provider. [Notes on 
Clauses] 
25. Duration and alteration of orders.—(1) A protection order 
made under section 18 shall be in force till the aggrieved person 
applies for discharge. 
(2) If the Magistrate, on receipt of an application from the 
aggrieved person or the respondent, is satisfied that there is a 
change in the circumstances requiring alteration, modification or 
revocation of any order made under this Act, he may, for reasons 
to be recorded in writing pass such order, as he may deem 
appropriate. 
COMMENTS 
This section lays down that a protection order given under the 
Act shall be in force till the aggrieved person applies for its 
discharge, fn case there is a change in the circumstances of a 
case, the Magistrate may, on application made by the aggrieved 
person or the respondent pass an order altering, modifying or 
revoking any order made under the Act. [Notes on Clauses] 
26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.—(1) Any relief 
available under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also be 
sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family court 
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or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the 
respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after 
the commencement of this Act. 
(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in 
addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved 
person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or 
criminal court. 
(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person 
in any proceedings other tharl a proceeding under this Act, she 
shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such 
relief. 
COMMENTS 
This section provides that any relief available under the Act may 
also be sought in any legal proceeding before a civil court, family 
court or a criminal court and that any relief which may be 
granted under the Act may be sought for in addition to and along 
with reliefs sought for in a suit or legal proceeding before a civil 
or criminal court. Sub-section (3) lays down that the aggrieved 
person shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the reliefs 
obtained by her in any proceeding other than proceedings under 
the Act. [Notes on Clauses] 
27. Jurisdiction.—(1) The court of Judicial Magistrate of the first 
class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within 
the local limits of which— 
(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or 
carries on business or is employed; or 
(b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is 
employed; or 
(c) the cause of action has arisen, 
shall be the competent court to grant a protection order and 
other orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act. 
(2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable 
throughout India. 
COMMENTS 
This section lays down that the Magistrate, within the local 
limits of whose jurisdiction the aggrieved person permanently or 
temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed or the 
respondent resides or carries on business or is employed or the 
cause of action has arisen, shall be the competent Magistrate to 
LVI 
grant protection orders and other orders and to try offences 
unde r the Act. Sub-section (2) provides tha t any order made 
unde r the proposed legislation shall be enforceable th roughout 
India. 
[Notes on Clauses] 
28. Procedure.—(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, all 
proceedings u n d e r sections 12,18,19, 20, 2 1 , 22 and 23 and 
offences unde r section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). 
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the cour t from laying 
down its own procedure for disposal of an application unde r 
section 12 or unde r subsection (2) of section 23 . 
COMMENTS 
This section provides tha t proceedings unde r the Act relating to 
application and orders for reliefs and offence of breach of 
protection order or interim protection order by the respondent 
shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973. Sub-section (2) envisages tha t the court may 
lay down its own procedure for disposal of applications for any 
relief or for ex parte order. [Notes on Clauses] 
29. Appeal.—There shall lie an appeal to the Court of Session 
within thirty days from the date on which the order made by the 
Magistrate is served on the aggrieved person or the respondent , 
as the case may be, whichever is later. 
COMMENTS 
This section provides tha t an appeal from the order made by the 
Magistrate shall lie to the Court of Session within thirty days 
from the date of service of the order on the aggrieved person or 
the respondent , whichever is later. [Notes on Clauses] 
CHAPTER V 
MISCELLANEOUS 
30. Protection Officers and members of service providers to be 
public servants.—The Protection Officers and members of service 
providers, while acting or purport ing to act in p u r s u a n c e of any 
of the provisions of this Act or any rules or orders made there 
unde r shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning 
of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). 
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COMMENTS 
This section seeks to provide that the Protection Officer and 
members of service providers shall be deemed to be public 
servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal 
Code while acting or purporting to act under any of the 
provisions of the Act or the rules or orders made thereunder. 
[Notes on Clauses] 
31. Penalty for breach of protection order by respondent.—(1) A 
breach of protection order, or of an interim protection order, by 
the respondent shall be an offence under this Act and shall be 
punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to 
twenty thousand rupees, or with both. 
(2) The offence under sub-section (1) shall as far as practicable 
be tried by the Magistrate who has passed the order, the breach 
of which has been alleged to have been caused by the accused. 
(3) While framing charges under sub-section (1), the Magistrate 
may also frame charges under section 498A of the Indian Penal 
Code (45 of 1860) or any other provision of that Code or the 
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961), as the case may be, if 
the facts disclose the commission of an offence under those 
provisions. 
COMMENTS 
This section provides that a breach of protection order or an 
interim protection order by the respondent shall be an offence 
under the Act punishable with imprisonment of either 
description which may extend to one year or with fine which may 
extend to twenty thousand rupees or with both. Sub-section (2) 
provides that the offence of breach of protection order or interim 
protection order shall be tried as far as practicable by the 
Magistrate who had passed the order which is alleged to have 
been breached. Sub-section (3) provides that the Magistrate, 
while framing charges regarding breach of order, may also frame 
charges under section 498A or any other provision of the Indian 
Penal code or the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 in case the facts 
disclose the commission of any offence under those provisions. 
[Notes on Clauses] 
32. Cognizance and proof.—(1) Notwithstanding anything 
contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 
the offence under sub-section (1) of section 31 shall be 
cognizable and non-bailable. 
(2) Upon the sole testimony of the aggrieved person, the court 
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may conclude that an offence under sub-section (1) of section 31 
has been committed by the accused. 
COMMENTS 
This section lays down that the offence of breach of protection 
order by the respondent shall be a cognizable and non-bailable 
offence and the court may conclude on the sole testimony of the 
aggrieved person that the offence has been committed. 
[Notes on Clauses] 
33. Penalty for not discharging duty by Protection Officer.—If 
any Protection Officer fails or refuses to discharge his duties as 
directed by the Magistrate in the protection order without any 
sufficient cause, he shall be punished with imprisonment of 
either description for a term which may extend to one year, or 
with fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees, or with 
both. 
COMMENTS 
This section provides that any Protection Officer who fails or 
refuses to discharge his duties as directed by the Magistrate in 
the protection order shall be punished with imprisonment of 
either description which may extend to one year or with fine 
which may extend to twenty thousand rupees or with both. 
[Notes on Clauses] 
34. Cognizance of offence committed by Protection Officer.—No 
prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the 
Protection Officer unless a complaint is filed with the previous 
sanction of the State Government or an officer authorised by it 
in this behalf. 
COMMENTS 
This section provides that no prosecution or other legal 
proceeding shall lie against the Protection Officer except on a 
complaint filed with the previous sanction of the State 
Government or an officer authorised by the State Government for 
the purpose. [Notes on Clauses] 
35. Protection of action taken in good faith.—No suit, 
prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the 
Protection Officer for any damage caused or likely to be caused 
by anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done 
under this Act or any rule or order made there under. 
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COMMENTS 
This section provides that no suit, prosecution or other legal 
proceeding shall lie against the Protection Officer for any damage 
caused or likely to be caused by anything done or intended to be 
done in good faith under the Act or any rule or order made 
thereunder. [Notes on Clauses] 
36. Act not in derogation of any other law.—The provisions of 
this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the 
provisions of any other law, for the time being in force. 
COMMENTS 
This section stipulates that the provisions of the Act shall be in 
addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other 
law. [Notes on Clauses] 
37. Power of Central Government to make rules.—(1) The Central 
Government may, by notification, make rules for carrying out the 
provisions of this Act. 
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the 
following matters, namely:— 
(a) the qualifications and experience which a Protection Officer 
shall possess under sub-section (2) of section 8; 
(b) the terms and conditions of service of the Protection Officers 
and the other officers subordinate to him, under sub-section (3) 
of section 8; 
(c) the form and manner in which a domestic incident report 
may be made under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 9; 
(d) the form and the manner in which an application for 
protection order may be made to the Magistrate under clause (c) 
of sub-section (1) of section 9; 
(e) the form in which a complaint is to be filed under clause (d) 
of sub-section (1) of section 9; 
(f) the other duties to be performed by the Protection Officer 
under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 9; 
(g) the rules regulating registration of service providers under 
sub-section (1) of section 10; 
(h) the form in which an application under sub-section (1) of 
section 12 seeking reliefs under this Act may be made and the 
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particulars which such application shall contain under sub-
section (3) of that section; 
(i) the means of serving notices under sub-section (1) of section 
13; 
(j) the form of declaration of service of notice to be made by the 
Protection Officer under sub-section (2) of section 13; 
(k) the qualifications and experience in counselling which a 
member of the service provider shall possess under sub-section 
(1) of section 14; 
(1) the form in which an affidavit may be filed by the aggrieved 
person under sub-section (2) of section 23; 
(m) any other matter which has to be, or may be, prescribed. 
(3) Every rule made under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may 
be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in 
session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised 
in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, 
before the expiry of the session immediately following the session 
or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in 
making any 
THE DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961 (28 of 1961) 
[20th May, 1961] 
An Act to prohibit the giving or taking of dowry. 
BE it enacted by Parliament in the Twelfth Year of the Republic of 
India as follows:— 1. Short title, extent and commencement.—(1) 
This Act may be called the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. ' 
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir. 
(3) It shall come into force on such date^ as the Central 
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint. 
J2 . Definition of 'dowry*.—In this Act, "dowry" means any 
property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either 
directly or indirectly— 
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; 
or 
(b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other 
person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person. 
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at or before ^[or any time after the marriage] '*[in connection with 
the marriage of the said parties, but does not include] dower or 
mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim. Personal Law 
(Shariat) applies. | 5r,»] 
Explanation 11.—The expression "valuable security" has the 
same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 
1860). 
COMMENTS 
(i) The word 'dowry' should be any property or valuable given or 
agreed to be given in connection with the marriage. The 
customary payments in connection with birth of child or other 
ceremonies are not involved within ambit of dowry; Satbir Singh 
V. Stats of Punjab, AIR 2001 SC 2828. 
(ii) "Dowry" in the sense of the expression contemplated by 
Dowry Prohibition Act is a demand for property of valuable 
security having an inextricable nexus with the marriage, i.e., it is 
a consideration from the side of the bride's parents or relatives to 
the groom or his parents and/or guardian for the agreement to 
wed the bride-to-be. But where the demand for property or 
valuable security has no connection with the consideration for 
the marriage, it will not amount to a demand for dowry; Arjun 
DhondibaKamblev. State of Maharashtra, 1995 AlHC 273. 
(iii) Any property given by parents of the bride need not be in 
consideration of the marriage, it can even be in connection with 
the marriage and would constitute dowry; Rajeev v. Ram Kishan 
Jaiswal, 1994 Cri LJ NOC 255 (All). 
(iv) The definition of dowry is wide enough to include all sorts of 
properties, valuable securities, etc., given or agreed to be given 
directly or indirectly; Vemuri Venkateswara Rao v. State of 
Andhra Pradesh, 1992 Cri LJ 563 AP HC 
(v) There had been no agreement between either parties to give 
any property or valuable security to the other party at or before 
or after the marriage. The demand of T.V., refrigerator, gas 
connection, cash of Rs. 50,000 and 15 tolas of gold are not 
demand of dowry but demand of valuable security in view of 
section 2; Shankar Prasad Shaivw. State, J (1992) DMC 30 Cal. 
(vi) While dowry signifies presents given in connection with 
marriage to the bridal couple as well as others, Stridhan is 
confined to property given to or meant for the bride; Hakam 
Singh V. State of Punjab, (1990) 1 DMC 343. 
(vii) Dowry, means, any property given or agreed to be given by 
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the parents of a party to the marriage at the time of the marriage 
or before marriage or at any time after the marriage in 
connection with the marriage. So, where the husband had 
demanded a sum of Rs. 50,000 some days after the marriage 
from his father-in-law and on not being given became angry, 
tortured the wife and threatened to go for another marriage, it 
was held that the amount was being demanded in connection 
with the marriage and it was a demand for dowry though it was 
demanded after the marriage; Y.K. Bonsai v. Anju, All LJ 914. 
(viii) The furnishing of a list of ornaments and other household 
articles such as refrigerator, furniture, electrical appliances, etc., 
at the time of the settlement of the marriage amounts to demand 
of dowry within the meaning of section 2 of the Dowry 
Prohibition Act, 1961; Madhu Sudan Malhotra v. K.C. Bhandari, 
1988 BLJR 360 (SC). 
(ix) A sum of money paid by a Mohemmadan in connection with 
his daughter's marriage to prospective bridegroom for the 
purchase of a piece of land in the joint name of his daughter and 
would-be son-in-law is not 'dowry' within the meaning of the Act; 
Kunju Moideen v. Syed Mohamed, AIR 1986 Ker 48. 
(x) Where the demand was made after the marriage for the 
purchase of a car, it was held that it did not fall within the 
definition; Nirdosh Kumar v. Padma Rani, 1984 (2) Rec Cr R 239. 
(xi) Where the demand was made at the time when marriage 
ceremony was in progress and was repeated after the marriage, 
it was held that it fell within the definition of dowry; L.V". 
Jadhavv. ShankarRao, (1983) 2 Crimes 470. 
(xii) Definition of 'dowry' is not restricted to agreement or 
demand for payment of dowry before and at the marriage but 
also includes demands made subsequent to marriage; State of 
Andhra Pradeshv. Raj GopalAsawa, AIR 2004 SCW 1566. 
(xiii) Demand of dowry in respect of invalid marriage would not 
be legally recognisable; Reena Aggarwal v. Anupam, AIR 
2004J5C 1418. 
3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.—[(1)] If any person, after 
the commencement of flu's Act, gives or takes or abets the giving 
or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable [with imprisonment 
for a term which shall not be less than [five years, and with fine 
which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the 
amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more]: 
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to 
be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment 
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for a term of less than [five years]. [(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) 
shall apply to, or in relation to,— 
(a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the 
bride (without any demand having been made in that behalf): 
Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in 
accordance with the rules made under this Act; 
(b) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the 
bridegroom (without any demand having been made in that 
behalf): Provided that such presents are entered in a list 
maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act: 
Provided further that where such presents are made by or on 
behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such 
presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is not 
excessive having regard to the fmancial status of the person by 
whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given.] 
COMMENTS 
(i) Section 3 does not contravene articles 14, 19, 21 and 22 of the 
Constitution and therefore this section is not ultra vires of the 
said articles; Mdrau;ati V. Union of India, 1 (1991) DMC 117.(All). 
(ii) The offence is founded in the relationship of the property 
demanded as abettor with the nature of demand. It should not 
bear a mere connection with marriage; Madan Lai v. 
Amamath.( 1984) 2: Rec Cr 581. 
(iii) Abetment is a preparatory act and connotes active complicity 
on the part of the abettor at a point of time prior to the actual 
commission of the offence; Muthummal v. Maruthal, 1981 Cr LJ 
833 (Mad). 
[4). Penalty for demanding dowry.—If any person demands, 
directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or 
guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any 
dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term 
which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend 
to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand 
rupees: 
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to 
be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of 
imprisonment for a term of less than six months. 
COMMENTS 
(i) The mere demand of dowry before marriage is an offence; 
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Pandurang Shivram Kawathkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2001 Cr 
LJ 2792 (SC). 
(ii) The offence of demanding dowry stood committed even before 
the marriage was performed and also when the demand was 
repeated again and again after the performance of marriage in 
respect of the same items of dowry; Harbans Singh v. Smt. 
Gurcharan Kaur alias Sharan Kaur, 1993 Rec Cr R 404 (Del). 
(iii) The deceased had before being set on fire by her in-laws 
written a letter to her father that she was being ill-treated, 
harassed and threatened of dire consequences for non-
satisfaction of demand of dowry. Thereby proving that an offence 
of demanding dowry under section 4 had been committed; 
Bhoora Singhw. State of UttarPradesh, 1993 Cri LJ 2636 All. 
(iv) There had been no agreement between either parties to the 
marriage nor their relations to give any property or valuable 
security to the other party at or before or after the marriage. 
Held that the demand of TV, refrigerator, gas connection, cash of 
Rs. 50,000 and 15 tolas of gold will not amount to demand of 
dowry but demand of valuable security and the said offence does 
not attract section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act; Shankar 
Prasad Shaw v. State, I (1992) DMC 30 Cal. 
(v) Furnishing of a list of ornaments and other household articles 
at the time of settlement of marriage amounts to demand of 
dowry and accused are liable to be convicted under section 4; 
RakshaDeviv. Arum Devi, I (1991) DMC 46 (PSsH). 
(vi) Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act is not ultra vires nor does 
it contravene articles 14,19, 21, 22 of the Constitution; 
Indrawativ. Union of India, 1 (1991) DMC 117 All. 
[4A. Ban on advertisement.—If any person,— 
(a) offers, through any advertisement in any newspaper, 
periodical, journal or through any other media, any share in his 
property or of any money or both as a share in any business or 
other interest as consideration for the marriage of his son or 
daughter or any other relative; 
(b) prints or publishes or circulates any advertisement 
referred to in clause (a), 
he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall 
not be less than six months, but which may extend to five years, 
or with fine which may extend to fifteen thousand rupees: 
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to 
be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment 
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for a term of less than six months.] 
5. Agreement for giving or taking dowry to be void.—Any 
agreement for the giving or taking of dowry shall be void. 
6. Dowry to be for the benefit of the wife or her heirs.—(1) Where 
any dowry is received by any person other than the woman in 
connection with whose marriage it is given, that person shall 
transfer it to the woman— 
(a) if the dowry was received before marriage, within 2[three 
months] after the date of marriage; or 
(b) if the dowry was received at the time of or after the marriage, 
within [three months] after the date of its receipt; or 
(c) if the dowry was received when the woman was a minor, 
within [three months] after she has attained the age of eighteen 
years, and pending such transfer, shall hold it in trust for the 
benefit of the woman. 
[(2) If any person fails to transfer any property as required by 
sub-section (1) within the time limit specified therefore, [or as 
required by sub-section (3),] he shall be punishable with 
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six 
months, but which may extend to two years or with fine [which 
shall not be less than five thousand rupees, but which may 
extend to ten thousand rupees] or with both.] 
(3) Where the woman entitled to any property under sub-section 
(1) dies before receiving it, the heirs of the woman shall be 
entitled to claim it from the person holding it for the time being: 
[Provided that where such woman dies within seven years of her 
marriage, otherwise than due to natural causes, such property 
shall,— 
(a) if she has no children, be transferred to her parents; or 
(b) if she has children, be transferred to such children and 
pending such transfer, be held in trust for such children.] 
[(3A) Where a person convicted under sub-section (2) for failure 
to transfer any property as required by sub-section (1) [or sub-
section (3)] has not, before his conviction under that sub-section, 
transferred such property to the woman entitled thereto or, as 
the case may be, [her heirs, parents or children] the Court shall, 
in addition to awarding punishment under that sub-section, 
direct, by order in writing, that such person shall transfer the 
property to such woman or, as the case may be, [her heirs, 
parents or children] within such period as may be specified in 
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the order, and if such person fails to comply with the direction 
within the period so specified, an amount equal to the value of 
the property may be recovered from him as if it were a fine 
imposed by such Court and paid to such woman or, as the case 
may be, [her heirs, parents or children]. 
(4) Nothing contained in this section shall affect the provisions of 
section 3 or section 4. 
COMMENTS 
(i) Since the woman had died issueless, the articles constituting 
dowry are to be returned to her parents and not to her husband; 
Rajeevv. Ram Kishan Jaiswal, 1994 Cri LJ NOC 255 (All). 
(ii) The wife had died within less than three months of her 
marriage, therefore not leaving behind any issue and the 
contention of the husband that he was the heir of the dowry 
articles was negatived and dowry articles were transferred to the 
parents of the wife; Prithichand v. Des Raj Bansal, II (1990) DMC 
368 P85H; see also Manas Kumar Dutt v. Alok Dutta, II (1990) 
DMC 115 (Ori). 
(iii) Dowry items are required to be transferred to the parents 
and not to husband of the deceased; Pradeep Kum.ar v. State of 
Punjab, 1990 (1) CC Cases 594. , 
[7. Cognizance of offences.—(1) Notwithstanding anything 
contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),— 
(a) no Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a 
Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under 
this Act; 
(b) no Court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act 
except upon—. (i) its own knowledge or a police report of the 
facts which constitute such offence, or 
(ii) a complaint by the person aggrieved by the offence or a 
parent or other relative of such person, or by any recognized 
welfare institution or organisation; 
(c) it shall be lawful for a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial 
Magistrate of the first class to pass any sentence authorised by 
this Act on any person convicted of an offence under this Act. 
Explanation.—^For the purposes of this sub-section, "recognized 
welfare institution or organisation" means a social welfare 
institution or organisation recognized in this behalf by the 
Central or State Government. 
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(2) Nothing in Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1973 (2 of 1974) shall apply to any offence punishable under 
this Act] 
[(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time 
being in force a statement made by the person aggrieved by the 
offence shall not subject such person to a prosecution under this 
Act.] 
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